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ABSTRACT
Research on the Indian party system has been dominated by descriptive approaches, 
wherein case studies of a specific party, election or geographic region have been 
analysed. Cross-country studies that include the Indian data tend to focus only on the 
national level, paying little attention to the party systems at the sub-national level. 
My thesis compiles a comprehensive database covering the period 1951 to 2004, and 
undertakes an empirical investigation into the determinants of the size of Indian party 
system at the sub-national level. The main focus of my thesis is the state level, but I 
also undertake analysis at the district level to evaluate Duverger’s Law, and the 
effects of District Magnitude and Electoral reservation on the size of the Indian party 
system.
I investigate the effects of institutional, sociological and contextual variables on the 
size of the party systems in the Indian states. I find that Assembly Size and Effective 
Threshold are important institutional variables affecting the size of party system 
States with larger Assembly Size tend to have higher number of parties, while higher 
Effective Thresholds are associated with lower number of parties. Further, higher 
social and religious heterogeneity increases the number of parties in the Indian states. 
Federal centralisation and dependence of the states’ on the national government 
emerge as important contextual variables affecting the size of the Indian party 
system I find that these two factors reduce the number of parties at the state level. 
My unified regression analysis shows the importance of institutional, sociological 
and contextual factors in determining the size of the party systems in the Indian 
states.
Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings on the electoral and political 
system and democracy in India, and identify some important areas of future research.
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am most grateful to Professor Keith Dowding, my research supervisor for his 
regular guidance, encouragement and support during my MRes/PhD.
I also thank my family for their full support without which I would not have been 
able to devote the required effort and time for my research.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF IM PORTANT ABBREVIATIO NS...........................................................................................8
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES............................................................................................................ 9
1 INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND M E T H O D S..................................................................12
1.1 DO PARTY SYSTEMS MATTER?.........................................................................................13
1.2 W h y  is the In d ia n  c a se  im po r t a n t?....................................................................... 15
1.3 In d ia n  p a r t y  sy ste m  o r  p a r t y  system s  in  the  In d ia n  st a t e s? ...............18
1.4 O verview  of the In d ia n  political  s y s t e m .........................................................21
1.4.1 Indian democracy..................................................................................................... 23
1.4.2 Parliamentary form ofgovernment...................................................................26
1.4.3 Single Member Plurality System (SMPS)....................................................... 27
1.4.4 Federal system with a written constitution....................................................29
1.4.5 Electoral reservation for weaker sections o f the society..........................30
1.4.6 Role o f the Judiciary and Election Commission..........................................30
1.5 Ba c k g r o u n d  to  the In d ia n  Pa r t y  s y s t e m .........................................................31
1.5.1 Parties andparty-symbols.....................................................................................32
1.5.2 The evolution o f the national party system..................................................... 32
1.5.3 Party systems in the Indian states......................................................................36
1.6 Resea r c h  q u estio ns  a n d  h y po t h e se s ...................................................................40
1.1 D a t a  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g y ..............................................................................................42
1.7.1 Variables...................................................................................................................... 42
1.7.2 Methodology............................................................................................................... 42
1.8 C o n c lu sio n s  a n d  su m m a r y  of rem aining  chapters.................................... 46
2 W HAT DETERMINES PARTY SY STEM S?.................................................................... 54
2.1 Em ergence  of a n d  n ee d  for  p a r t ie s ......................................................................54
2 .2  C h aracterisatio n  o f  party  s y s t e m s ................................................................... 55
2.3 M ethods  of m easuring  th e  n u m b e r  of  parties in  a  p o l it y ..................... 57
2.3.1 Measures based on simple counting o f the number ofparties...............58
2.3.2 Measures based on index offractionalisation...............................................59
2.3.3 Measures computing effective number o f parties........................................ 60
2.3.4 Measuring the number o f electoral and legislative parties..................... 66
2.3.5 Computing the Effective number o f parties with incomplete data 61
2 .4  Ex pla n a t io n s  of the size of the pa r t y  s y s t e m s ............................................ 69
2 .4.1 Institutional explanation o f the size ofparty system.................................. 71
2.4.2 Sociological explanations o f the party systems.............................................83
2 .4.3 Strategic interaction................................................................................................ 88
2 .4.4 Other factors .............................................................................................................. 93
2.5 C o n c l u sio n s ....................................................................................................................... 94
3 EXISTING  RESEARCH ON INDIAN PARTY SY ST E M ............................................ 96
3.1 The current  In d ia n  political s c e n e .................................................................... 96
3.2 Ex pla n a t io n  of IN C ’s d o m ina n c e  b e tw een  1952 a n d  1 9 6 7 ................... 101
3.3 In d ia  ’s  exceptionalism  to  D u v e r g e r ’s La w ..................................................105
3.4  Ex pl a n a t io n s  ba se d  o n  social  c l e a v a g e s  a n d  issu e  d im e n sio n s  ... 111
3.5 Pa r ty  A ggregation  a t  the  n a t io n a l  lev el ................................................... 114
3.6  Empirical  s t u d ie s ..........................................................................................................117
3.7  C o n c l u sio n s .....................................................................................................................119
5
4 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS...............................................................................................121
4.1 In stitu tio n al  v a r ia b l e s  a n d  the In d ia n  party  sy st e m ........................... 122
4 .2  Th e  size of  the In d ia n  p a r t y  sy ste m  a n d  D uv er g er’s La w .................. 124
4.2.1 Theoretical and empirical issues....................................................................... 125
4.2.2 Does India confirm to Duverger’s Law?....................................................... 128
4.2.3 Unit o f empirical analysis....................................................................................148
4.3  D epend ent  v a r ia b l e s .................................................................................................. 152
4.3.1 Effective number o f electoral and legislative parties (ENP, ELP).. 152
4.3.2 Number o f con testing parties (NCP)............................................................... 153
4.3.3 Degree o f support for the wining party.......................................................... 153
4.3.4 Degree o f disproportionality.............................................................................. 153
4.3.5 Trends of the dependent variables....................................................................156
4 .4  In d e pe n d e n t  v a r ia b l e s ...............................................................................................165
4.4.1 District Magnitude................................................................................................165
4.4.2 Electoral Threshold................................................................................................ 167
4.4.3 Assembly size.............................................................................................................171
4.4.4 Reservation of districts for SC and ST ........................................................... 172
4.4.5 Geographical size and population....................................................................174
4.4.6 Electoral reforms..................................................................................................... 175
4.4.7  Malapportionment...................................................................................................176
4.4.8 Trends o f the independent variables..............................  177
4.4.9 Methodology for the empirical analysis.........................................................182
4.5  C o r r elatio n s  a n d  c r o ss- t a b u l a t io n ................................................................ 184
4 .6  Reg r e ssio n  An a l y s is ....................................................................................................189
4 .7  C o n c l u sio n s ..................................................................................................................... 195
5 RELIG IO U S AND SOCIAL HETREOGENEITY.........................................................197
5.1 In t r o d u c t io n .................................................................................................................... 197
5.2 S ocial  c leav a g es  a n d  the  In d ia n  pa r ty  s y s t e m ......................................... 200
5.3 SC AND ST POPULATION IN THE INDIAN STATES................................................... 203
5.4  M e a s u r in g  social heterogeneity  in  the In d ia n  s t a t e s ..........................207
5.4.1 Measuring religious fragmentation in the Indian states.........................209
5.4.2 Caste-based fragmentation................................................................................. 213
5.4.3 Effective number o f social groups.................................................................... 217
5.5 D a t a  o n  social a n d  religious g r o u p s ...............................................................218
5 .6  Reg r e ssio n  An a l y s is ................................................................................................... 220
5.7 C o n c l u sio n s ..................................................................................................................... 225
6 PARTY AGGREGATION A N D  CONTEXTUAL FACTORS.................................. 227
6.1 THE PARTY AGGREGATION PHENOMENON.............................................................. 228
6.1.1 The Projection argument...................................................................................... 229
6.1.2 Electoral coordination argument......................................................................232
6.1.3 Federal distribution o f powers argument...................................................... 234
6.2  F ederal  D istribution  of pow ers a n d  pa r ty  a g g r eg a tio n  in  In d ia  236
6.3 Pa r t y  aggreg ation  in  In d ia  -  a n  ex t e n d e d  a n a l y s is ............................... 241
6.3.1 Party aggregation in Indian states — an empirical analysis................. 250
6.3.2 Dependence and party aggregation — an empirical analysis................ 258
6.4  O ther  C o n tex tu al  f a c t o r s .....................................................................................264
6.4.1 Politicisation o f cleavages and success o f ethnic parties.......................264
6.4.2 Expectation o f coalition government at the national level..................... 266
6
6.4.3 Literacy levels...................................................................................266
6.4.4 Urbanisation...................................................................................... 268
6.5 C o n c l u s io n s ..................................................................................................................... 270
7 SYNTHESIS: UNIFIED MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEM S.............................. 272
7.1 To w a r d s  a  u n ified  m o d e l  of p a r t y  sy ste m s  in  In d ia n  s t a t e s ............ 272
7.1.1 Size o f party systems, and sociological and institutional variables. 275
7.2 U n ified  m o d el  of the  size  of p a r t y  system s  in  In d ia n  s t a t e s ............ 277
7.3 C o n c l u d in g  r em ar k s  a n d  a r e a s  fo r  fu tu r e  r e se a r c h ...........................285
APPENDIX A - EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES FOR INCOMPLETE DATA.... 289
APPENDIX B - ELECTORAL REFORMS INDEX........................................................ 290
APPENDIX C -  SNAPSHOT OF DATA POINTS AT STATE LEVEL........................... 291
APPENDIX D - EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF SOCIAL GROUPS.................................. 292
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................ 293
7
LIST OF IMPORTANT ABBREVIATIONS
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
NCP Number of Contesting parties
EC Election Commission of India
ENP Effective number of electoral (vote-getting) parties
ELP Effective number of legislative (seat-getting) parties
FEM Fixed Effects Model
FPTP First Past The Post
INC Indian National Congress
JMM Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
LC Least Component Index
LSDV Least Squares Dummy Variable
NDA National Democratic Alliance
PCSE Panel corrected standard errors
PR Proportional representation
REM Random Effects Model
SC Scheduled Castes
SMPS Single member plurality system
ST Scheduled Tribes
TSCS Time series cross sectional
UPA United Progressive Alliance
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
Figure 1-1 Effective Electoral parties in India at the state level................................ 16
Figure 1-2 Number of Contesting & Winning parties at national level in India 34
Figure 1-3 Effective number of electoral and legislative parties in India at the
national level..................................................................................................... 35
Figure 1-4 Effective Electoral & Legislative parties in Indian states 1951 -  2004... 38
Figure 1-5 Effective Electoral and Legislative parties at state level by election 39
Figure 2-1 Effect of electoral institutions, social cleavages on number of parties ... 89
Figure 3-1 Effective number of parties at the national and district level................. 115
Figure 4-1 Histogram of ENP at state level in the Indian regions 1951 -2004........ 132
Figure 4-2 Histogram of ENP at district level 1951 - 2004.....................................133
Figure 4-3 Histogram of Effective number of parties by election........................... 135
Figure 4-4 Histogram of ENP in the Indian regions at district level 1951 -  2004... 140
Figure 4-5 ENP in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar at district level............... 141
Figure 4-6 Naga>uma diagram for Indian elections at the district level.................. 144
Figure 4-7 Vote share of state parties.......................................................................151
Figure 4-8 Average ENP at state level over time.................................................... 156
Figure 4-9 Average ENP at the state level by region 1951 -2004............................ 157
Figure 4-10 Average ENP in the Indian states 1951 -2004.................................... 158
Figure 4-11 Histogram of ENP 1951 -2004............................................................. 158
Figure 4-12 Average ELP at state level over time................................................... 159
Figure 4-13 Average ELP in Indian regions 1951 -2004......................................... 159
Figure 4-14 Average ELP in the Indian states 1951 -2004......................................160
Figure 4-15 Average NCP at state level over time................................................... 161
Figure 4-16 Average NCP in Indian regions 1951 -2004........................................161
Figure 4-17 Average NCP in the Indian states 1951 -2004.................................... 162
Figure 4-18 Average Disproportionality at state level over time............................. 163
Figure 4-19 Average Disproportionality in the Indian states 1951 -2004................ 163
Figure 4-20 Average Disproportionately in the Indian regions 1951 -2004.............164
Figure 4-21 Frequency histogram of Disproportionality 1951 -2004..................... 164
Figure 4-22 Effective Threshold in Indian districts in 2004 elections.................... 170
Figure 4-23 Effective Threshold in (all) Indian states over time............................. 177
Figure 4-24 Average Effective Threshold in Indian states......................................178
Figure 4-25 Average Effective Threshold by region............................................... 178
Figure 4-26 Assembly Size in the Indian states....................................................... 179
Figure 4-27 Average number of electors in the Indian states..................................180
Figure 4-28 Average number of Electors in the Indian states 1951 -2004 ............. 181
Figure 4-29 Voting population in some large Indian states..................................... 181
Figure 5-1 Scatter chart of Effective number of parties and religious groups in Indian
states................................................................................................................ 211
Figure 5-2 Proportion of Muslim population in Indian states..................................212
Figure 5-3 Proportion of Muslim population by region...........................................213
Figure 5-4 Proportion of SC population in Indian states (2001 census)..................214
Figure 5-5 Proportion of SC population percentage by region (2001 census).........215
Figure 5-6 Proportion of ST population in Indian states (2001 census)..................216
Figure 5-7 Proportion of ST population by regioa..................................................216
Figure 5-8 Proportion of ST population in North Eastern states (2001 census) 217
9
Figure 5-9 Scatter chart of Effective religious and social groups............................218
Figure 5-10 Scatter chart of effective number of social groups and electoral parties
 218
Figure 5-11 Effective Number of religious and social groups in the Indian states ..219
Figure 6-1 Summary of periods in India’s post-independence history....................238
Figure 6-2 ENP at national, state and district level by election year...................239
Figure 6-3 Voting patterns and party aggregation...................................................243
Figure 6-4 Effect of federal centralisation and states’ dependence on party
aggregation...................................................................................................... 245
Figure 6-5 Party Aggregation trends at state level in India......................................248
Figure 6-6 Size of party system in the Indian states 1962 - 1977...........................251
Figure 6-7 Party aggregation in the Indian states 1962 -  1977................................253
Figure 6-8 Size of party system in the Indian states 1991 - 2004...........................255
Figure 6-9 Party aggregation in the Indian states 1991 -  2004................................257
Figure 6-10 ENP in Highly dependent states..........................................................260
Figure 6-11 Party aggregation in Highly dependent states......................................261
Figure 6-12 ENP in other (not Highly dependent) states........................................262
Figure 6-13 Party Aggregation on other (not Highly dependent) states..................263
Figure 6-14 Urban population percentage at state level by election years...............269
Figure 6-15 Urban population percentage by state.................................................269
Tables
Table 1-1 Key statistics from Indian parliamentary elections 1951 -2004 ...............22
Table 1-2 Number of electoral districts in the Indian states......................................29
Table 2-1 Illustration of alternative measures of Effective number of parties...........62
Table 3-1 Seats won by, share of votes of national parties 1998 - 2004....................99
Table 4-1 SF ratio illustration..................................................................................127
Table 4-2 Effective electoral parties in India by election........................................129
Table 4-3 Frequency distribution of Effective number of parties at the State level 130
Table 4-4 Effective number of parties at state level by region by year................... 131
Table 4-5 Distribution of Effective Number of Parties at district level by election 137 
Table 4-6 Distribution of Effective number of parties at district level by region 1951
-2004)..............................................................................................................139
Table 4-7 Inter-election trends at the district level..................................................146
Table 4-8 Effective number of parties -  Trends at the individual district level 147
Table 4-9 Components of variance in Effective number of parties at district level. 150
Table 4-10 Average ENP in the Indian districts by District Magnitude.................. 166
Table 4-11 Regression of ENP and District Magnitude in Indian districts.............. 167
Table 4-12 Effect of Electoral reservation in the Indian districts 1951 -  2004....... 172
Table 4-13 Index of Electoral Reforms....................................................................182
Table 4-14 Description of variables for regression analysis....................................183
Table 4-15 Expected direction of relationship between variables........................... 184
Table 4-16 Correlation between dimensions of party system.................................. 184
Table 4-17 Correlation between party system, winning party share and
Disproportionality............................................................................................185
Table 4-18 Average dimensions Indian party systems at state level by region 186
Table 4-19 Cross-tabulation of Effective Threshold and Party system................... 187
Table 4-20 Relationship between Party system and Assembly size........................ 188
10
Table 4-21 Regression of Party System, Assembly Size, Effective Threshold,
Reforms............................................................................................................ 190
Table 4-22 Regression of Party System, Electors, Effective threshold, Reforms.... 190 
Table 4-23 Regression of Party System, Assembly Size, Effective Threshold,
Reforms............................................................................................................ 194
Table 4-24 Regression of Party System, Electors, Effective Threshold, Reforms . 194
Table 5-1 Indian population percentage by religion................................................ 197
Table 5-2 Population percentage in terms of languages spoken.............................. 198
Table 5-3 Effective number of religious groups by region.....................................219
Table 5-4 Effective number of social groups by region...........................................219
Table 5-5 Correlation between social cleavages and party system variables..........220
Table 5-6 Regression of Party System, SC, ST and Muslim Population.................222
Table 5-7 Regression of Party System, Effective religious groups..........................222
Table 5-8 Regression of Party System, Effective social groups..............................223
Table 6-1 Correlation between Literacy rates and number of parties......................267
Table 6-2 Correlation between urbanisation and number of parties........................270
Table 7-1 Regression analysis using Institutional and Sociological factors............276
Table 7-2 Variables for the Unified model..............................................................278
Table 7-3 Unified model regression results.............................................................281
11
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND METHODS
1 INTRODUCTION, GOALS AND METHODS
Study of party systems is one of the most important and well-researched areas of 
political science. The size of the party system (number of political parties), variance 
in parties’ policy positions, nature of electoral competition, and the fragmentation of 
the party system are all important determinants of whether voters get meaningful 
choice at the time of elections.1 This choice in turn, is important to sustain 
democratic functioning of the political system. How are the party systems shaped and 
what determines the number of parties in the political system? In this thesis, I 
answer these questions in the context of the Indian party system. Specifically, I 
investigate the effects of institutional, sociological and contextual factors on the size 
of party systems in the Indian states.2 By doing so, my research contributes towards 
furthering our understanding of the determinants of party systems in general.
Previous research on the Indian party system concentrates either on the national 
level, or on few states often focussing only on specific political parties. My research 
differs from the existing research by focusing on the state level, taking an empirical 
approach, and adopting a comparative methodobgy within a single country case 
study. Although my focus is to understand the determinants of the size of Indian 
party system at the state level, I also study trends in the party system at the district, 
state and the national level to examine phenomenon such as ‘Duverger’s Law’ 
(Duverger, 1954) and Tarty Aggregation’ (Chhibber and Kollman, 1998; 2004). My
’Literature provides different formulae for calculating the number of parties. These formulae, their 
merits and limitations are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
2According to Cox (1999), the difference between the effective number of parties at the national party 
level and the effective number o f parties in the local party system can be used as an inverse measure 
o f linkage between the two levels. A clearer idea o f what explains the variation in the size of the 
effective parties at the local (for example state) level is thus necessary first step for a complete 
understanding o f  the national party system.
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research contributes to the current scholarship on the Indian party systems in many 
ways. I identify and measure important institutional, sociological and contextual 
factors affecting Indian party system. I compile a comprehensive data set of these 
variables covering the period 1951 -  2004, and undertake detailed empirical analysis 
of the data compiled using alternative methods and models. My research constitutes 
a systematic attempt to study the Indian party system across the Indian states using 
empirical data, and enables a clearer understanding of the factors affecting the party 
systems especially at the state level.
In the next section, I discuss why study of party systems constitutes an important 
area ofboth academic research and practical importance.
1.1 Do party systems matter?
Parties are the key building blocks of the political system, and provide for a co­
ordinating mechanism between voters, candidates, legislators, ministers and other 
key actors in a political system. The party system consists of competitive interaction 
patterns among parties (Eckstein, 1968), or as Duverger (1954) puts it, the forms and 
modes of their (parties’) co-existence. The party system can produce legislative 
majorities, leading to one party or a block of parties dominating the political scene, 
or alternatively leading to coalitions. Studying the factors that explain the nature and 
size of party system can help decipher the configuration and evolution of party 
system over time. Party systems vary across countries, and sometimes, within 
countries, and the theories to explain them often need to be combined or
3This period covers all the general elections held in India since its independence. The first elections 
were held in 1951 and the latest ones in 2004.
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reformulated. Parties help in sustaining democratic politics, and they prepare 
candidates to contest and win elections under the party name. Parties organise their 
members around their policies, work to gain support for these policies from the 
voters. They also exert pressure on governments to secure their policy objectives. 
Different political parties engage continuously in electoral competition, and together 
constitute a party system.
Some scholars have argued that basic features of a government, such as whether it is 
parliamentary or presidential have a higher degree of influence on political and 
economic outcomes, and that the effects of party systems are relatively unimportant 
(see Powell, 2000 for a summary of this argument). This argument is based on the 
view that party systems are shaped primarily by electoral systems and other 
institutional variables, and therefore, variations in party systems do not have real and 
direct political consequences. A counter view, with which I agree, argues that the 
size and the nature of party systems have independent and real political, social and 
economic consequences (for example, Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Alesina et aL, 
1999; Persson and Tabellini, 1999). Party systems can affect government formation 
and durability (King et al., 1990), political violence (Powell, 1982), macroeconomic 
outcomes (Roubini and Sachs, 1989), and party system extremism (Cox, 1990). 
Chhibber and Kollman (2004) point out parties’ role as solutions to collective 
dilemmas.
Understanding the determinants of the number of parties is an area of research in 
which there has been a steady and substantial accumulation of empirical and 
theoretical knowledge (Riker, 1982). The size and the competitiveness of the party
14
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systems are important determinants of voters getting meaningful electoral choices, 
and a country getting a stable government. In the Indian context, one has seen that 
fragmented legislatures and coalition governments have found it more difficult to 
pass laws, frame and implement government policies. Party systems determine the 
degree of bargaining complexity that may affect government formation and 
maintenance (Warwick, 1994; Van Roozendaal, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Muller and 
Strom, 2000; De Winter and Dumont, 2001). Chhibber and Noorudin (2004) find 
that Indian states with two-party competition provide more public goods than ones 
with multiparty competition. This happens because in two-party systems parties draw 
support from many social groups and therefore need to provide more public goods to 
win elections. In multiparty systems on the other hand, parties need only a plurality 
to win an election, and therefore are more likely to use private goods rather than 
public goods to mobilise electoral support.
My view is that party systems matter, and research into the determinants of the size 
of party system can provide insights into the nature of party competition, and the 
likely political and economic outcomes arising from it. In the next section, I discuss 
the importance of the Indian case in furthering our understanding of the factors 
affecting the size of party system.
1.2 Why is the Indian case important?
Understanding the Indian case is important because the political system here 
functions within a heterogeneous population consisting of many religious and social 
groups. Indian democracy has been an important area of research, and existing
15
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scholarship either considers India as a deviant case, or cannot fully explain the 
sustenance o f  Indian democracy despite odds such as poverty and illiteracy. India is 
also an important emerging economy, with a strong party system, and a record o f  
regular elections. Research into the determinants o f  the size o f  Indian party system  
can help to further our insights into the nature o f  electoral competition, and extend 
our knowledge in this area o f  research.
Furthermore, with multiple social cleavages, Single member plurality system  
(SMPS), significant intra-country differences, and an evolving party system, India is 
an interesting case to study the determinants o f  the size o f  the party system. Figure 1- 
1 depicts a box chart showing the range o f  the effective number o f  electoral parties 
(by votes) as measured by the method proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) in 
the Indian states for elections between 1951 and 2004.4
Figure 1-1 Effective Electoral parties in India at the state level
1951 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004
Source: Author’s calculations using Election Commission of India data
4The formula given by Laakso and Taagepera weighs the number o f parties winning votes, by their 
respective votes. It is discussed in detail, in Chapter 2.
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In Figure 1-1, each box represents the effective number of electoral parties in a 
particular year at the state level, and also shows the range of inter-state variation in 
that particular year.5 The boxes are drawn so that their lower and the upper bounds 
represent 25th and 75th percentile values of the distribution within a particular year. 
Similarly, the upper and the lower bounds of the two whiskers represent almost the 
whole distribution, while the points outside the whiskers show the outliers. The line 
drawn inside each box shows the median number of effective electoral parties in a 
particular election. As can be seen, the size of Indian party system varies across 
states, and also over time, thus providing an interesting area of research.
Most of the comparative studies on the determinants of the size of the party systems 
are based on western democracies. The studies that include India do so as a single 
data point at the national level in a cross-country analysis. This approach, while 
useful from a cross-country perspective, does not fully highlight the dynamics of the 
party system within a county such as India. Since Indian states vary in terms of social 
and religious cleavages, institutional effects, the determinants of the party system are 
better studied and understood at the sub-national level. Existing research on the 
Indian party system at the state and district level has largely been descriptive, and 
relatively less attention has been paid towards empirically validating existing 
theories, and developing new ones.6 Furthermore, the existing scholarship focuses 
on subjects such as the party system in one or few states (Wallace and Roy, 2003), 
the rise or fall of a particular party (Pai, 1997; Chandra, 2000; Kothari, 1964), 
election results (Butler et al, 1995; Aggarwal and Chowdhry, 1996), fragmentation
5General elections are held once in five years. After 1971, the next elections were held only in 1977 
because o f Emergency rule invoked in 1975.
6An Indian electoral district is called a constituency. Through out this thesis, I use the commonly used 
term ‘district’ to represent a constituency.
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of the party system (Sridharan, 2002), the effect of electoral reservation for backward 
classes (MacMillan, 2003). Chhibber and Kollman’s (1998, 2004) contribution is on 
the party aggregation at the Indian national party system, while Chhibber and 
Petrocik (1989) examine support of social cleavages for a particular party. As 
mentioned earlier, cross-country analysis such as Amorim and Cox (1997) and 
Lijphart (1994) include India as a single data point at the national level, thus ignoring 
the inter-region and inter-state differences in Indian party system
Thus, the existing research on the Indian party systems has four main weaknesses. 
One, it focuses on specific parties or states, rather than on the general patterns seen 
in all Indian states and regions. Second, conclusions drawn are often not based on 
systematic examination of empirical data for all states and election years. Third, 
inadequate attention has been paid to the sub-national party systems in the Indian 
states and districts. Fourth, most of the comparative work on India has been of the 
cross-country type, where India is taken as a single data point, thus missing out the 
heterogeneity of party systems across the Indian states. Overall, there is limited 
empirically verified body of knowledge for the determinants of party systems in the 
Indian states and districts. In this study, I make a contribution towards the existing 
scholarship on the Indian party system especially at the state level.
1.3 Indian party system or party systems in the Indian states?
An important question is whether a single country can have more than one type of 
party system? My view is that in India, the states are so diverse that it is difficult to 
envisage the Indian party system without considering state-level party systems.
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Further, the presence of many important regional parties implies that the nature of 
party competition also varies because of a range of policy platforms, personalities 
and ideologies of these parties. It seems appropriate therefore to refer to the Indian 
party system in the plural.
According to Sartori (1976), parties make a system only when they are in parts, and a 
party system is nothing but the system o f interactions resulting from inter-party 
competition. Therefore, parties exist to compete with and respond to other parties, 
and the party system resulting from these interactions forms a part of the larger 
political system. Blondel (1978) stresses that the party system goes beyond 
individual leaders, societal and political groups, and this leads to parties relating to 
each other not only for voter mobilisation and electoral competition, but also in 
legislatures and other power situations. According to Blondel (1978: 76),
Basically, a party exists in order to win battles against 
other parties or groups. Parties which compete overtly 
necessarily come to resemble each other through this 
competition. Similarly, when a party stands alone, its 
characteristics are a function of the latent opposition 
which it might fight or repress. The nature of the 
competition thus influences the nature of the party 
system.
Thus, the different linkages between the parties result into a party system. In a 
heterogeneous society such as India, the links between parties and society are 
complex and varied, and this leads to multiplicity of party systems across the Indian 
states. According to Mehra et al. (2003), party system acquires special connotation 
in multi-cultural societies since they represent multiple groups and interests, and 
need to engage in coalition building at national, state and regional levels. This is true
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in the Indian case, where parties compete and engage at various levels, and as such 
give rise to many party systems across the Indian states and regions. This supports 
the view that the Indian party system consists of many distinct party systems 
operating in different states. Weiner (1989) argues that it is important to distinguish 
between the national and the state party system in the Indian context. This view is 
based on the argument that political activities operating at different levels in diverse 
states create political processes that lead to more than one party system within one 
country. Therefore, the research done at the national level does not reflect the 
diversity of party systems in the Indian states and districts, and this necessitates 
studying the party systems at the sub-national level.
Indian states are important political actors, and many important decisions about 
distribution of national revenues and resources are constitutionally entrusted with 
them. Indian states also mirror the national government in implementing many 
policies and schemes such as the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, negotiation 
for fiscal incentives for foreign investment, poverty alleviation programmes. Local 
governments on the other hand, possess limited financial and political powers. This 
division of powers between different levels of government has led to intense 
electoral competition at the state level. Also, the importance of state level has grown 
in Indian politics so that the national party system has become a sum of diverse state 
level party systems. From a research point of view, the number of the Indian states 
and the elections held constitute a large data set to carry out a comparative empirical 
study of the Indian party system.7
7Currently there are 28 states and 7 union territories (units directly administered by the National 
Government), and elections have regularly been held since 1951.
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The analysis at the district level on the other hand is useful to evaluate theories such 
as Duverger’s Law, and the effects of certain electoral features such as District 
Magnitude and electoral reservations for particular social groups. My research 
mainly focuses on the determinants of the size of party systems at the state level, 
while also analysing the effect of important electoral features at the district-level.
Party systems function as a part of broader political system, and as such 
understanding of the political history and environment, and the electoral system is a 
starting point to analyse party systems. In the next section, I provide an overview of 
the Indian political system which includes an analysis of Indian democracy, its 
electoral system, and a background on the Indian party system.
1.4 Overview of the Indian political system
India attained Independence on 15th August 1947 and adopted its Constitution on 26th 
January 1950. According to the Indian Constitution, India is a sovereign, secular, 
democratic republic, and it is a union of states with a parliamentary form of 
government. With over a billion people, India is often referred to as the world’s 
largest democracy, and one of the few stable ones in the developing world. The size 
of electorate is by far the world’s largest, and in the 2004 elections stood at 672 
million Elections have been conducted successfully since 1951, and except for a 
brief period of emergency rule in 1975-77, India has sustained its democracy since
o
its independence. Till date, there have been 14 parliamentary elections resulting in
8India became independent country in 1947, and the first elections were held in 1951.
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peaceful transfer of power to new governments. Table 1-1 summarises some key 
statistics about the Indian elections.
Table 1-1 Key statistics from Indian parliamentary elections 1951 -  2004
Year No. of electoral 
districts
No. of 
Candidates
Electorate
(Millions)
Voter turn 
Out (%)
No of recognised 
Parties
1951 489 1864 173.2 47.0 16
1957 494 1591 193.6 47.0 16
1962 494 1985 216.3 49.0 16
1967 520 2369 249.0 49.0 21
1971 518 2784 274.0 49.0 25
1977 542 2439 321.1 49.0 23
1980 542 4620 355.6 51.0 25
1984 542 5481 399.8 51.0 26
1989 543 6160 498.9 48.0 28
1991 543 8699 514.1 53.0 36
1996 543 13952 592.6 54.0 38
1998 543 4693 605.3 61.8 42
1999 543 4648 619.6 59.9 47
2004 543 5435 671.5 58.1 57
Source: Aggarwal and Choudhary (1998), Election Commission o f India reports.
As can be seen in Table 1-1, the number of electors and candidates has registered a 
large increase since the first election. The number of recognised parties too, has 
gone up from 16 in 1951 to 57 in 2004.9 Election turnout has also generally kept 
rising, and has in general, exceeded the levels typical in several western democracies. 
Since 1977, many incumbent governments have been repeatedly defeated in 
elections. The press has remained relatively free to challenge the government. The 
judiciary, despite periodic pressure from the executive branch, has maintained
9The recognised parties as defined by the Election Commission o f India are those which contest 
elections in more than one Indian state.
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institutional autonomy, and more recently taken an active role in ensuring that 
executive performs its role as per the constitutional provision.
1.4.1 Indian democracy
The emergence and success of Indian democracy defies many political science 
theories that stipulate preconditions for democracy. The main academic approaches 
have emphasised factors such as affluence, social homogeneity, education, and 
industrialisation as pre-requisites for democracy. However, India is not an 
industrialised, developed economy, it is anything but ethnically homogenous, and 
would probably rank low on a number of attributes of “civic culture” (Kohli, 2001). 
Dahl (1989) cites India as a leading contemporary exception to democratic theory, 
and points out that in India polyarchy was established when the population was 
largely illiterate, agricultural and highly traditional in their beliefs. Diamond et. al. 
(1995) arrive at the same conclusion in their survey of Third World democracies.
The world’s largest and the most heterogeneous democracy runs counter to Mill’s 
(1958) proposition that democracy is close to impossible in multi-ethnic societies and 
not possible in linguistically divided societies. It also confounds Harrison’s (1960) 
prediction, of India’s democratic failure and/or territorial disintegration, who thought 
that the odds were wholly against the survival of Indian democracy. Yadav (1996a) 
points out that India is perhaps the only large democracy in the world where the turn 
out of the lower orders of society is well above that of the more privileged groups.
The type of democracy that has been chosen is radical in many ways. There is no 
recognition of any ethnic, religious or caste basis of citizenship. There are no
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separate electorates, no religious qualification for holding office, nor a literacy test. 
Women are given the vote on the same terms as men. The adoption of secularism is a 
guarantee that a religious minority had nothing to fear from majority rule.
Under the leadership of Nehru, the first prime minister, institutions that ensured a 
wide sharing of power and provided a place for dissent, were created. During this 
phase, India also benefited from the presence of a well-functioning civil service and 
a popular ruling party. Between 1975 and 1977, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime 
Minister, suspended civil rights, and imposed a national emergency. However, 
democracy was restored after the 1977 elections. Although some parts of India such 
as Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab have witnessed law and order problems, it has 
not disrupted the overall democratic stability. India in the 1990s has moved away 
from a single-party rule towards coalition politics, and this has led to difficulties in 
forming stable governments, and frequent elections. In general, Indian elections have 
been recognised as impartial, free and fair. Efemocracy seems so deeply rooted in 
India that it seems difficult to imagine any other form of governance.
Thus, India represents a rare example of a developing and socially heterogeneous
country that has been able to sustain a stable democracy. Lijphart (1996) has
attempted to explain the puzzle of Indian democracy by a consociational
interpretation. According to Lijphart, India fulfils all the conditions of a
consociational society, and therefore, India is a confirming and not a deviant case of
democracy. He argues that
The consociational interpretation of India strengthens 
our understanding of the Indian case by providing a 
theoretically coherent explanation of the main patterns
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and trends in its political development. Furthermore, it 
strengthens consociational theory by removing the one 
allegedly deviant case and by showing that, instead, the 
crucial case of India is unmistakably a confirming case 
(Lijphart, 1996:266).
Lijphart’s analysis however ignores that India does not have substantial mechanisms 
to ensure power sharing, even though in practice, people from different interest 
groups have succeeded in finding some level of representation. Similarly, there is no 
formal grand coalition of major linguistic and religious groups. Thus, although there 
is power sharing, it is not of the kind suggested by Lijphart, and definitely not of the 
kind seen in consociational societies such as Switzerland and Netherlands.
To explain India’s democracy, one also needs to consider its pre- independence 
political history, including the effect of British rule, the freedom struggle, and the 
role of the Indian National Congress (INC). These factors coupled with threats to 
national security post independence, seem to have led to a political culture of 
accommodation and tolerance. Finally, the form of the government, the party system, 
the electoral rules, and the legal and the institutional framework (such as judiciary, 
the civil service and the Election Commission - EC) in which the political system 
operates have also contributed towards strengthening India’s democratic traditions.
Political parties and party system are affected by the key features of the political 
system such as the form of government, the electoral rules, and its key institutions. 
Following, I discuss the key features of Indian political and electoral system.
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1.4.2 Parliamentary form o f government
The Indian constitution established a parliamentary system of government led by a 
Prime Minister who is assisted by a council of ministers. India’s electoral system is 
based on single-member districts determined by a simple plurality of votes.10 Indian 
political system is broadly based on UK’s Westminster model, with two houses of 
the parliament: the lower house, Lok Sabha and the upper house, Rajya Sabha. The 
Lok Sabha is the main legislative body currently comprising 543 members elected 
directly from single-member districts in different Indian states following the first- 
past-the-post (FPTP) system. Members of the Lok Sabha typically represent an 
average of 1.24 million electors (based on 2004 elections). The elections are held 
every five years (or earlier if the Lok Sabha is dissolved under certain circumstances 
specified in the Constitution). Currently, there are 233 elected members of the Rajya 
Sabha, and in addition 12 members can be nominated for their contribution towards 
literature, art, science and social services. The number of Lok Sabha and Rajya 
Sabha seats allotted to each state is fixed according to its population.
India also has a President, who is only the symbolic head of the state, and is elected 
indirectly by an Electoral College for a period of five years. Although the President 
is only the symbolic head of the state, he or she has some important powers like 
declaring an emergency in the country if the security of the country or of any part of 
its territory is threatened by war, external aggression or armed rebellion. The 
Constitution of India also provides for a Vice-President who is elected by the
10In the first two elections held in 1951 and 1957, some districts were multi-member. Thereafter, all 
districts have been single-member.
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members of an electoral college consisting of members of both Houses of Parliament 
as per proportional representation system by a single transferable vote.
1.4.3 Single Member Plurality System (SMPS)
Lijphart (1994) defines electoral systems as sets of essentially unchanged election 
rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted. He describes the 
basic characteristics of the electoral systems as -  measures of disproportionality, 
measures of multipartism and the production of majority parties. According to 
Lijphart, the two most important dimensions of an electoral system which affect 
proportionality of election outcomes and for the party systems are the electoral 
formula and district magnitude. He later introduces a third factor: electoral threshold. 
Electoral formula relates to the conversion of votes into seats obtained in the 
legislatures. A closer or direct relationship between the votes and seats leads to a 
more proportional electoral system. District magnitude is the number of 
representatives elected per electoral district, and the electoral threshold is the 
minimum level of support a party needs to gain representation in the legislature.
India’s choice of electoral rules at the time of independence was influenced by the 
twin pressures of continuing with the SMPS, with which it had some experience 
during British rule, as well as the pressure towards PR to ensure adequate 
representation of its heterogeneous population. Farrell (2001: 20) points out the three 
main themes of SMPS being simplicity, stability and constituency representation. 
India chose the SMPS system, but also introduced a system of reservation for the 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), a system that continues till
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today.11 In the first two elections post-independence, the electoral system also 
involved some multimember districts (McMillan, 2003).
For elections to the Lok Sabha, the main legislative body, the Indian states and the 
union territories are divided into single-member districts, and the winner elected on 
the basis of FPTP rule. An independent Delimitation Commission ensures that the 
electoral districts established contain roughly equal number of electors, keeping in 
mind the administrative and geographical considerations. The boundaries of these 
districts are to be therefore evaluated after every population census which is carried 
out every ten years. However, this exercise of examining the districts has been 
suspended since 1976, and the seats allotted to the states are currently based on 1971 
Census.12 This has led to some degree of mal-apportionment of seats with large 
discrepancies in the size of population in different districts. For example, the largest 
district in the 2004 was Outer Delhi with about 3.2 million electors, while the 
smallest district was Lakshadweep with just over 39000 electors. The number of 
parliamentary seats currently allocated to the Indian states and union territories are 
shown in table 1-2 below.
1 'These represent two constitutionally defined social groups that have been provided special rights in 
terms of reservations in electoral representation, jobs, etc.
12The main controversy surrounding the changes in districts based on population is that the states that 
have been most successful in controlling their populations will be the ones that will lose out.
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Table 1-2 Number of electoral districts in the Indian states
States/union territories Total
districts
General
districts
SC
districts
ST
districts
Andhra Pradesh 42 34 06 02
Arunachal Pradesh 02 02 - -
Assam 14 11 01 02
Bihar 54 41 08 05
Goa 02 02 - -
Gujarat 26 20 02 04
Haryana 10 08 02 -
Himachal Pradesh 04 03 01 -
Jammu & Kashmir 06 06 - -
Karnataka 28 24 04 -
Kerala 20 18 02 -
Madhya Pradesh 40 25 06 09
Maharashtra 48 41 03 04
Manipur 02 01 - 01
Meghalaya 02 02 - -
Mizoram 01 - - 01
Nagaland 01 01 - -
Orissa 21 13 03 05
Punjab 13 10 03 -
Rajasthan 25 18 04 03
Sikkim 01 01 - -
Tamil Nadu 39 32 07 -
Tripura 02 01 - 01
Uttar Pradesh 85 67 18 -
West Bengal 42 32 08 02
Andaman & Nicobar Islands 01 01 - -
Chandigarh 01 01 - -
Dadra & Nagra Haveli 01 - - 01
Daman & Diu 01 01 - 01
Delhi 07 06 01 -
Lakshadweep 01 - - 01
Pondicherry 01 01 - -
TOTAL 543 423 79 41
Source: Election Commission of India
1.4.4 Federal system with a written constitution
India has a federal structure, but unlike the United States of America it is only a 
loose federation with the national government having greater power in relation to its 
states and union territories. The federal structure is derived from a written 
constitution, which defines the distribution of powers between the national and state 
governments. The Indian national government has control over the states in terms of 
constitutional division of powers, and also through informal mechanisms such as
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funding of development programmes, deciding the basis of sharing of the national 
revenues with the states, assisting states to deal with emergencies such as natural 
calamities. Over the years, states have been trying to secure more fiscal and political 
decentralisation, and this has been supported by the economic reforms programme 
carried out in India since the early 1990s. According to Chhibber and Kollman 
(2004), fiscal and political centralisation in India has gone through various phases, 
and since 1991, India is going through a phase of decentralisation with more powers 
being transferred to the Indian states.
1.4.5 Electoral reservation for weaker sections o f the society
After India’s independence, some districts were reserved for SC and ST candidates 
so that socially weaker sections of the society were duly represented in the political 
process. Although this measure was initially supposed to be temporary, its operation 
has been extended and continues today. Currently, there are 79 reserved districts for 
SC and 41 reserved districts for ST in the Parliament. McMillan (2003) finds that 
the modal population proportion of SC in a reserved district is only 15-20%, while 
for ST, their modal population proportion is 50-60%. This indicates that SC are not 
concentrated geographically, and therefore they may not be able to have a decisive 
influence on the electoral outcome in the reserved districts.
1.4.6 Role o f the Judiciary and Election Commission
The judiciary and EC play an important role in ensuring the stability of the Indian 
political system. The judiciary (particularly the High Courts and the Supreme Court) 
has been entrusted with the powers to interpret the Indian constitution and resolve 
disputes regarding distribution of powers between the national and the state
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governments. The EC is a constitutional institution that has been entrusted with the 
task of registering political parties, allotting party symbols, and planning and 
conducting elections. Indian general elections involve large administrative 
arrangements, and are often staggered over a period of weeks and even months. 
Although the members of the judiciary and the EC are appointed by the government, 
they are protected from arbitrary dismissal and interference from the government to 
ensure their impartiality in conduct of elections, and interpreting constitutional 
provisions.
With this overview of the political and the electoral system, I now turn to provide a 
background to the Indian party system.
1.5 Background to the Indian Party system
For many years following its independence, India was described as a one-party 
dominant system, in which the INC exercised considerable influence on the 
composition of the legislature. In the last decade or so, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
has emerged as the main challenger to the INC’s historical prominence. 
Furthermore, the inability of the two main parties to win enough seats to form 
governments has contributed to the emergence of coalition politics as an important 
element of electoral competition.
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1.5.1 Parties andparty-symbols
EC categorises political parties as national, state and unrecognised parties. Parties 
that have received certain amount of votes or seats in a state might be recognised as a 
state party by the EC. Recognition as a state party gives the party the possibility to
reserve a particular election symbol in the concerned state. A party might be
recognised in more than one state. A national party is defined as one that wins seats 
in at least four states or Union Territories, and its symbol cannot be used by any 
other party anywhere in India. The state parties are allotted symbols, which some 
other party may also use in a different state. The symbol allotted to the party is its 
visual identity, and is an important element in its election campaign. In light of the 
high rate of illiteracy, election symbols are an essential means of identifying political 
parties on the ballot papers (and on electronic voting machines). Therefore, these 
symbols have value, and often EC has to decide upon the disputes on the use of party 
symbols in the event of party splits.
1.5.2 The evolution o f the national party system
The Indian party system at the national level has been evolving, and has gone 
through a number of distinct phases. The first phase saw the dominance of the INC 
starting from the first elections in 1951 until 1970. The INC was founded in 1885 
and is credited with leading India’s independence struggle. According to Kothari 
(1964), the INC drew support from all sections of the electorate, mainly due to its 
association with the freedom struggle, and after the independence its commitment 
towards national integration.
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The period between 1970 and 1993 has been termed as Congress-opposition system 
by Yadav (1996a), when its domination came under attack. INC fought the 1977 
elections after the state of emergency, suffered a party-split, and was defeated by 
Janata Party, a united coalition of opposition parties. This coalition later split and the 
INC returned to power in 1980, to be defeated again by a new opposition coalition of 
the National Front/ Janata Dal in 1989. Overall, since 1977, the national party 
system has generally become more competitive. 1990s have seen the onset of 
coalition politics, and the national party system has moved towards a multi-party 
system with two dominant parties, the INC and the BJP. The BJP held the power 
since 1996 either as a minority government or heading a coalition government, has 
been the longest serving non-congress party to do so. However, in the 2004 
elections, the BJP led coalition - the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) lost the 
elections to a Congress-led coalition, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA).
Figure 1-2 shows the number of contesting and winning parties in the Indian 
parliamentary elections. It shows that the number of contesting parties has been 
increasing over the years, even though the number of (seat) winning parties has not 
increased in the same proportion.
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Figure 1-2 Number of Contesting & Winning parties at national level in India
& $  $  $
mean of Contesting_parties mean of Winning_parties
Source: Author’s calculations from Election Commission of India’s reports
One measure o f  the number o f  parties competing for elections is the Effective 
number o f  parties’ defined by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which weights the 
number o f  parties with the number o f  votes secured by them. According to their 
definition, the effective number o f  parties is calculated by the formula (Sv,2)"1, where 
Vj is the vote share or the seat share o f the ith party contesting elections.13 Figure 1-3 
shows the effective number o f  parties by vote share -  electoral parties (ENP) and 
seat share -  legislative parties (ELP) at the national level in the India.
,3Through out this thesis, I use this method to compute Effective number of parties. Reasons for 
choosing this method are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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Figure 1-3 Effective number of electoral and legislative parties in India at the national level
00  -
mean of ELP mean
Source: Author’s calculations from Election Commission of India’s reports
As shown in Figure 1-3, the number o f effective parties has increased, even as the 
rate o f increase has varied over the years. The biggest increase has taken in the last 
decade, driven by the growing importance o f regional and state parties, and the 
emergence o f  coalition politics. A key feature o f  the Indian party system today is 
the presence o f  few national parties and a large number o f  regional parties. Further, 
the base o f  the national parties no longer spans the whole country, and they have to 
rely on alliances with regional parties to increase their chances o f  gaining power in 
the national parliament. These alliances often involve pre-poll agreements, as to the 
number o f  seats to be contested by the alliance partners. Alliances have also been 
post-poll, where faced with no single party winning majority, parties join together to 
form governments based on a common minimum programme. Heath and Yadav 
(1999) point out that the party systems and competition vary greatly across the Indian 
states, mirroring the social and geographical diversity o f  India.
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1.5.3 Party systems in the Indian states
At the time of first elections in 1951, India had a total of 26 states and union 
territories. In 1953, following the States Reorganization Commission, states were 
organised according to the languages spoken. Madras State was reorganised into 
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Kerala. Further reorganisation took 
place along similar lines in 1960 and 1966, and more recently in 2002. In the last 
elections held in 2004, there were 28 states and 7 union territories. The 
reorganisation of states on the basis of languages, cultural identities have led to new 
parties being formed on the basis of region and language.
The importance of party systems at the state level has grown with the increased 
competitiveness of the electoral politics. The ‘National Constituency’ syndrome 
which emerged during the 1970s and 1980s saw nationwide electoral waves, with 
one party winning landslide electoral victories. However, the focus of Indian politics, 
especially in the last decade has shifted towards the state level. As Yadav (1996b: 
44) puts it,
For an overwhelming majority of underpreviliged voters, the 
Lok Sabha elections have become not more than 
countrywide state-level elections. What looks like an 
unclear verdict at the national level is an artificial 
summation of fairly clearly verdict at the state level.
Party systems in the Indian states have shown diverse trends: some states have 
moved towards being a two party system, while some have bipolar multiparty 
systems. In some states, a clear multiparty system has emerged. The structure of the 
party competition therefore varies across states, and in the last ten years, the focus of
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the large parties has shifted somewhat to form intra and inter-state alliances to win 
the maximum number of seats. In the 1996 elections, BJP emerged as the single 
largest party in the Lok Sabha and formed a minority government, which lasted 
however, only for thirteen days. In contrast, in 1998 elections, BJP focussed on 
forming on alliances in states where it did not have a strong presence (Sridharan, 
2002). In all, it had thirteen pre-election alliances, with seat sharing in nine states, 
and this helped it to form the government.
Similarly, INC’s success in the 2004 elections can be attributed largely to the large- 
scale pre-poll alliances that it formed for the first time in its history. The electoral 
alliances in the last two general elections have been made both on ideological and 
pragmatic grounds. According to Sridharan (2002), with the exception of the Left 
Front, alliances have been driven by the desire to win seats, and not by ideology or 
social cleavage. It is clear that in the future, the success of both the national and the 
state parties are dependent on the kinds of alliances they can forge with other parties. 
Another important development in the party system has been the growing importance 
of state parties, especially since the decision to make alliances is based on pragmatic 
rather than ideological considerations. In this context, the effect of individual 
charisma and leadership in forming alliances has gained importance, rather than the 
institutional strength of a particular party. The effect of this factor is also more 
difficult to evaluate and measure.
To summarise, following trends are now visible in the Indian party system. The INC 
is no longer the centre of the Indian politics scene (Yadav, 1996a). Further, two 
national parties -  BJP and INC now contest to win a majority for their respective
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alliances. INC which did not pursue the alliance strategy earlier, decided to do so in 
the 2004 elections, and this was a big factor in its winning these elections and 
gaining power. The rise o f  any third force or party to challenge the dominance o f  
INC and BJP led alliances looks unlikely at the moment.
Figure 1-4 shows the trend o f  average number o f effective parties in a cross-section 
o f key Indian states during 1951- 2004. These are measured following Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979) using vote share (ENP) and seat share (ELP).
Figure 1-4 Effective Electoral & Legislative parties in Indian states 1951 -  2004
co -
m ea n  of EN P m ean  of ELP
Source: Author’s calculations from Election Commission of Indian reports
As can be seen in Figure 1-4, the average number o f  parties vary from 1 to over 5 in 
different states. Further, the size o f  party systems at the state level has also varied 
over time, as can be seen in Figure 1-5 below.
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Figure 1-5 Effective Electoral and Legislative parties at state level by election
Source: Author’s calculations from Election Commission o f India reports
Figures 1-4 and 1-5 also show that many states witness multi-party competition thus 
representing a deviation from Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954). According to this 
law, polities following SMPS tend to have two dominant parties. Although India 
follows SMPS, the number o f  parties has varied in different states, and has not 
necessarily converged to two, as predicted by Duverger.14
Although there have been many attempts to study the party system in India (see 
Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion), these largely have been descriptive, often  
focussing on specific parties or dections. Furthermore, political scientists have 
rarely attempted to explore the size o f  sub-national party systems based on a 
systematic and empirical analysis. My thesis is an attempt to contribute to the 
scholarship in this important area o f research.
l4This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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1.6 Research questions and hypotheses
My research addresses the following inter-related questions about the size of the 
Indian party system.
Do the number of parties vary across Indian districts, states and regions? What is 
happening to the size of the Indian party system over time? Does the Indian party 
system follow Duverger’s Law? How ‘disproportional’ is the electoral system? 
What are the determinants of the size of the Indian party system? What is the 
importance of sociological, institutional and contextual factors in determining the 
size of the Indian party system at the state level?
From the above research questions and the underlying theory, I derive the following 
general hypotheses.
Institutional Hypothesis: Electoral institutions affect party systems in the following 
ways
• District magnitude is positively related to the number of parties
• High Electoral Thresholds reduce the number of parties
• Electoral reservation (for SC, ST) reduces the number of parties
• A positive relationship exists between the number of parties and the size 
of the electoral unit
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Sociological Hypothesis: Party systems reflect underlying social cleavages, such as 
religious and caste groupings. Thus, a positive relationship should exist between the 
number of religious and social groups and the number of parties in the Indian states.
Federal distribution of powers hypotheses: Periods of federal centralisation 
witness a decrease in the number of parties at the state level. This happens because of 
the party aggregation phenomenon whereby voters have higher incentives to vote for 
state or national parties in order to influence policy outcomes at these levels. 
Similarly, periods of federal decentralisation witness an increase in the number of 
parties at the state level.
Dependence hypothesis: Indian states that are more dependent on the national 
government have fewer number of parties and a higher level of party aggregation, 
because voters in these states have more incentives to vote for state or national 
parties t) get adequate share of financial resources and grants from the national 
government.
My research fills the gap in the empirical research on the determinants of party 
systems in India. It combines case study approach (since it deals with one county), 
and comparative approach (since it compares units within a country) to analyse the 
size of the Indian party system. It is a systematic and comprehensive empirical study 
using data on electoral returns, social cleavages and other hypothesised variables to 
identify determinants of the size of party system in the Indian states. It also 
contributes towards developing a database of electoral returns, important
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institutional, sociological and contextual variables especially at the sub-national 
level.
1.7 Data and methodology
1.7.1 Variables
My dependent variables measure the size of the Indian party systems at various 
stages of the electoral process, and also the degree of disproportionality of the Indian 
party system. I focus on Effective number of electoral parties as my dependent 
variable, which is a widely used measure for studying the size of party systems. I 
also include other measures of the size of the party system (Contesting and 
Legislative parties) in my analysis.
I specify three categories of independent variables -  institutional, sociological and 
contextual. Institutional variables include factors such as electoral rules, size of the 
assembly, electoral reforms, whereas the sociological category includes variables to 
measure religious and social heterogeneity across the Indian states. Finally, the 
contextual factors include variables representing federal centralisation or 
decentralisation, literacy levels, degree of urbanisation, and the expectation of a 
coalition government. The dependent and independent variables are used in 
alternative empirical models to test my research hypotheses.
1.7.2 Methodology
The research design includes in the first instance, developing a database of electoral 
returns, social cleavages and contextual factors. I collect data regarding votes and
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seats gained by all the parties in the Indian general elections which enables the 
computation of my dependent variables - measures of the size of the party system, 
and the degree of disproportionality. My data on social and religious cleavagps data 
enables the construction of a measure of social heterogeneity.
My database is a comprehensive one covering all the Indian states and the period 
1951-2004. In all, there are 401 data points at the state level, which is main focus of 
my research. In addition, I also compile and use data on electoral returns at the 
district level to study effect of certain district-level institutional factors, and 
applicability of Duverger’s Law in India. The database at the district level includes 
7178 data points. Overall, my data set covers all the 14 general elections held in 
India.
I prefer using the aggregate data described above, instead of information about an 
individual or group of voters, or a particular party. The reason for doing so is linked 
to the objective of the research: I am interested in understanding the general patterns 
about the determinants of the size of the party systems. Further, aggregate data have 
the advantage of being more objective and comparable, and are also easily accessible 
at the level of detail required for this research. The development of a comprehensive 
database of the above mentioned variables is also a contribution of this research. My 
empirical analysis is based on the data collected by me as part of my research. The 
data on electoral returns is sourced from Election Commission of India reports and 
the CSDS data unit, whereas the data on sociological and contextual factors has been 
collected from Census of India and Indiastat database.
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Based on a comprehensive literature review of the determinants of the size of party 
system in general and specifically of the Indian system together with my hypotheses 
and research questions, I identify the list of dependent and explanatory variables. 
These variables are studied both in qualitative and quantitative terms to test my 
research hypotheses. The empirical methodology includes carrying out statistical 
analysis of dependent and independent variables. An exploratory analysis is done by 
examining summary statistics on a cross-sectional and time-series basis, which is 
supplemented by undertaking cross-tabulation and correlation analysis of dependent 
and independent variables. This analysis provides insights into how the variables are 
related, and help specify testable statistical hypotheses. Finally, I use multivariate 
regression to study the determinants of the party systems in the Indian states. I use 
alternative models to study the robustness of my statistical results.
Since my data is time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS), there is a need to address 
potential problems caused by autocorrelation and heteroskedacity in the regression 
analysis (Greene, 2003).15 Literature also suggests using panel data methods such as 
the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) -  also called dummy variable approach and the 
Random effects Model (REM) to model the unit level heterogeneity. While FEM 
assumes that each unit has its own intercept, the REM treats the intercept as a 
random constant term (Greene, 2003).
According to Hsaio (1986: 41-43), for TSCS data, FEM is appropriate if one wants 
to make inferences to the observed units, whereas the REM is appropriate if one
15Beck (2001) differentiates between TSCS and panel. Panel data are repeated cross-section data, but 
the units are sampled, and they are typically observed only a few times. TSCS units are fixed; there is 
no sampling scheme for the units. In panel data, the people observed are o f no interest; all inferences 
o f interest concern the underlying population that was sampled. TSCS data are exactly the opposite; 
all inferences of interest are conditional on the observed units.
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thinks of the observed units as a sample from a larger population In my study, the 
units (states and districts) are fixed and extending inference from my analysis to a 
larger population does not apply, and therefore REM is not a preferred regression 
method.
Regarding the FEM, Beck (2001: 285) points out:
Fixed effects are clearly collinear with any independent
variables that are unchanging attributes of the units, so they 
force us to drop such unchanging variables from the
specification.... These variables (perhaps characteristics such as 
democracy) might be of interest..., the fixed effects will soak up 
most of the explanatory power of those slowly changing
variables. Thus, if a variable such as type of bargaining system 
changes over time, but slowly, the fixed effects will make it 
hard for such variables to appear either substantively or
statistically significant.
According to Greene (2003: 301), “From a purely practical standpoint, the dummy 
variable (FEM) approach is costly in terms of degrees of freedoms lost”. Since my 
institutional and sociological independent variables either do not vary over time or 
tend to change very slowly, FEM is also not an appropriate model for my regression 
analysis.
Beck and Katz (1995) and Beck (2001) suggest using OLS regression coefficients, 
but with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and a lagged dependent variable to 
model TSCS data.16 I follow their suggested methodology, and use OLS with PCSE,
16This method has been widely used in the comparative politics literature for modelling o f TSCS data.
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and include lagged dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables for my 
regression analysis.17
1.8 Conclusions and summary of remaining chapters
In this chapter, I introduce my research agenda, explain my research questions and 
objectives, and argue why these constitute an important area of scholarship.
To provide a background to my research, I provide an overview of Indian political 
system. This includes an analysis of the key features of India’s polity such as the 
parliamentary form of government, an SMSP electoral system, a written constitution, 
and federal distribution of powers between the national and the state governments. I 
also discuss the role of other key institutions such as the judiciary and the EC in 
upholding India's Constitution and conducting free and fair elections. This overview 
helps in analysing how Indian democracy has functioned despite facing challenges in 
terms of social heterogeneity and economic underdevelopment, and highlights the 
role of key institutions and electoral rules in shaping the political system.
I then proceed to provide an analysis of the evolution of the Indian party system over 
the last five decades. Thus, I discuss the key changes in the Indian party system, 
starting from the domination of the INC in the first two decades or so in India’s post­
independence history, to the current situation where the party system has become 
more fragmented and competitive, with a more important role being played by the 
state level parties.
,7I have also run regressions using OLS and REM, and find that their results are consistent with the 
method suggested by Beck and Katz (1995).
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I use electoral data for the period covering 1951-2004 to show that the number of 
parties at the state level vary across the Indian states, and also over time. Based on 
this analysis of the Indian political and party systems, I specify my research 
questions and objectives, which focus on researching the determinants of the size of 
party systems across the Indian states. I also develop my research methodology, and 
explain my data sources in this chapter.
Below I provide the summary of the remaining chapters of my thesis.
In Chapter 2 ,1 provide a review of the existing research on party systems. I review 
general scholarship relating to party systems including the need for parties, typology 
of party systems, and the methods to measure the size of party systems. The main 
focus of the literature review is the scholarship on the determinants of the size of 
party systems. Accordingly, I examine the key propositions of the institutional and 
the sociological schools, and how institutions and social cleavages shape party 
systems. Important empirical studies on the determinants of the party systems are 
also analysed and reviewed in this chapter. The main conclusion from my review is 
that theoretical propositions support the arguments of both sociological and 
institutional schools. Furthermore, the proposition of the third school that party 
systems are shaped by an interaction of sociological and institutional factors is also 
supported by theoretical underpinnings18 The results of the empirical studies 
however, are not consistent in this regard, and there does not seem to be a consensus 
on the determinants of the party systems in the empirical literature. While some
18I define an interaction model where both sociological and institutional factors are used to explain the 
size o f party system. In terms of the regression equation, the type of interaction can be additive or 
multiplicative.
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studies show the relative importance of sociological factors in shaping party systems, 
others have found that institutions have a dominant affect on party systems. Some 
empirical studies have used both sociological and institutional factors into their 
analysis, but the nature of the interaction between these factors is still debated. Some 
studies find that an additive interaction model is superior, i.e. that sociological and 
institutional factors have independent effects on party systems, while other studies 
report the superiority of the multiplicative model, where party systems are a result of 
an interaction of these factors. In my conclusion to Chapter 2, I also argue for 
recognising the importance of contextual factors in shaping party systems, and 
including these factors to improve the results from a comparative study of party 
systems.
In Chapter 3, I undertake a review of the existing research and scholarship on the 
Indian party system. In particular, I discuss explanations relating to domination of 
INC in the years immediately following India’s independence, India’s deviation from 
the Duvergerian norm of having a two-party system, the importance of social 
cleavages and issue dimensions, and the effect of distribution of powers between 
national and state governments. I also show how the national party system is 
increasingly being influenced by coalition politics and election alliances between 
national and state parties. The review of existing research on the Indian party system 
reveals that it has been in most part descriptive, focusing on specific parties, states or 
election-years. I also review the principal empirical work done on the Indian party 
systems and find that the empirical work has been mostly in the form of comparative 
cross-country studies, where India has been taken as a single data point. Thus, there 
is lack of a systematic empirical analysis that takes into account the different party
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systems, and social structures that exist in the Indian states. There has been some 
empirical work on the application of Duverger’s Law to the Indian system but that 
too in most part either focuses on the national level or suffers from many 
methodological and data limitations. As such, there is still no systematic 
comparative study to investigate the reasons for variations in the party system across 
the Indian states. My research attempts to fill this gap in the literature, and find some 
general patterns and influences that affect the size of party systems in the Indian 
states. Chapters 4-6 contain my primary empirical analysis on the determinants of 
the party systems in the Indian states.
In Chapter 4 ,1 identify important institutional factors that affect party systems in the 
Indian states, and analyse how these affect the number of parties and the nature of 
party systems. The institutional factors I discuss include Asseiribly size, reservation 
of districts for SC and ST, District Magnitude, Effective Threshold, the presence of 
districts with substantial unequal voting populations, electoral reforms, and 
geographical size. For my empirical analysis, I focus on the effect of Assembly Size, 
Effective Threshold and Electoral reforms index on the size and nature of party 
system in India. My empirical analysis reveals that Assembly Size has positive effect 
on the size of party systems in the Indian states, while Electoral Threshold has a 
negative effect on the size of party system in Indian states. The effect of Electoral 
Reforms is not as uniform: it is not a significant variable for Effective number of 
electoral parties, even though it has a significant effect on number of contesting 
parties. Overall, my findings show the importance of institutional factors in 
explaining the variation in the size of the party systems in the Indian states. While 
District Magnitude and system of electoral reservation for SC and ST are important
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institutional factors at the district level, Assembly Size and Effective Threshold are 
two key institutional variables affecting the state level party systems.
In Chapter 5, I examine social heterogeneity in the Indian states, and their 
relationship with the size of party systems. I discuss the nature of social cleavages in 
India based on caste, language, religion and constitutionally defined social groups -  
SC and ST. Given the overlapping nature of social cleavages in India, I note the 
difficulties of constructing an index of social heterogeneity, and the complexities 
associated with the effect of this heterogeneity on the party system. Keeping in mind 
these limitations, I construct and use two related measures of social heterogeneity for 
my empirical analysis: One is based on ‘Effective number of religious groups’ which 
is computed using the share of different religions in the population of the Indian 
states, while the other - ‘Effective number of social groups’, also takes into account 
the presence of two distinct social groups based on caste -  SC and ST. My empirical 
results confirm that in general, social and religious heterogeneity increases the 
effective number of parties in Indian states. Thus, a state with higher social 
heterogeneity will also tend to have higher number of parties, a finding which is 
consistent with theoretical predictions. I also examine the effect of the presence of 
two constitutionally defined social groups - SC and ST and presence of Muslims in 
the population of the states, and find that their effects on the party system are not 
uniform. In general, the presence of large SC and Muslim population tends to 
increase the number of parties. The presence of a large ST population on the other 
hand, depresses the number of parties in a state. The reasons for these trends are 
discussed in Chapter 5.
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In Chapter 6, I show how the context in which elections take place can affect the 
party system. I argue that in addition to the traditional institutional and sociological 
factors, there are contextual factors which can affect the size of party systems. The 
objective of including these factors in my thesis is to improve our understanding of 
dynamics at play in shaping of party systems in the Indian states, and also move 
towards a unified empirical analysis that includes the effect of these factors. In 
particular, I discuss the effect of federal centralisation and decentralisation, literacy 
levels, the degree of urbanisation, and coalition politics on party systems in the 
Indian states. Thus, while federal centralisation is expected to decrease the number 
of parties, federal decentralisation can increase the prospects of smaller parties in the 
states, and should lead to an increase in the size of party system. I extend the work of 
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) about the effects of federal centralisation and 
decentralisation on the party systems at the state (rather than the national level). In 
particular, I discuss the importance of states’ responses to the changes in federal 
centralisation, and how states’ dependence on national government can affect the 
size of the party system.
I also discuss the effects of literacy rates and the degree of urbanisation on the party 
systems in the Indian states. Thus, in a state with higher literacy rate or higher degree 
of urbanisation, one should expect to see more sophisticated voter behaviour and 
strategic voting, and therefore, lower number of parties. Regarding the effect of 
coalition politics, I argue that the expectation of formation of a coalition government 
improves the chances of smaller parties to gain voters, the motivation of voters to 
vote for smaller and state level parties, and therefore should lead to increase in the 
number of parties. Since these factors only represent a specific environment in which
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elections take place, individual regression using only these factors serves little 
purpose. Instead, their effects need to be considered while interpreting overall 
empirical results using the primary -  institutional and sociological factors that shape 
party systems. Results of my correlation analysis confirm the theoretical prediction 
that the degree of urbanisation tends to reduce the number of parties in the Indian 
states.
In general, iry empirical results in chapters 4-6 are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions about the determinants of the size of the party system in that the variation 
in the size of party systems in the Indian states can be understood in terms of 
institutional and sociological effects. In addition, the context in which elections take 
place also is an important factor affecting the party systems in the Indian states.
Chapter 7 presents the unified model of the Indian party system, and also provides 
the key conclusions of my research. The results are consistent with the expected 
theoretical hypotheses for most of the variables. Thus, while Assembly Size and 
social and religious heterogeneity increases the number of parties, Effective 
Threshold and Federal Centralisation reduces it. States which are highly dependent 
on the national government tend to have fewer parties since voters are inclined to 
voter for large parties which can influence decision making at the national level. 
Federal decentralisation however is not a significant variable, and it does not have 
statistically significant effect on the size of party systems in the Indian states. 
Overall, results confirm the importance of institutional, sociological and contextual 
factors in shaping the size of party systems in the Indian states. Chapter 7 also 
discusses important implications of my findings on the Indian political system, and
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provides directions for future research on party systems in general and in particular, 
on the Indian party system.
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2 WHAT DETERMINES PARTY SYSTEMS?
This chapter provides a review of the literature on the determinants of party systems 
in the context of my research questions and objectives.
Three main lines of research can be found in the literature on party systems. The first 
relates to the question relating to the emergence of and need for parties. The second 
line of research has studied the classification of party systems, while the third 
investigates the determinants of the number of parties expected in a polity. Below, I 
review these different strands of research on party systems.
2.1 Emergence of and need for parties
An important theme of research on party systems concerns the need for political 
parties (Moselle, 2002). Parties are seen by this branch of literature as a mechanism 
to improve the functioning of legislatures, and provide stability in coalition politics 
(Jackson and Moselle, 2002). A dominant view within this strand of research 
explains the need for parties in terms of the self-interested behaviours of voters, 
candidates and legislators (Aldrich, 1995; Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Politicians 
join parties in order to achieve their personal goals. Legislators also engage in 
opportunistic politics, defecting from a party, splitting it or joining another party, 
when their options serve their objectives. Political parties are thus needed to solve 
collective dilemmas faced by the legislators. Collective dilemmas such as cycling 
majorities and collective action problem are inherent in democratic politics,
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especially in legislatures, and therefore, entrepreneurial politicians have strong 
incentives to set up long-term commitment devices (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004). 
Further, as Aldrich (1994: 186) comments,
there are more or less continual incentives for 
ambitious politicians to consider party organizations as 
means to achieve their goals. In the most general terms, 
these incentive flow from the very nature of liberal 
democracies in an extended republic, and in an 
immediate sense that means the ability to fashion and 
hold majorities.
However, to be useful, parties must offer equilibrium solutions to the collective 
dilemmas; otherwise theory would not be able to explain why some parties sustain 
themselves for long periods of time (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004). According to 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967), political parties emerge due to the presence of social 
cleavages. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) state that party formation and survival are 
closely linked not only to electoral rules, but also how parliamentary seats are 
distributed and decided. Some other reasons for emergence of new parties mentioned 
in the literature are economic factors or due to the emergence of a new issue 
dimensions (such as immigration or environmental issues). Kitschelt (1999) has 
found that parties emerge due to a combination of factors in a situation, but largely 
when voters are dissatisfied with existing parties. Cox (1997) indicates that like- 
minded voters will coordinate across districts, states and country.
2.2 Characterisation of party systems
Characterising party systems has been an important area of research in the 
comparative politics literature. Scholars have distinguished democratic polities on
55
CHAPTER 2
WHAT DETERMINES PARTY SYSTEMS?
the basis of a typology of party systems. One feature of party systems that has been 
used in the literature is the ideological distance between the parliamentary parties. 
Sartori (1976) discusses the level of polarisation that correlates with the type of party 
competition -  centripetal or centrifugal. The study of this feature requires extensive 
information about the ideological placement of different parties.
Another feature employed to categorise party systems is on the basis of the number 
of parties in a polity. Following Duverger’s (1954) attempt to differentiate party 
systems on the basis of number of parties competing for votes and seats, the 
numerical measures of the party systems have become widely used in comparative 
politics research (Mair, 1992; Lijphart, 1994, 1999). A numerical measure of party 
systems is important since it may be a result of key determinants in a polity, and in 
turn also affect policy outcomes in that polity. Further, a numerical measure of a 
party system is particularly attractive in comparative politics research.
Existing scholarship on the determinants of the number of parties in a polity has been 
dominated by two approaches. One approach treats the number of party systems as a 
reflections of social cleavages (for example, Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Taagepera 
and Grofman, 1985; Lijphart, 1999), while the other treats it as a reflection of 
institutional rules (for example, Duverger, 1954; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; 
Lijphart, 1994 and 1999; Cox, 1997). An increase in the number of parties has also 
been related to democratisation, or in western democracies, to an electoral change 
such as party dealignment (Dalton et al., 2000). Recently, another approach -  the 
‘strategic interaction’ approach has emerged that stresses the interaction between 
sociological and institutional factors to explain the size of the party system in a
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polity. There is also a view which explains the change in the number of parties 
within a polity over time, in terms of the effect of fiscal and political centralisation 
by the national government.
In the next two sub-sections, I discuss and evaluate alternative explanations of the 
size of the party system in a polity. Before discussing the explanations to the size of 
the party systems, I first review the methods of counting the number of parties in a 
polity.
2.3 Methods of measuring the number of parties in a polity
Constructing a measure of the number of parties that contest elections, win votes and
seats is fundamental to understand the dynamics of party systems in a polity. In
particular, after the works of Duverger (1954) and Rae (1967), a quantitative
measure of the number of parties has been used to describe party systems and their
features. As the movement continues away from older typologies of party systems
and towards a more empirically sensitive description of party systems, measuring the
number of parties remains a very important issue (Ware, 1995). Counting the
number of parties that contest elections (contesting parties) is important since it
represents the first stage at which social cleavages get transformed into partisan
preferences (Amorim and Cox, 1997). As Sartori points out,
it does matter how many are the parties. For one thing, 
the number of parties immediately indicates, albeit 
roughly, an important feature of the political system: 
the extent to which political power is fragmented or
non-fragmented, dispersed or concentrated the
indication clearly is that the greater the number of 
parties (that have a say), the greater the complexity and
57
CHAPTER 2
WHAT DETERMINES PARTY SYSTEMS?
probably the intricacy of the system....in particular, the 
tactics of party competition and opposition appear 
related to the number of parties; and this has, in turn, 
an important bearing on how governmental coalitions 
are formed and are able to perform (Sartori, 1976:120)
Following, I review the various methods adopted in the literature to measure the size 
of party system in a polity.
2,3.1 Measures based on simple counting o f  the number ofparties
Counting the number of parties has been debated, and various methods of counting 
have been put forward by scholars. At the very basic level, the number of parties can 
be counted by simply adding them. One can also fix a threshold level, under which a 
party is not counted, even though fixing this level may be problematic.19 For 
example, Ware (1995) only considers ‘relevant’ parties that receive at least three per 
cent of the seats in an assembly. However, once any party clears the fixed threshold 
level, it is treated equally, i.e. with the same weight, even though their share of seats 
or votes, or influence may vary considerably. Despite its weaknesses, simple 
counting of parties criterion was used by Duverger (1954) in differentiating two- 
party systems from multi-party systems. Blondel (1968) refined this classification by 
looking at the number of parties, and their sizes to identify two-party systems and 
multiparty systems. However, this refinement was also based on subjective threshold 
level of vote shares for defining ‘half and ‘strong’ and ‘dominant’ parties.
Counting the number of parties by simply adding the number of parties can give a 
misleading picture of the size of the party system. For example, is it really sensible
19For example, a threshold can specify that a party getting less votes or seats than a specified level will 
not be counted as a political party.
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to count equally a party getting 100 votes as one getting say 100,000 votes? As 
Lijphart (1994: 67) points out, “The assumption in the comparative politics literature 
has long been that some kind of weighting is necessary.” The solution proposed is to 
calculate the effective number of (electoral and legislative) parties by some sort of 
weighting mechanism. This recognises the view-point that since the universe of the 
size of party systems is continuous, a continuous measure is required instead of a 
measure based on subjective criteria to identify different categories of party systems.
2.3.2 Measures based on index o f fractionalisation
Rae (1967) proposes a fractionalisation index (F), which was in turn derived fom 
the concentration index (HH) (Herfindahl, 1950; Hirschman, 1945). The HH index, 
as applied to the number of parties is given by the following formula:
n
Equation 2-1 HH = ^  PZ
/=  1
where Pi is the proportion of votes or seats of the rth party. Thus, the HH represents 
the probability that two randomly selected voters will vote for the same party 
(Molinar, 1991). The HH returns a value of one, if there is only one party, and zero, 
if the number of parties tends to infinity. Rae’s (1971) F  works on the same 
principle; it represents the probability that two randomly selected voters will vote for 
different parties. Thus, its value is given by 1 -  HH. The limits on the value of F  are 
opposite of that of HH: it returns a value of zero, if there is one party, and a value of 
one, if the number of parties tends to infinity. The HH and the F represent two initial 
attempts to provide an objective way of counting parties, so that the larger parties are 
weighted more than the smaller ones.
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These indices suffer from two major weaknesses. First, Rae’s index does not follow 
a linear pattern when the number of tied parties increases. In other words, doubling 
the number of parties of equal size does not lead to the doubling of the index. This 
weakness therefore creates a consistency problem for its use in a univariate or 
multivariate analysis. Secondly, the index is difficult to interpret since it does not 
describe a party system in terms of the number of parties, but provides the degree of 
fragmentation.
2.3.3 Measures computing effective number o f  parties
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) propose a measure of the level of concentration of 
votes or seats, which gives greater weight to the larger parties in its computation. 
They reformulate HH so that their measure of the Effective number of parties (N) 
makes more intuitive sense and is easier to interpret in terms of counting the number 
of parties. Their measure of number of effective parties can be calculated based on 
either the shares of the votes or the share of seats in the legislature, and is given by
Equation 2-2 N=  1 / ( $ P j 2)  _ IIHH =  1 /  (1  -F)
where pj is the vote share or seat share of the ith party
This measure of the number of parties weighs the number of parties in a polity with 
their respective vote or seat share, to give the effective number of electoral or 
legislative parties. The N  returns a value of one if there is only one party, and infinity 
if the number of parties tends to infinity. To understand the mechanics of this 
formula, assume that there are two parties each getting 50% of the vote and 50% of 
the seat share. The formula gives 2 as the effective number of both electoral and
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legislative parties. However, if the vote and the seat share becomes 60% and 40% 
for the two parties, the number of effective electoral parties is only 1.92. Thus, this 
index weighs the largest parties most, while the smaller parties (with support under 
around 10 percent) count for very little and tiny parties (under 1 percent) count 
hardly at all (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003). Further, doubling the number of equal­
sized parties doubles the index, something that is not achieved by Rae’s F. In the 
comparative politics literature, the value of Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) index can 
be interpreted as the number of hypothetical equal-sized parties competing in a 
polity.
According to Taagepera and Shugart (1989:80), N  has become widely used because 
it ‘usually tends to agree with our average intuition about the number of serious 
parties’. However, N  is not particularly useful when a single party has more than the 
majority of seats available in an assembly (Taagepera, 1999: 497). In this situation, 
where one party is dominant, N  may still show multi-party system, a counter­
intuitive result. Taagepera (1999) suggest to ‘supplement’ the N  in particular 
situations, through his Largest Component approach. The Largest Component index 
(LC) is the inverse of the share of the largest party. When this index is less than 2, 
this party dominates the party systems as its share is larger than 50 percent, a feature 
that one could see by looking at the share of the largest party. Taagepera (1999, 499) 
stresses that for most purposes, N  will be an adequate measure for the number of 
parties, and we should not clutter our data set by including the supplementary index 
unless it serves a purpose.
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Another index mentioned in the literature is the hyperfractionalisation index 
which was introduced in communication studies as a measure of entropy (Shannon, 
1948; Shannon and Weaver, 1959; Theil, 1972). This index is also called as the 
Kesselman-Wildgen index in the political science literature (Kesselman, 1966; 
Wildgen, 1971). The I  has same limits as N, and is given by
n
Equation 2-3 I = anti log[-^(P - * log Pj)],
i= l
where Pi is the share of votes or seats of the ith party.
Molinar (1991) argues that both N  and /  work well when parties are of similar size, 
but gives inconsistent results in other cases. Table 2-1 illustrates this point.
Table 2-1 Illustration of alternative measures of Effective number of parties
Case Share of votes or seats among parties (%) Indices
N /
1 100% 1.00 1.00
2 50% 50% 2.00 2.00
3 33% 33% 34% 3.00 3.00
4 25% 25% 25% 25% 4.00 4.00
5 51% 40% 7% 1% 1% 2.35 2.69
6 51% 26% 12% 12% 1% 2.80 3.49
7 40% 35% 12% 12% 1% 3.21 3.63
8 40% 35% 9% 9% 5% 3.32 3.73
9 55% 45% 1.98 1.99
10 70% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 1.98 3.15
When the parties are of the same strength (cases 1-4) both N  and /  return consistent 
values equal to the number of parties. Following Taagepera and Shugart (1989), 
cases 5-8 can be classified as two-party or at best two and a half-party systems. 
However, both N  and /  return higher values than the type of party systems they are 
representing. Further, in cases 9 and 10, N  returns the same value for two-party 
system (case 9) and a one-party system (case 10). The value of I  is higher for a
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single-party dominant system (case 10) than a two party system (case 9). This 
illustration shows that although the weighing mechanism of calculating effective 
number of parties provides an objective numerical measure of the number of parties, 
it has limitations, and in some situations, the value returned may not reveal the true 
character of the party system it represents. N  counts the largest party as more than 
one in certain situations, while /  is too sensitive to the presence of many small parties 
(Molinar, 1991).
Molinar (1991) proposed an alternative formula to calculate the number of parties 
(NP), by multiplying the N  score by an additional term and then adding 1. This 
additional term is the sum of the opposition parties’ squared vote shares expressed as 
a proportion of the sum of all the parties’ squared vote shares. The formula for NP 
(represented in M here) is given by
Equation 2-4
According to Molinar, NP avoids both problems of excess weight given to larger 
parties (as in N), as well as excessive sensitivity towards presence of smaller parties 
(as in I). It does so by counting the winning party as one, and weighing N  by the 
contribution of the minority parties. Further, he claims that NP captures the number 
and relevance of parties in a better way, since it decreases if the gap between the two 
largest parties widens (while N  tends to increase). Arguably, the increase in gap
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between the two largest parties means a reduction in the relevance of minority 
parties. Molinar concluded that
[M]y index outperforms [the effective number of 
parties] as an operationalization of the variable number 
and size of parties . . . [because it] behaves better in 
relation to the size of the largest party and the gap 
between the two largest parties. (1991: 1383, 1390)
However, a measure of the number of parties, and the competitiveness and relevance 
of parties, represent two different things, and as such it is difficult to agree whether 
NP is superior to N  in all situations. The Molinar index has not been used much in 
the literature, because of the complexity of calculations and difficulty in interpreting 
its output (see Lijphart, 1994: 69-70).
Among the three main measures of number of parties (/, N  and NP), Molinar’s NP 
index gives special weight to the largest party, while the Wildgen’s index of 
‘hyperfractionalisation’ I  accords special weight to small parties. In a situation, 
where all parties receive equal share of votes or seats, all three measures result into 
the same value of effective number of parties. In a situation, where parties have 
unequal shares, I  has the largest value, followed by N, with NP being the lowest 
value.
Lijphart (1994:68) argues that a high degree of consensus has been reached on the 
question of how the number of parties should be measured. He has described N  as 
the ‘purest measure of the number of parties’ (1994:1970). Lijphart has continued to 
express his confidence in N  in his recent writing, ‘The problem of how to count
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parties of different sizes is solved by using the effective number measure” (Lijphart, 
1999: 69).
Dunleavy and Boucek (2003:292) claim that N, the effective number of parties is a 
somewhat flawed index, whose use in quantitative analysis can create problems. 
Specifically, they show that N  behaves oddly with changes in two key variables: (i) 
the level of support for the largest party (VI); and (ii) the number of observable 
parties in competition. Dunleavy and Boucek (2003) also demonstrate that N , and its 
main rival - the Molinar index behaves in unpredictable and anomalous ways under 
some configurations of party support. Their solution is to average N  scores with a 
simple measure of largest party predominance (1/VI to produce a highly correlated 
measure Nb, which is given by Equation 2-5.20
Equation 2-5
Their conclusion is that the Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) effective number of 
parties measure does not deliver a reliable relationship between changes in the 
largest party’s share of the vote and the index number shown. In particular, the N  
index may not be reliable when party fragmentation is low, and will often produce 
inappropriately high scores for party systems where the largest party is in a strong 
governing position. Similarly, they also conclude that NP also has major limitations, 
since it understates the numbers of parties in situations where one party has majority
20VI represents the share o f the largest party.
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support. They claim that their own index, the Nb variant of the effective number of 
parties yields more consistent and readily interpretable results.
The above review reveals that each method has its strengths and weaknesses, and one
needs to consider the objective of the research or analysis being done, to decide
which measure would be the most appropriate to use. In my study, I use Laakso and
Taagepera’s (1979) method in computing the effective number of parties because of
its simplicity and ease of interpretation, and also because it has been widely used in
the comparative literature. Furthermore, the choice of the method of calculating
Effective number of parties will make little or no difference to my results because
0 1these measures are highly correlated.
There are two other minor, yet important matters concerning the measurement of the 
number of parties. One relates to the variables (whether voter share or seat share) to 
be used in measuring the size of the party system, while the other is about 
constructing the number of parties with incomplete data. These are discussed below.
2.3.4 Measuring the number o f electoral and legislative parties
The effective number of parties can be calculated on the basis of share of votes or 
share of seats, giving two measures - the effective number of electoral and effective 
number of legislative parties respectively. Since one of the objectives of the electoral 
system is to reduce vote-getting parties into seat-getting parties, the number of 
legislative parties would tend to be lower than the number of electoral parties.
21For example, using a large data set o f Indian elections between 1951-2004, I find that Laakso and 
Taagepera’s (1979) and Dunleavy and Boucek’s (2003) measures of Effective number o f parties have 
correlation o f 0.99.
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Although, the two measures would normally be positively and strongly correlated 
(especially in PR systems), it is important to distinguish between the two measures. 
These two measures are affected differently by the ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ 
(Duverger, 1954), or the ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ (Rae, 1971) effects of the electoral 
systems. The mechanical or proximal effects are visible in the translation of votes 
into seats in an election. Since, this translation tends to discriminate against smaller 
parties, voters, politicians, financial sponsors and political workers do not want to 
waste their vote, effort and money on these parties. This strategic behaviour forms 
the basis of the psychological or distal effects of electoral systems, which tend to 
favour larger parties. The distinction between effective number of electoral and 
legislative parties is theoretically important, because the effective number of 
electoral parties is affected only by psychological effects, while the effective number 
of legislative parties is affected by both the psychological effects and the mechanical 
effects. Thus, the number of effective electoral parties that get votes are reduced by 
the expectations of voters, politicians, sponsors and political workers in not backing 
smaller parties. However, any further reduction to the effective number of 
parliamentary parties is caused only by mechanical effects of electoral system.
2.3.5 Computing the Effective number o f  parties with incomplete data
Another important question about counting the number of parties relates to the 
treatment given to the vote share of independent candidates. Independent candidates 
are the ones who do not contest elections on a larger party label, but stand as a single 
candidate (party) themselves. If the vote share or the seat share of the independents is 
taken together as one party (which is the case in many studies in the literature), it can
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distort the calculations of the number of effective parties. Further, the data on 
independent candidates is sometimes not readily available. Taagepera (1997) 
suggests a method of bounds to calculate a more accurate effective number of 
parties, when complete data is not available on the number of votes and seats won by 
all competing parties. According to Taagepera (1997:145),
The problem is acute for India 1952 -  1984. A listing 
of 12-19 separate parties (Lijphart, 1994, pp. 169-172) 
still leaves 7-20 per cent of the votes and 2-9 per cent 
of the seats in the ‘Others’ category. Depending on the 
treatment of these residuals, the average N  for votes 
1962 -  1984 has been given as 4.31 (Lijphart, 1994, p.
161) and as about 3.5 (graph in Chhibber and Kollman,
1996).
If one treats the ‘others’ category as a single party, it leads to an overestimation the 
effective number of parties. On the other hand, ignoring this category altogether will 
lead to underestimation of results. Taagepera’s method involves either deleting the 
residual category if the share of the residual category is less than the least non-zero 
share of a political party. Alternatively, if that is not the case, the method involves 
assuming that the residual category is composed of parties each having vote shares 
equal to the least non-zero share of a political party, and taking the average of 
possible ranges for effective number of parties (The method is illustrated in 
Appendix A).
I now turn to review the theoretical and empirical attempts to explain the size of the 
party system in a polity.
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2.4 Explanations of the size of the party systems
As is clear from the discussions in the preceding sections, the influence exercised by 
electoral laws and social cleavages on party systems has been an important topic of 
research during the latter half of the twentieth century. Many scholars have argued 
that electoral laws exercise an important and independent effect on party systems, 
while others have taken the view that it is sociological cleavages that are the primary 
determinants of party systems. A third approach has emerged, that advocates an 
interactive approach, where the influence of social cleavages on the party system is 
conditional on the degree of the permissiveness of the electoral system and rules.
Scholars who view electoral laws as exercising an independent effect on the party 
systems include Duverger (1954), Sartori (1968, 1976), Rae (1971), Lijphart (1990,
1994), Riker (1982), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Palfrey (1989), Myerson and 
Weber (1993), and Cox (1994). On the other hand, some scholars argue that the 
effect of electoral systems on party systems is limited compared to the effect of 
sociological factors. This second group includes Bogdanor (1983), Grumm (1958), 
Eckstein (1963), Meisel (1963), Lipson (1964), Key (1964), Lipset (1960), Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967), Rose and Urwin (1970) and Nohlen (1996). This strand of 
literature argues that party systems are caused by social cleavages, and influence the 
selection of electoral laws that are designed to mirror the party system.
Cox (1997) observes that if the electoral system did not matter, why would political 
elites bother to adopt one that “fits” the extant party system. Similarly, many 
scholars from the institutional school have not ignored the importance of social
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cleavages altogether. For example, Lijphart (1984), Powell (1982), Taagepera and 
Grofman (1985), and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) have historically examined the 
issue of social cleavages in their work. Thus, although the two approaches appear 
distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. As Amorim and Cox (1997: 151) state
To assert that social structure matters to the formation 
and competition of parties -  which no one denies, 
when the point is stated in such a broad fashion -  does 
not imply that electoral structures do not matter. To 
make this latter point, one has to adopt a rather extreme 
monocausalist perspective according to which the 
underlying cleavage structure of a society is so much 
more important than the details of electoral law that 
basically the same party system would arise regardless 
of the electoral system employed... Similarly, to assert 
that electoral structure affects party competition in 
important and systematic way does not imply that 
social structure is irrelevant.
Some scholars have stressed the interaction effects of the social and the electoral 
structure. Papers such as Sartori (1968), Riker (1982), Rae (1971), and Kim and Ohn 
(1992) which consider the importance of the geographical location of party 
supporters recognise the possibility of such interaction effects.
Recently, another approach is emerging that stresses the ‘strategic interaction’ 
between social cleavages and electoral rules, while shaping the party systems. This 
approach has been used by Powell (1982), Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), 
Amorim and Cox (1997), Cox (1997), Filippov et aL (1999), Mozaffar (2001), and 
Jones (1999, 2002). According to Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994: 101), 
“Analysing the effects of electoral institutions separate from other things ignores the 
possibility that institutions are intervening structures and that they influence, say the
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number of political parties only to the extent that the ‘more basic’ characteristics of a 
society act through them to increase or decrease this number.” They conclude by 
saying that if district magnitude is one, the party system is relatively impervious to 
ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity.
Some scholars have explicitly incorporated measures of social cleavages and 
electoral features in their analysis (e.g. Amorim and Cox, 1997; Cox, 1997; Filippov 
et al., 1999; Jones, 1997; Moser, 2001; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Taagepera, 
1999; Powell, 1982). They propose an interactive model, including the effects of 
both political institutions and cleavages on party system. In their analysis of 
legislative elections at both the cross-national and sub-national level these authors 
find considerable support for the superiority of an interactive model vis-a-vis a pure 
institutional model.22
Below, I discuss the institutional, sociological and interaction-based explanations of 
the party systems.
2.4.1 Institutional explanation o f the size ofparty system
Bartolini and Mair (1990) find that party strength does not vary significantly over 
time, which emphasises the role of institutions in maintaining party systems’ 
stability. The institutional approach treats electoral laws as exogenous to the party 
system, while social cleavages and groupings are considered endogenous to it. 
Although this approach is based on the theory of the rational voter, its predictions,
22The partial exception is Filippov et al. (1999) who found an interactive model to be superior for one 
population but equal to a pure institutional model for another.
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even after some valuable reformulations do not match with the prevailing situation in 
many countries. However, predictions of this approach do improve considerably 
when we add social cleavages to the analysis (Amorim and Cox, 1997).
According to the institutional approach, electoral mles and institutions have decisive 
influences on the size of the party system. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) stress 
features pertaining to ballot structure, district magnitude and electoral formula, while 
Lijphart (1994) emphasises effective threshold of representation and the size of 
assembly. Other important explanatory variables used in the literature to explain 
party systems include the demand for public goods (Desposato, 2000), electoral 
reforms (Mendez. 2000), and the number of issue dimensions (Taagepera, 1999).
I now turn to the institutional features of electoral and political system that affect 
party systems. Lijphart (1994) refers to an electoral system being a set of unchanged 
election rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted in a 
particular democracy. Farrell (2001:3) points out the importance of differentiating 
between electoral laws and systems. While “Electoral laws are the family of rules 
governing the process of elections...(electoral system is) the mechanism of 
determining victors and losers, which clicks into action once the campaign has 
ended.” Different dimensions and classifications of electoral systems have been 
discussed in the literature for example see Massicotte and Blais, 1999, Farrell, 
2001).
There are three main types of electoral systems: majoritarian, which includes 
plurality, two-ballot systems, and the alternative vote; PR which includes largest
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remainders, highest averages, and single transferable vote; semi-proportional, which 
includes cumulative vote and the limited vote. PR systems tend to produce greater 
proportionality, and minority representation as compared to majoritarian electoral 
systems.
In majoritarian system, a party needs to win majority of vote in districts, and this 
feature systematically favours large parties by making it difficult for small parties to 
gain representation. It also tends to produce disproportional election outcomes, and 
discourages multipartism. Countries can mitigate this effect to some extent by 
making special provisions so that interests of minority are not ignored altogether. 
For example, in India this is sought to be achieved by reserving a proportion of seats 
in the parliament for candidates belonging to socially and economically backward 
classes -  the SC and ST (MacMillan, 2003).
Proportional representation (PR) includes all methods using mathematical methods 
for dividing multiple seats among multiple parties such that their seat shares are 
commensurate with their vote shares. Plurality rule totals votes for each party 
separately and award one or more seats to the top vote winners. This fundamental 
distinction between plurality and PR system provided the basis for Duverger’s 
propositions (1954) and much subsequent research (Blais and Carty 1987, 1991; Rae 
1967). While for proportional type formulas, it will be true that larger district sizes 
will yield more parties, this effect should be reversed when plurality rules decide the 
winners (Blais and Carty, 1987). This also suggests that the effects of district 
magnitude interact with the effects of electoral formula, in shaping party systems.
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A key feature of an electoral is the District Magnitude which refers to the number of 
representatives elected in a district. It can be calculated by dividing the number of 
seats in the legislature by the number of districts giving a figure of average district 
magnitude. As early as 1925, Horwill had pointed out that district magnitude was 
the ‘all-important factor’. Taking a similar view, Hogan (1945) proposed that “the 
greater the number of member it (constituency) elects, the more closely will the 
result approximate the proportionality.” Rae (1967, 1971) found that district 
magnitude had very strong affect on the degree of proportionality of political 
outcomes, and the size of party system. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) emphasise the 
importance of district magnitude, and call it the ‘the decisive factor’ in the 
conversion of votes into seats.
Clearly, party systems are shaped by the concept of district magnitude -  the number 
of seats allocated in an electoral district (Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994; Taagepera & 
Shugart 1993; Cox, 1997; Blais and Carty 1991; Palfrey 1989; Rae 1967). District 
magnitude is clearly an important determinant of the number of parties (Taagepera & 
Shugart 1989; Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Gallagher 1991; Rae 1967). This is 
expressed by Taagepera and Shugart (1993:455):
History, present issues, and institutions all intervene.
But if one had to give a single major factor [that] 
determines the number of parties ...it would have to be 
the district magnitude.
Another dimension of electoral system is the electoral threshold, or the minimum 
level of votes needed by a party to win an election. Some electoral systems provide 
for such a threshold, usually at a national level which is called a legal threshold.
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Even if no legal threshold is provided, an effective threshold can be implied by the 
dimensions of a particular electoral system, especially by the district magnitude 
(Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). As Lijphart (1994:12) puts it
Low magnitudes have the same effect as high thresholds: 
both limit proportionality and the chances for small 
parties to win seats; as magnitudes increase and 
threshold decrease, proportionality and the chances fir 
small parties improve.
Since majoritarian election systems favour larger parties, they do not generally 
provide for legal threshold levels. In practice however, parties do need to win a 
reasonable number of votes to win seats, and gain majority in the legislature. And 
therefore, normally there is an effective threshold of votes needed by parties, even in 
the absence of a legal one.
Assembly Size
The total number of seats in the legislature, or the assembly size is another dimension 
of the electoral system. Existing literature has not paid adequate attention to this 
dimension, especially in the empirical analysis (Lijphart, 1994 is the main 
exception). However, since the assembly size is a crucial determinant of the system 
of translation of votes into seats, its effect on the party system is direct and real. In 
particular, assembly size affects the degree of multipartism and the proportionality.
Some other minor features of an electoral system include the ballot structure, and the 
degree of malapportionment, and the difference between legislative elections in 
parliamentary and in presidential systems.
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Two types of ballot types are found: categorical, where voter can vote for one party 
only, or ordinal, where voter can divide the vote amongst different parties. Ordinal 
ballot by its very nature can be expected to favour multipartism. However Rae’s 
(1967) analysis for twenty countries between 1945 and 1964 does not find the 
evidence to support this hypothesis.
Gallagher (1991) points out the effect of malapportionment on the degree of 
proportionality of election outcomes. Malapportionment refers to a situation, where 
district (in a single-district system) have substantially unequal voting populations. 
Malapportionment, in a multi-member district system, means district magnitudes that 
are not commensurate with their voting populations. This phenomenon can favour or 
work against particular parties, and also affect electoral disproportionality.
Further, as is shown by Shugart (1988), plurality-based Presidential elections can 
effect legislative elections held at the same time. Larger parties have better chances 
of having their presidential candidate elected, and its knock-on effect can also affect 
legislative elections. Therefore, presidential systems should normally discourage 
multipartism.
The mechanics of the institutional effect
The Institutional approach incorporates Duverger’s Law which holds that the simple- 
majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system (Duverger, 1963: 217). 
This happens due to a ‘mechanical’ effect, whereby larger parties get 
disproportionately higher share of legislative seats, as compared to their share of 
votes, and a ‘psychological effect’, whereby both voters and elites avoid wasting
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their votes, time and money on candidates and parties less likely to succeed in 
elections. In a complementary message, Sartori (1968) distinguishes between strong 
and feeble electoral systems, and implies that this distinction can strongly or feebly 
constrain the voters’ choice. A system of proportional representation on the other 
hand, leads to low effective threshold of representation, and presents better chances 
for the smaller parties to win votes and seats.
Riker (1982) argued that Duverger’s Law operates because voters and politicians act 
in a sophisticated manner, resulting in a two party system under the plurality rule; 
politicians will leave losing parties, donors will not fund losing parties and voters 
will vote to minimise their regret by voting for their best choice among the 
candidates likely to win. However according to Abramowitz (1995), whether voters 
look at all range of electoral choices, is not explicitly clear from studies done. It 
seems that that they are operating under some kind of “bounded rationality”. Cox 
(1997) finds that voters in Britain favour candidates who were involved in close 
contests in previous elections previously. It can be said that Duverger’s Law forces 
or encourages voters to vote for candidates likely to win, but their actual vote is 
influenced by a variety of factors, including the party the candidate belongs to, the 
intensity of preferences on local versus national issues, and also what other friends 
and acquaintances are voting for. Chhibber and Kollman (1998) find strong evidence 
for Duverger’s Law in district elections, but they argue that national party 
composition is a more complex affair, where federal system, social cleavages and 
electoral rules all play important role.
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The effect of the electoral formula and district magnitude on the size of the party 
system can take place by the way votes are translated into seats. Electoral rules can 
affect the number of parties in a ‘mechanical’ manner, irrespective of the way in 
which votes are determined. This effect will therefore influence how accurately the 
number of legislative parties corresponds with the number of vote-getting parties. In 
a purely PR system, the number of electoral parties will be same as the number of the 
electoral (vote-getting) parties. However, in practice even in PR systems, many 
parties winning a significant proportion of votes might not win a seat. Therefore, the 
number of legislative parties will invariably be smaller than the electoral parties.
Thus, the most important institutional features of the electoral system that can lead to 
mechanical effect include the district-magnitude and the method of selecting the 
winner. In some countries, a threshold of votes that must be overcome before a party 
can obtain a seat. While a ‘natural’ threshold that depends on the size of the 
legislative assembly and the district magnitude exists in all electoral systems and 
countries, some countries have also introduced higher legal thresholds that must be 
reached before winning a seat. In electoral systems with single-member districts, 
there can be only one winner, and therefore, even a party receiving a fairly large 
share of votes might end up losing the seat. Consequently, the number of parties 
winning seats will be far lower than the number of parties receiving votes. Electoral 
systems using multi-member districts and PR formula on the other hand, can be 
expected to yield a higher number of seats for parties that would not win in a single­
member district. Thus, as the district magnitude increases, one can expect to see a 
larger number of parties win seats with the same share of votes, and the number of 
legislative parties will mirror the number of electoral parties.
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The presence of the ‘upper tier’ seats also leads to more representative legislature, 
since these seats are typically compensatory in nature. For example, 39 seats are 
distributed in a second tier among the parties and cartels in Sweden whose share of 
the seats is less than their share of the votes (Caramani, 2000). Similarly, in 
Venezuela, parties that are under-represented in the allocation of district level seats 
relative to their national vote share can receive some compensatory seats (Jones,
1995). The effect of upper tier seats however depends on the proportionality of the 
electoral system’s mechanical effects.
Reed (1990) stresses that the Duverger’s psychological effect, which decimates third 
parties, applies at both the voter level and at the politician level, a point also made by 
Riker (1982, 1986). Reed (1990) argues that elite-level coalition formation to secure 
the required percentage of votes at the district level occurs due to incentives under 
the system for factions inside parties with over half the vote to defect and seek 
cooperation with elements of the opposition. Thus, third parties get decimated by 
defections, splits and mergers, in addition to voters not “wasting” their votes. In the 
Indian context of weakly institutionalised parties, this could be a powerful factor.
Evidence for mechanical effect
Golder (2002) finds that lumber of electoral parties has an increasing, but less than 
proportional effect on the number of legislative parties when the district magnitude is 
one and there are no upper tier seats. Furthermore, an increase in district magnitude 
leads to a more proportional translation of votes into seats. On average, upper tier 
seats do not increase the proportionality of translation of votes into seats. Their 
model suggests that upper tier seats actually make the electoral system more
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disproportional. The small district magnitude has a mechanical reductive effect on 
the number of legislative parties. These effects encourage voters to vote strategically 
for larger parties, and for party elites to participate in strategic entry or withdrawl 
(for example in India, it leads to pre-poll-alliances, especially when coalition 
government is expected). Thus electoral institutions can have a mechanical reductive 
effect on the number of legislative parties even when the voter behaviour is 
exogenously determined (Golder, 2002, 2006). The second reductive effect of 
electoral laws takes place by their influence on the behaviour of voters and 
candidates.
Duverger (1954) discussed the behavioural effect of non-permissive electoral laws 
on voters and candidates as the ‘psychological effect’. According to Riker (1982), 
electoral rules can encourage strategic voting on the part of voters, and the strategic 
entry on the part of candidates. Cox and Monroe (1995) discuss a situation where 
voters have some preferences over formation of national legislature and clear 
expectations of how parties will fare in national elections. Therefore, voters will 
usually avoid voting for nationally non-competitive parties, even though these are 
competitive at district level, and this will lead to two nationally competitive parties.
Deviations from Duverger’s Law
Deviations from Duverger’s Law have been explained by various hypotheses. Voters 
have different levels of information, do not have same expectation about how 
candidates’ performance in elections; people are engaging in disillusioned or sincere 
voting -  to parties closest to their ideal points, they have intense preferences; they 
look at next elections and not just the present one. Rohrschneider (1993) argues that
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more sincere voting for minor parties will take place when a new dimension is being 
openly debated and contested. Another possibility is that when one party is sure to 
win, people might vote sincerely, to express their preference. According to Riker 
(1976), deviations from Duverger’s Law emerge because of ‘sincere voting’ and 
‘disillusioned voting’ by voters. This happens because voters vote to express their 
preference, or when supporters of a large party leave it to the voter for their second 
preference. According to Riker, large parties have to withstand greater factionalism 
and tension within it due to ideological diversity and sharing of spoils. This can lead 
to party splits, formation of new parties.
Rae (1971:95) reformulated Duverger’s Law to say that Plurality formulae are 
always associated with two-party competition except where strong local minority 
parties exist According to Riker (1982: 762), “If the third party nationally is one of 
the two larger parties locally, then sophisticated voting by supporters of the weakest 
party (i.e., one of the two larger parties nationally) strengthens the third party. This 
latter effect is probably what has kept alive the Liberal party in Britain and some 
Canadian third parties.”
Other reformulations of Duverger’s Law incorporate the effects of number of issue 
dimensions and social cleavages. Taagepera and Grofman (1985) argue that 
Duverger’s Law can work only if there is single issue dimension and once the 
number of issue dimensions increases, the equilibrium number of parties is tie 
number of issue dimensions plus one. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) argue that 
Duverger’s Law may not work where there are multiple issue dimensions. An
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important observation of theirs is that the effect on party system depends on whether 
issue dimensions remain salient, or they are absorbed by existing parties.
Lijphart (1994) accepts application of Duverger’s Law, but stresses the importance 
of number and depth of social cleavages as a key element influencing the party 
system. According to him, India remained a multi-party system with a dominant 
party, and if measured by Laakso-Taagepera index for the number of effective 
parties, it approached a two-party system. However, it still represents a departure 
from the prediction of the Duverger’s Law, especially if one considers the growing 
number of parties especially at the national level in the last decade.
Cox (1997) in a review of the institutionalist school, argues that bipartism in a 
simple-majority single-ballot electoral system is a result of resource concentration by 
two sets of instrumentally rational agents: strategic voting by voters and strategic 
entry by party elites. While voters will be strategic and prefer to cast their votes for 
candidates who have a high chance of winning, party elites (and contributors) will 
allocate resources such as money and endorsements to serious candidates only. Also, 
potential entrants into the electoral fray may drop out if they anticipate strategic 
voting on the part of the electorate. Cox (1999:149) states that “strategic refers to 
actions that are primarily instrumental as opposed to consummatory, that is, actions 
taken because of their perceived impact on the final outcome of the election, rather 
than because of any intrinsic value they may have.” Under conditions of perfect 
strategic coordination by voters and parties, the equilibrium number of parties in a 
single-ballot simple-majority system is two.
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An important criticism of this school is that it neglects to take into account the 
impact of social cleavages on the party system. Scholars of the institutionalist school 
question the sociological explanation of the party systems by pointing out that 
socially defined groups are not always able to organise themselves as groups, 
especially in light of the collective action problem (Olson, 1965). Further, the social 
groups might not result into political parties since this may not necessarily be a better 
strategy as compared to forging coalitions. Schattschneider (1960) argued that 
politicians can combine or recombine social groups for political purposes, and 
therefore the presence of existing social cleavages may not lead to politically active 
parties or groups, and imply a unique party system.
Jesse (1990: 62) questions whether Duverger’s generalisations serve “any useful 
function at all.” Scholars such as Grumm (1958), Eckstein (1963), Lipson (1964), 
and Fukui (1988) argue that party systems determine electoral systems, rather than 
the other way around. This implies that the institutional school focus on electoral 
rules ignores the more important variable -  the number and type of cleavages in the 
society.
The following sections analyses the literature stressing the importance of social 
cleavages in shaping party systems.
2.4.2 Sociological explanations o f the party systems
According to the sociological school, social cleavages play a crucial role in 
determining the nature of party system (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The focus of this 
view is to ascertain the nature of social cleavages from which parties emerge and
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seek votes. More heterogeneous societies can expect to have more fragmented party 
systems. Thus, according to this view, the size of the party systems is determined by 
the number and type of cleavages in the society.
Amorim and Cox (1997:152) have defined social cleavages to mean enduring social 
differences that might become politicised, or might not: differences of ethnicity, 
religion, language, or occupation, for example. Similarly, Gallagher et al. (1992:90) 
define a social cleavage as a division in which the groups involved are conscious of 
their collective identity, partly because there is an organisation that gives expression 
to this identity. Cox (1997:19) also presents the same idea as follows:
Although a bit fuzzy, the idea that social cleavages 
condition the party system has considerable force and 
has spawned an entire literature in opposition to, or at 
least in tension with, the institutionalist literature.
The major proponents of the social cleavage theory of party systems are Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967). According to their freezing hypothesis, the European party systems 
stabilised or “froze” in the 1920s, and continued with the same socially-defined 
patterns of political competition until at least the 1960s. In other words, the party 
systems were structured by social cleavages that appeared as a result of the political 
mobilisation and organisation of sections of society affected by the national and
tViindustrial revolutions of the 20 century. The logic behind this proposition is based 
on the effect of established social equilibrium on the party systems. Burnham (1970) 
points out only major events and changes such as wars, economic depression can 
change the established social structures. This leads to voters developing loyalty for 
parties and candidates, often based on social groupings, and therefore, the efforts of
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the parties to attract voters, and change their political orientation can be very 
difficult. Social cleavages and groups are therefore politicised by the interactions 
between voters, parties and candidates, and this interactions shapes the party 
systems. Mainwaring and Torcal (2003) have found that in Chile, parties and social 
cleavages are closely related, and this is facilitated by the role of political elites. 
Chhibber and Torcal (1997) find more generally that inter-elite politics is a key 
determinant of the effect of social cleavages on the party systems.
Taagepera and Grofinan (1985) argue that Duvergefs Law is based on the 
assumption of a single left-right issue dimension. However, there may be more than 
one issue dimension in a society, often resulting from social division and conflicts. 
In general, the sociological school assumes that social cleavages are exogenous to the 
political system while electoral laws are endogenous. Cleavages should have an 
incremental effect on the number of entrants at the pre-entry stage of politics. 
According to Cox (1999:159),
At the local level, the story is simply that, as the 
number of distinct religious, ethnic, or linguistic 
groups in a district increases the chances of mah 
coordination also increase.
Using this logic, cleavages should have an incremental effect on the number of vote 
getting parties. Powell (1980) uses election data from 27 countries to show that party 
fractionalisation has a positive association with both ethnic fractionalisation as well 
as the strength of the electoral system as measured by the average district magnitude.
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Social cleavages can directly affect the party systems, since candidates can appeal to
*
voters, based on social affinity, rather than ideologies. Jones (1997) examines the 
effect of social heterogeneity on the number of effective candidates in majority 
runoff elections to the Louisiana House of Representatives between 1975 and 1995 
and finds a positive and significant relationship between racial heterogeneity and 
party fractionalisation. According to Mainwaring and Torcal (2003), inter-elite 
politics is the main instrument through which party systems get based on social 
cleavages. State bureaucracies also tend to influence party systems, in combination 
with other social factors (such as literacy levels, societal heterogeneity, power and 
structure of state bureaucracy, economic development etc) to create social cleavages.
The working and the policies of the government and its bureaucracy also play an 
important role in shaping the partisan alliances and loyalty (Kitschelt, 1999; 
Maravall, 1997). Further, social factors can interact with government policies to 
result into politically stable social cleavages. Bartolini (2000), in the context of 
European electoral politics in the 20th century, argues that politicisation of the class 
cleavages was a consequence of many social and political features prevalent at that 
time in Europe. These included factors such as bureaucratisation, centralisation of the 
state power, the consolidation of external boundaries, the degree of cultural 
heterogeneity, the educational level of the population and the extent of intra-state 
communication. Thus, the
economic-functional conflicts tended to prevail over 
other divisions with the formation and consolidation of 
the economic and administrative center. It was only
23Ideologies, once formed can be difficult to change, and consequently party loyalties tend to remain 
stable and difficult to change.
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with the development of the modem state and with the 
integration of different groups ...[were] conflicts 
between these groups...centralized. (Bartolini, 2000:
18-19).
The empirical analysis of the party systems in many countries has relied heavily on 
sociological explanations. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) point out that British 
electoral politics are typically described in terms of the class and regional cleavages. 
In Britain, social class forms an important basis of the party systems, whereby the 
working class traditionally associated itself with the Labour party, and the regional 
factors explain the performance of the Scottish and Welsh parties (Butler and Stokes 
1970; Mughan 1986; Rose 1974). In Canada too, region and language have been the 
dominant factors shaping the number of parties (Schwartz 1974, Martin 1974). 
Research on American party politics also emphasizes social cleavages as an 
important determinant of party systems. Many studies relate the American partisan 
coalitions to the crises that disrupt formerly stable alliances among social groups 
(Key 1950, Schattschneider 1960, Burnham 1970, Petrocik 1981). The American 
two-party system is also explained in terms of the weakness of the third parties, 
because of the cultural dualism in the society, and the lack of a strong labour 
movement in the late 19th and early 20th Century (Lipset et al., 1956, Hartz, 1955). 
Thus, according to this view, social cleavages in America are stable and shape the 
American party system.
Explanation of party systems in India has been studied in terms of social and cultural 
divisions based on language, religion, and caste. The research has mostly focused on 
the effect of caste on the number of parties and partisan politics (For example, Brass
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1965, 1981; Yadav 1996a, Chhibber and Petrocik, 1989). According to Jaffrelot 
(1995), religion is a major social cleavagp in Indian politics, especially from the 
point of view of the rise of parties such as the BJP. Further, the evolution of Indian 
party systems has also been strongly influenced by regional factors, rather than lines 
based on ideologies or different preferences over national policies (Wallace, 2000).
An important criticism of the sociological school is that it does not address the 
question of how cleavages are politicised and come to structure the party system. It 
ignores the possibility that strategies adopted by parties may actively create new 
cleavages rather than passively adapting to pre-existing cleavages. In short, there is 
an absence of agency in the social cleavage theory of party formation.
2.4.3 Strategic interaction
Recently, another approach is emerging that stresses the ‘strategic interaction’ 
between social cleavages and electoral rules, while shaping the party systems. This 
approach has been used by Powell (1982), Moser (2001), Ordeshook and Shvetsova 
(1994), Amorim and Cox (1997), Cox (1997), Filippov et al. (1999), Mozaffar 
(2001), and Jones (1999, 2002). According to Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994: 
101),
Analysing the effects of electoral institutions separate 
from other things ignores the possibility that 
institutions are intervening structures and that they 
influence, say the number of political parties only to 
the extent that the ‘more basic’ characteristics of a 
society act through them to increase or decrease this 
number.
They conclude by saying that if district magnitude is one, the party system is 
relatively impervious to ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity.
CHAPTER 2
WHAT DETERMINES PARTY SYSTEMS?
Amorim and Cox (1997) discuss a hypothetical series of stages by which social 
cleavages are translated into party-defining cleavages, noting that “some stages are 
sensitive to the particularities of social structure, some to the details of the electoral 
structure, and some to both.” According to their view, the number of parties are an 
end-product of a stages or series of decisions by various individuals and groups that 
lead to a reduction of a large number of social cleavages to a smaller number of 
political cleavages or parties. According to them, these stages are -  the translation of 
social cleavages into partisan preferences, the translation of partisan preferences into 
votes, and the translation of votes into seats. This is shown in the Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1 Effect of electoral institutions, social cleavages on number of parties
Social Cleavages
1
Partisan Differences
__________________Access to Resources
^  (Money, Media, etc.)
Stage 1 Launched Parties
-------------------  Strategic Voting
I '
; i
Stage 2 Electoral (vote-getting) Parties
--------------------------- Mechanical effect
Stage 3 Legislative (seat-getting) Parties
Source: Based on Amorim and Cox (1997)
As shown in Figure 2-1, different forces or factors affect these stages to varying 
degrees. In purely institutional models, the translation of social cleavages into 
partisan preferences is not explicitly studied, and the number of parties with their 
respective ideologies and polices are exogenously determined. Further, it assumes 
that parties’ inability to advertise does not affect its votes, and all potential parties
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have the necessary resources to eventually come into existence. According to 
Amorim and Cox (1997), the creation of parties and the advertisement of their policy 
positions are key stages at which the reduction of political players takes place. 
Accordingly, the political groups or individuals are reduced to an actual number of 
launched parties, before the elections reduce these parties to an effective number of 
vote-getting parties.24 Reduction of launched parties into vote-getting parties takes 
place through a mechanism of strategic voting. Thus, unless a party is perceived to 
have viable chances of winning the elections, voters may not waste their votes on 
that party, and will in turn vote strategically in favour of a party that has reasonable 
chances of winning. The strength of the electoral system (Sartori, 1968) affects the 
degree of the reduction of launched parties into vote-getting parties.25 Finally, the 
reduction of vote-getting parties into the seat-getting parties takes place according to 
the features of electoral system.
The reasons for superiority of strategic interaction model have been discussed by 
Amorim and Cox (1997). They argue that a polity will have many parties only if it 
has many cleavages and a permissive enough electoral system that lets political 
agents to convert these cleavages into parties. Second, a polity can have few parties 
either because it has no need for many parties because of few cleavages, or there are 
limited opportunities for them because of a strong electoral system. Thus, according 
to interaction approach, both the social cleavages and the institutional features of
24According to Amorim and Cox (1997), the reduction of launched parties depends on the level o f  
preexisting non-political organisation that can be turned to political advantage, financial resources, 
access to media, etc.
25The stronger the electoral system, the greater will be its efficiency to reduce launched parties into 
vote-getting parties.
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electoral and political system are important, they interact to produce the size of party 
systems in a polity.
Two most important dimensions of electoral systems which determine its 
permissiveness are the electoral formula and the district magnitude. All majoritarian 
systems make it difficult for small parties to gain representation, because they need 
to win pluralities in electoral districts. Smaller district magnitudes also grant 
considerable advantage to larger parties, since they usually get a larger share of seats 
than the share of votes they receive. If the assumptions behind the interaction model 
are correct, it will rule out additive models, whereby the number of parties depend 
only on cleavage or only on electoral system, or only on additive combination of 
these two (Amorim and Cox, 1997).26
The Indian case seems to defy the strict interpretation of the strategic interaction 
model. India follows the plurality formula, whereby voters cast votes in single- 
member districts, and the candidate with most votes win. Thus, it is not a permissive 
electoral system. Yet India has ‘many’ and not ‘few’ parties, in contrast to the 
argument made in Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994).
A few scholars have attempted to reconcile the propositions of the institutional and 
the sociological schools by empirically testing for the effect that the interaction 
between electoral structure and social cleavages has on the size of the party system. 
Powell (1982) uses election data from 27 countries to show that party
26An additive model assumes that number o f parties can be large either because of many cleavages 
(irrespective of the permissiveness o f the electoral system), or because the electoral system is very 
permissive (irrespective o f the number o f cleavages).
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fractionalisation has a positive association with both ethnic fractionalisation as well 
as the strength of the electoral system as measured by the average district magnitude. 
Powell’s (1982) findings support the superiority of additive model over an interactive 
one. Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) show that the interactive effect between 
strength of electoral structure and ethnic fractionalisation is a stronger predictor of 
the effective number of parties than their individual additive effects. They conclude 
that
...if the effective number of ethnic groups is large, 
political systems become especially sensitive to district 
magnitude. But if ethnic fractionalisation is low, then 
only especially large average district magnitudes result 
in any “wholesale” increase in formally organized 
parties. Finally, if district magnitude equals one, then 
the party system is relatively “impervious” to ethnic 
and linguistic heterogeneity... (pp. 122)
Using slightly different measures of district magnitude, Amorim and Cox (1997) 
extend the analysis to include developing countries. They find that the number of 
parties depend on the product of social heterogeneity and electoral permissiveness, 
rather than being an additive function of these two. Thus, multipartism results as the 
joint product of many social cleavages and a permissive electoral system. Amorim 
and Cox (1997) caution in deriving conclusions about the superiority of either of the 
two (additive or interactive) specification, because of lack of enough empirical 
evidence, and because these studies are largely based on European countries.
Findings of the interaction based studies are important because they differ from the 
pure sociological formulations of the party systems. Further, it also argues against 
the purely institutional approaches. However, as Amorim and Cox (1997) point out
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that the further investigations of the interaction between social and electoral structure 
is required, particularly by using a more micro-level data.
2.4.4 Other factors
Finally, the size of the party systems is also influenced by some other factors, which 
I call ‘contextual factors’. These include factors such as the role of presidential 
elections (Cox 1997), the relative timing of presidential and parliamentary elections 
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), and the degree of political fiscal centralisation 
(Chhibber and Kollman 1998).
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) argue that electoral system effects are most 
prominent in district elections, and that the number of national parties depends on the 
policies and role of the national government in relation to sub-national governments. 
They argue that since both social cleavages and electoral rules tend to be stable, the 
change in number of parties over time can be explained by the degree of fiscal and 
political centralisation exercised by the central government. According to them, in 
the periods of centralisation of power in the hands of central government, the voters 
tend to vote for larger party labels, and this leads to party aggregation at the national 
level. Similarly, in the periods of decentralisation, the sub-national governments get 
more powers, and voters need not vote for a national party label, in order to get his or 
her views heard. Hence, decentralisation phases see party disaggregation at the 
national level. Chhibber and Kollman (2004: 80) summarise their findings as thus
In general, ...centralizing authority at the national level 
will reduce the number of parties because voters will 
be less inclined to vote for regional, state or province-
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level, or local parties. The opposite trend, 
decentralisation or provincialisation, ought to make it 
more likely to see an increase the number of parties, 
though this does not necessarily occur. Regardless, 
provincialisation should increase the preponderance of 
regional voting.
It could be argued that political parties, which control the state, are actually the 
instruments of centralisation and decentralisation and that it is the party system that 
has a bearing on which level of government has more influence than the other way 
around. However, Chhibber and Kollman note that the trend towards centralisation 
and decentralisation (or the level of government at which most decisions are made - 
central or provincial/state) is actually the consequence of economic change that 
works somewhat independently of the party system.
2.5 Conclusions
As is discussed in this chapter, theory supports the arguments of both the 
sociological and the institutional schools. Irteraction-based models too have been 
adequately supported by theoretical underpinnings. The results of empirical studies 
however, have varied and there does not seem to be a consensus on the empirical 
determinants of the size of the party system in the existing literature. Some studies 
show the superiority of sociological school, while others stress institutional factors. 
Some recent empirical models have supported the view both sociological and 
institutional factors interact to shape the size of the party system of a polity. 
However, the type and nature of the interaction is still being debated. Some 
empirical studies find that the additive model is superior, i.e. that sociological and 
institutional factors have independent effects on the party systems, while some 
studies have found that an interaction-based models are better meaning thereby that
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the effects of the sociological and institutional factors are multiplicative rather than 
additive in nature.
I argue that the variation in empirical findings can also arise because the political 
situation and context differs across countries and regions. Theory postulates both 
sociological and institutions factors are important, but their relative importance 
depends on the social and political context in a particular polity, at a particular time. 
This places some limitations on comparative studies of the size of the party systems. 
To be more meaningful and consistent, these studies need to also consider the 
contextual factors. The importance of contextual factors for new and emerging 
democracies, with heterogeneous populations is much greater than for the western 
democracies.
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3 EXISTING RESEARCH ON INDIAN PARTY SYSTEM
In this chapter, I review the existing research on the Indian party system. I focus on 
the explanations relating to the domination of one party -  INC, in the years 
immediately following India’s independence, India’s deviation from the Duvergerian 
norm of having a two-party system, the importance of social cleavages and issue 
dimensions, and the effect of distribution of powers between the national and the 
state governments. I also review empirical studies that have been carried out to 
explain the size of the party system in India. I start with a brief introduction about 
key features of Indian politics and party system, as it stands today.
3.1 The current Indian political scene
Indian politics in the 1990s has been characterised by the politicisation of increasing 
number of social cleavages and identities. The two main national parties -  INC and 
BJP remain relatively broad-based and ‘catch-all’ parties, but have to contend with 
the increasing number of groups and parties based on ethnic, caste, religion, language 
and geography. The 2004 election results reinforce the trends of the 1990s, especially 
at the national level. It also marks the return to power of INC, which saw its 
electoral fortunes decline dramatically during the last 4 general elections. Some 
commentators had interpreted the rise of BJP to its exploitation of religious 
extremism, even though the party claims its policies and ideology represent the true 
‘nationalism’ and dismisses the ‘pseudo-secularism’ practiced by more ‘catch-all’ 
parties such as the INC. The rise of the BJP was also witnessed with interest in the 
academic community because some commentators saw its rise as an anomaly where
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a ‘catch-all’ party -  the INC, was losing ground to a party which has ‘intense-views’, 
unlike the trend witnessed in most other polities. The BJP on the other hand has 
denied being an extremist party, and has referred to the ‘catch-all’ policies of EMC as 
being ‘pseudo-secular’. There is also one school of thought which believes that BJP 
has increasingly become a centrist or a catch-all party, and this helped it to win 
elections in the majority of the elections in the last decade. BJP headed a coalition 
government at the national level between 1998-2004 based on a ‘Common Minimum 
Programme’ of governance with its alliance partners. To do so, it had to abandon 
some of the policies that were considered by some to be controversial.27
In the 2004 elections, a coalition government led by the INC came to power. INC’s 
unexpected success is largely a result of its alliance with state or regional parties, 
which enabled it and its allies to win a majority of the seats in the parliament. As the 
situation stands now, political parties in India are increasing incapable of winning 
parliamentary majority on their own, and have to engage in coalition politics to win 
seats and form governments. These trends have in turn led to the proliferation of 
groups based on caste, religious, language, and regional affiliations, both within and 
outside organised political parties. These trends have increased the importance of the 
state level politics and party systems, and their effects on the national politics.
The coalition governments being formed at the national level elections represent a 
new form of ‘catch-all’ political party, representing different interests and groups, in
27These included adoption of a uniform civil code, scrapping special status to the state o f Jammu & 
Kashmir
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this era of pre-poll alliances and seat adjustments.28 Similar trends are also visible at 
the state level, where national and regional parties often form pre-poll alliances or 
seat-adjustment arrangements, where they jointly decide their common candidates 
for the elections, and run their campaigns. In some states, although there are no joint 
candidates, the alliance partners agree to contest a pre-decided number of seats, and 
do not contest seats where their alliance partner is contesting. The coalitions being 
formed in India might also resemble Lijphart’s (1996) characterisation of India as a 
consociational democratic system. As Wallace (2003:1) points out,
the catch-all and consociational designations are both 
appropriate for India’s political party system as it 
enters the 21st century.
Although the number of parties does not seem to have reached equilibrium, and 
varies across states and elections, the coalition form of government seems to be here 
to stay, for sometime to come. Thus, the Indian party system at the national level 
has moved from a single-party dominance till the 1980s, to a two-party dominated 
system where two alliances compete for electoral supremacy. At the state level too, 
the days of single party dominance are over, but the trend has varied across the 
states. Some states have moved to a multi-party system, where national parties, 
regional parties, and other smaller parties are engaged in electoral competition either 
alone, or with their alliance partners. Some states have followed the national model, 
where two large national parties and their alliance partners constitute a two-party 
dominated party system.
28Kirchheimer (1966) first used the term “Catch-All Party”, while referring to changes in post-Second 
World War political parties in Europe. These changes, according to him transformed “the old 
bourgeois party of individual representation” and the “mass integration” party into a “catch-all 
‘people’s’ party”.
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The analysis of the election results for 1998, 1999 and 2004 clearly shows the effect 
of alliances and coalitions on the government formation.29 The INC which did not 
adopt a broad coalition strategy in 1998 and 1999, did so in 2004, and this was an 
important reason that it could return to power. This is illustrated by Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 Seats won by, share of votes of national parties 1998 - 2004
Seats contested Seats won Share of votes %
Party 1998 1999 2004 1998 1999 2004 1998 1999 2004
BJP 388 339 364 182 182 138 25.59 23.75 22.16
INC 477 453 417 141 114 145 25.82 28.30 26.53
BSP 251 225 435 5 14 19 4.67 4.16 5.33
CPI 58 54 34 9 4 10 1.75 1.48 1.40
CPM 71 72 69 32 33 43 5.16 5.40 5.69
JD 191 0 0 6 0 0 3.24 0.00 0.00
JD(S) 0 96 43 0 1 3 0.00 0.91 1.47
JD(U) 0 60 73 0 21 8 0.00 3.10 2.35
Source: Election Commission of India reports
As shown by Table 3-1 the national vote shares of the INC and the BJP in the last 
three elections show marginal changes, but the number of seats won by each has 
changed substantially. BJP’s share of votes declined from 25.6% in 1998 to 23.8% in 
1999, but it won the same number of seats at 182. In contrast, INC increased its vote 
share from 25.8% to 28.3%, but won fewer seats in 1999 (114) as compared to 1998 
(141). In 2004, both BJP and INC’s vote share declined by about 1.5%, but the 
number of seats won by INC increased by 31, while BJP got 44 fewer seats. In 1998 
and 1999 elections BJP followed a coalition strategy, contested fewer number of 
seats on its own, and left many seats for its allies. This strategy helped it to increase 
its seats, and helped it to form the government at the centre. In 2004, INC too, 
followed an active coalition strategy and contested fewer seats, leaving a large
29Early election took place in 1999, since the BJP led coalition government lost a vote in the 
parliament by a very narrow margin.
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number of seats for its alliance partners. Not only did it win larger number of seats, 
but it also regained power at the centre, and is now leading a coalition government at 
the national level.
The formation of alliances between parties has an effect of reducing the effective 
number of parties, which get votes and seats. This factor is also very difficult to 
predict in the Indian situation, since party loyalties and support have changed rather 
easily between alliance partners. However, the same forces that encourage alliances 
also hcrease the number of parties. Since India is witnessing a phase of coalition 
politics, there is an incentive for smaller groups and parties to contest elections on 
their own. This happens because larger parties often need support from smaller 
parties in order to form national governments, and that is why these parties get a 
much higher influence on national government formation than is warranted by the 
number of seats won by them Thus, coalition politics can increase or decrease the 
number of parties cortesting elections and influencing the formation of government.
Wallace (2003:8) presents the following points on the reformulation of the party
i ,L
system existing at the end of the 20 century. First, the Congress Party is no longer 
the centre of the system. The elections in 1996, 1998 and 1999 show that it is one of 
the major players, but not the main player. The recent 2004 national election results 
have confirmed that Congress on its own is unable to dictate the direction of Indian 
politics and the party system. Second, two alliances led by the two major national 
parties, instead of parties themselves, contest for electoral supremacy. Third, a 
single third political force, as an alternative to the two alliances led by the INC and 
the BJP, no longer exists, and the possibility of such a third force looks unlikely.
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Fourth, regional parties now hold the balance of power for the construction of a 
ruling coalition. Further, alliances between parties are increasingly based on power 
politics, rather than ideology. Consequently, there are frequent switches of loyalty 
by regional and smaller parties. Fifth, Niche parties representing narrow segments of 
society (such as a particular caste or region) continue to emerge from existing parties 
and social groips. Lastly, political leadership rather than the institutionalisation of 
parties, is affecting the formulation of party system, alliances and electoral outcomes.
However, these recent trends which are visible now emerged only in the 1980s, and 
got strengthened in the 1990s. The earlier periods in the Indian political history after 
its independence saw INC dominating the political scene. I discuss the reasons for 
this dominance below.
3.2 Explanation of INC’s dominance between 1952 and 1967
The Indian party system between 1952 and 1967 both at the national level and the 
state level was dominated by the INC. This domination of INC as the “catch-all” 
political party has often been explained in terms of it being an ideal type broad-based 
party. The INC party was credited for leading the Indian independence movement, 
and providing it with its first post-independent government. Its leaders, particularly 
Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru provided INC’s its character of aggregating 
India’s diversity of castes, religions, regions and ideologies. The Indian party system 
in this period has been described as of a one party dominance (Kothari, 1964), but 
one which was nevertheless competitive. This system consisted of a party o f  
consensus and parties o f pressure. While the factions within the party o f consensus 
(the INC) exerted pressure from within, the parties o f pressure included various
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opposition parties, dissident groups from ruling party and other interest groups. 
These outside groups and parties did not form an alternative to the ruling party, but 
constantly criticised, pressurised and influenced it. This effect and influence was to 
ensure that the ruling party did not stray too far from the popular public opinion, and 
if the factions within the ruling party were not mobilised to restore the balance, it
could be displaced by the opposition groups. As Kothari (1964: 1162) points out,
both the ideas of an in-built corrective (action) through 
fractionalisation within the ruling party, and the idea of 
a latent threat from outside the margin of pressure are 
necessary parts of the one-party dominance system.
The INC which functioned as a broad-based nationalist movement leading up the 
Indian independence in 1947 became a party o f consensus due to unique set of 
historical factors and circumstances. It developed a system of factions, which were 
built around a network consisting of various social groups and leader-client 
relationships. In the process, traditional institutions of kin and caste were drawn 
upon, and mediated by a political organisation structure. Over a period to time, this 
system led to a new cadre of leadership drawn from a diffuse social base, and 
structure of struggle, conflict, and factionalism within the framework of INC. Such a 
party system displayed plurality within the dominant party, which made it
representative, provided flexibility, and sustained internal competition. It also
absorbed groups outside the party, and prevented other parties from gaining strength.
Thus, INC’s unique position in the history of India, the character of its leaders then 
provided a basis for its dominance in a large heterogeneous country, at the time of its 
independence. Kothari (1964:1167) delineates how the congress led single-party
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dominated system was strengthened after independence. On assuming power, it gave 
an important role to the government and politics, in the building of the nation. It also 
made the central authority a key feature of national politics. Further, it gave to the 
government and the ruling party a great symbolic value, so that the political system 
got legitimised through identification with a particular leadership, and its agents and 
heirs. To ensure its continued dominance, INC concentrated economic power and 
patronage in its hands. The system could sustain itself because a ‘conciliatory 
machinery’ was developed within the INC over many years, which mediated in 
factional disputes, influenced political decisions, and backed up one group against 
the other, confirming its position of patronage and power. Further, such a position of 
the INC was strengthened by the policy of neutralising the effects of cleavages and 
disaffection. The specific steps taken by INC in this regard included organisation of 
states along linguistic lines, removal of feudalism, protective labour legislation, 
granting special privileges to the weaker sections of society, and firm suppression of 
violent conflicts, and acts encouraging secession and disaffection. According to 
Kothari, this system, despite INC having total control of parliament and party 
system, did not become an authoritarian one, because of the electoral process, the 
influence exerted by its factions, and the opposition, and the ideals of its founding 
fathers, and their faith in democratic principles.
Thus, the INC ‘system’ in India was a model representing political transition, where 
a new nation was trying to rediscover itself. It also represented a model of 
relationship between politics and society in India through mediation in a 
heterogeneous society. Kothari (1970: 1036) explains that the model
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sought to relate the operative mechanics of the system 
-  e.g., intra-party competition, inter-party competition, 
and the intimate relation between the two -  with its 
historical dynamics which included the nation-building 
ethos of the system, the changing role of the 
government, control of economic power and patronage, 
and mobilization of new social groups into the political 
mainstream through both the openness of the 
participatory structure and the use of government 
power and public policies.
This type of party system was a unique one, and an ‘ideal-type’ representation of a 
one-party dominated system, along with democratic functioning of parliament. 
While it lasted, it was a new addition to the typology of party systems. After the 
death of Jawaharlal Nehru, first Prime Minister of India in 1967, the congress 
‘system’ underwent some changes; it suffered electoral setbacks, leading to political 
instability in many states; the economic situation also became worse. Overall the 
system had to work under more complex circumstances and environment; the 
structure of opposition underwent a change, many new states were formed, and the 
international environment underwent many changes. Despite these changes, the 
congress system by and large remained intact till 1977.
Morris-Jones (1966) points out that the INC can be conceived as a circle whose mid­
point is at the intersection of all the principal axes of polarization. The opposition 
parties are on various axes, but outside the Congress circle, that is, diametrically 
opposed to each other along various axes and actually closer to Congress factions 
adjacent to them on their axes than to other opposition parties on their axes or outside 
the circumference of the Congress circle on some other axes. This model seeks to 
explain why the Congress has been, in Riker’s terms, a Condorcet winner most of the 
time. The opposition was thus fragmented in terms of votes and on ideological-
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programmatic terms, while the Congress was very much like the consociationalists’ 
grand coalition in composition and internal functioning. In Kothari’s analysis the 
success of this grand coalition brought about effective power-sharing in a 
heterogeneous society, facilitated Condorcet winning and was linked to the internal 
democracy practised in the Congress.
Thus, the above strand of research on the Indian party systems has focused on 
explaining how a single party could dominate in a large and heterogeneous country 
for almost two decades, due to unique set of historical circumstances, coupled with 
the personalities of the leaders of the INC.
Overall, the explanation of the India’s party system in terms of INC’s dominance is a 
stylised analysis which rests on the importance of historical and unique 
circumstances in explaining the party system in the first two decades of India’s post­
independence history. However, as Lijphart (1994) points out that even during this 
phase, India’s party system was competitive, and a focus only on one party does not 
fully describe or explain the Indian party system fully. Focussing on only one party 
also obscures the effects of various institutional and sociological factors that shaped 
the Indian party system in the Congress years.
3.3 India’s exceptionalism to Duverger’s Law
One branch of literature has attempted to explain India’s departure from Duverger’s 
Law, since the number of parties at the national level has never quite been two. One 
of the propositions put forward by Duverger states that “the simple-majority single­
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ballot system favours the two-party system” (Duverger 1963:217). Riker (1982:755) 
found that Duverger’s Law held with minor modifications, stating that
If winning is defined as plurality, then one might
reasonably expect a two-party system...Alternatively, 
if winning is defined as more than half the votes at a 
runoff election, candidates do not necessarily have to 
maximise votes at the initial election - the second most 
votes initially may be enough to win in the end. And if 
winning is defined as the achievement of some number 
of votes less than half (as is necessarily the case under 
proportional representation), then the necessity of 
maximising disappears entirely.
Riker (1982: 762-4) argues that both the mechanical and psychological effects that 
underlie Duverger Law, derive from the rational behaviour of politicians, donors, and 
voters. Riker (1976) explains the exceptions to the law saying that some voters vote 
not to influence selection, but to express an ideological preference. He also argues 
that voters engage in ‘disillusioned” voting, which helps the emergence and 
sustenance of these parties. Large parties also tend to generate greater internal 
tensions over policy, which can lead to Iractionalisation, and emergence of new and 
smaller parties. Rae (1971: 95) reformulated Duverger’s Law to “plurality formulae 
are always associated with two-party competition except where strong local minority 
parties exist”. Based on this, Riker (1982: 762) states
If the third party nationally s one of the two larger 
parties locally, then sophisticated voting by supporters 
of the weakest party (i.e., one of the two larger parties 
nationally) strengthens the third party. This latter effect 
is probably what has kept alive the Liberal party in 
Britain and some Canadian third parties.
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Regarding the Indian case, Riker (1976, 1982) argues that the Congress Party, as the 
largest single party, included the ideological median of voters and has been the 
second choice of many voters on both its right and left. Thus, the Congress Party has 
been a Condorcet winner most of the time, though never achieving an absolute 
majority of votes.
In the Indian example, Congress has probably been a 
Condorcet winner: that is, it probably would have been 
able to defeat rightists in a pairwise contest because 
leftists would vote for Congress rather than rightists, 
and similarly it would have been able to defeat leftists 
in a pairwise contest because rightists would vote for 
Congress rather than leftists (Riker, 1982: 761).
The implication of this is that Duverger’s Law will lead to a two-party system, unless 
the pattern of ideological cleavages and party fractionation makes the emergence of a 
Condorcet winner possible. Riker reformulates Duverger’s Law, taking into account 
Rae’s reformulation to explain the Canadian counter example:
Plurality election rules bring about and maintain two- 
party competition except in countries where (1) third 
parties nationally are continually one of two parties 
locally, and (2) one party in several is almost always 
the Condorcet winner in elections (Riker, 1982:761).
Sartori (1986:47) however does not agree with this reformulation and says that a 
party positioned in the centre of an ideological axis need not necessarily be a 
Condorcet winner. Instead, it could lose votes to parties at the two ends of the 
electoral spectrum, and become a Condorcet loser, as is the case of Liberal party in 
England. Lijphart (1994) suggests that Riker may have overestimated Congress’ 
dominance as even during this phase, Congress did face strong electoral competition.
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However, due to its unique position in India’s independence movement, it continued 
to be a dominant party until the 1980s. Riker’s model resembles that of Kothari’s 
(1964) model of the Congress system in its classic or ideal-type period of 1947-67. 
While Riker’s analysis is based on one issue dimension, Kothari’s model 
incorporates multiple issue dimensions. It is also close to Lijphart’s (1996) grand 
coalition model of power-sharing in the sense that one political party (instead of a 
government) is itself internally a grand coalition representing the various interest and 
pressure groups in the society. In the Indian context, it is important to note that 
Duverger’s psychological effect, applies at both the mass (voter) level and at the elite 
(politicians) level (Reed, 1990; Riker, 1982, 1986; Lijphart, 1990). Reed (1990) 
argues that elite-level coalition at the district level occurs due to incentives under the 
system for factions inside parties. Thus, as Sridharan (1997:10) points out that
third parties get decimated by defections, splits and 
mergers, in addition to voters not “wasting” their votes.
In the Indian context of weakly institutionalised 
parties, this could be a powerful factor.
Sridharan checks the applicability of India to Duverger’s Law, using the 
classification proposed by Sartori (1986:57):
A two-party system may be characterized by three 
traits: (1) over time two parties recurrently and largely 
outdistance all others, in such a way that (2) each of 
them is in a position to compete for the absolute 
majority of seats and may thus reasonably expect to 
alternate in power; and (3) each of them governs, when 
in government, alone...a two-party format denotes two 
relevant parties, each of which governs alone 
regardless of third parties.
108
CHAPTER3
EXISTING RESEARCH ON INDIAN PARTY SYSTEM
Sridharan (1997) also uses the criteria of bipolar multipartism which means electoral 
competition between two alliances each consisting of at least two distinct parties. 
According to Sridharan, the national party system was “roughly” a one-party 
dominated multi-party system between 1952 and 1971, a thought also echoed earlier 
by Kothari. Since 1977, the party system became more competitive, and the vote 
margin between the first and the second party narrowed.30 In the 1990s, the party 
system has moved towards a multi-party system, where two alliances led by two 
national party, INC and BJP compete for electoral supremacy. Regarding the state 
level party systems, Sridharan finds that the party systems at the Indian state level are 
tending toward either two-party systems or bipolar multiparty systems, measured by 
Sartori’s government formation criteria.
With the exception of three in flux and in some minor 
states, the party system seems to have evolved towards 
either a two-party system or bipolar multipartism, 
leaving no single predominant party systems that were 
prevalent from 1952-1967. (Sridharan, 1997: 10)
He concludes (1997: 11)
Duverger’s law certainly seems to hold true in state- 
level party systems for both state assembly and 
national elections. However, at the national party 
system level there is no visible tendency towards a 
two-party system. Rather, a multi-party system without 
a clearly dominant party has emerged...The national 
party system is not becoming a two-party system but a 
multi-party system without a clearly dominant party. 
Thus Duverger’s law does not appear to apply at the 
national party system level.
30The 1984 elections were the only exception, where Congress won a landslide victory following the 
assassination of its leader Indira Gandhi.
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Sridharan attempts to answer this ‘apparent contradiction’ by referring to 
disillusioned voters that have stopped voting for Congress at state level, which has 
eroded its grand-coalitional character. He argues that tie rational choice insight 
about sophisticated and disillusioned voting by both voters and politicians would 
appear to be the best explanation of erosion of Congress support. This process is 
hastened also by the growth of sophisticated voting and sophisticated alliance 
formation by political leaders. Sophisticated voting is expected to grow due to factors 
such as the growth of literacy, the expansion of the electronic media, and the growth 
of election forecasting. Sophisticated behaviour by political leaders and, implicitly, 
by donors, is clearly in evidence in terms of pre-poll alliances, seat adjustments, etc.
Sridharan’s (1997) notes that (pp 1) “What remains unresolved is the question of 
whether multiple social (religious, caste, class, ideological, etc.) cleavages in society 
will remain cross-cutting...”. However Sridharan does not discuss the circumstances 
when the cleavagps will remain cross-cutting or otherwise. Further, he does not 
answer why the number of parties varies across the Indian states. He goes on the say
The result of Duverger’s law in the Indian party system 
is a multi-party system in which coalition or minority 
governments at the Centre may become the norm rather 
than the exception. Further, it implies that even when 
the Central government is a one-party majority 
government, politics will be coalitional since several 
major states at any given time will be governed by 
other state-level political parties (pp 1).
While evaluating India’s adherence to Duverger’s Law, Sridharan uses Sartori’s 
(1986) criteria of relevant parties. I believe that since Sartori’s criteria do not 
provide us an objective measure of the number of parties, its usefulness for 
evaluating Duverger’s Law is limited.
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From the above analysis I can conclude that although Duverger’s (1954) conclusion 
even after its amendments and reformulations is theoretically robust, the empirical 
findings are more complex. India has been generally considered as an exception to 
the Duverger’s law; the number of parties in India at national level has never quite 
been 2 (Lijphart, 1994). However, attempts to explain its exceptionalism have been 
sketchy, and not based on the analysis of comprehensive empirical data and 
alternative methods.
An important element of research on the determinants of Indian party system 
concerns the effect of social cleavages and issue dimension. Below, I discuss how 
these affect the party system in India.
3.4 Explanations based on social cleavages and issue dimensions
The basic difference between Riker’s Condorcet winner and Kothari’s and Lijphart’s 
models is that the latter two incorporate a much broader multi-dimensional concept 
of ideological spectrum. Indian situation is full of many social cleavages based on 
religion, caste, language, region, etc, and a large body of research on India focuses 
on the effects of these divisions on the party politics and system (Yadav, 1996a). 
Chhibber and Petrocik (1989) demonstrate that during the 1950s and the 1960s, INC 
is not a Condorcet winner at the state level but reflects particular social (caste, class, 
religious community) constituencies. It has been a Condorcet winner at the national 
level after the first three or four general elections because
each state has peculiar social cleavages that provide the 
basis of political support for the Congress and its
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opponents. Since these cleavages do not translate 
across states, the opposition parties do not have a 
consistent social basis for support across states 
(emphasis added); they are from constituencies that are 
limited by regional boundaries (Chhibber and Petrocik,
1989:120).
Thus, although the INC has been a Condorcet winner at the national level, it has not 
been so at constituency or state levels, due to a combination of historical reasons, 
elite-level coalition formation for winning elections, multiple cleavages and 
federalism. Recent research on the Indian party system has focussed on the effects of 
religious and ethnic divisions on party politics and political system (Yadav, 1996a; 
Jaffrelot, 1995; Chandra 2000). Macmillan (2003) focuses on the effect of 
implementation and operation of special electoral arrangements designed to enhance 
the representation of specific social groups in India.31 Further, the Indian party 
system has also evolved along regional lines, rather than being based on any 
ideology. The rise of the BJP has been traced by some, to its exploitation of the 
religious cleavages (Jaffrelot, 1995). Similarly the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
claims to represent the interests of a particular section of the society -  the SC. In the 
Indian context, it is clear however, that cleavages alone do not create a political 
party, as is also indicated by Kitschelt (1989), and that there are other enabling or 
hindering factors that will ultimately be decisive for cleavages resulting into a 
political party.
Taagepera and Grofman (1985) argue that the institutional approach focusing on the 
electoral rules, assumes a single issue dimension: a left right ideological axis only. 
They demonstrate that if one increases the number of issue dimensions (implicitly,
31 Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST)
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non-coinciding social cleavages), the equilibrium number of parties tends to be the 
number of issue dimensions plus one. In the presence of more than one issue 
dimension, there is no median voter ideal point. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) 
suggest that Duverger’s Law may not work in the presence of multiple issue 
dimensions, thus implying importance of social cleavages. They also mention 
however, that the relationship between the number of issues and the effective number 
of parties remains two-directional, as does the relationship between the number of 
parties and district magnitude. Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 152) emphasise that 
much depends on whether issue dimensions remain salient, and whether they are 
absorbed by existing parties.
Lijphart (1984, 1990, 1994), while accepting the application of Duverger’s Law to 
plurality-rule systems, agrees with Taagepera and Shugart on the number and depth 
of societal cleavages, as a key variable in influencing the effective number of parties 
(Lijphart, 1990: 488), even as emphasising the greater role of the mechanical effect 
to reduce the number of legislative parties compared to the number of elective 
parties.
Thus, the sociological explanation of the Indian party system is a powerful one, and a 
one which fits into the heterogeneity of the Indian state. The proliferation of the 
number of parties based on social cleavages, geography is explained successfully by 
the presence and politicisation of sociological differences in India. However, one 
still misses a systematic comparative study that links these differences to the size of 
the party system in the Indian states.
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Finally, literature has explained the party system change in India by the party 
aggregation phenomenon.
3.5 Party Aggregation at the national level
Chhibber and Kollman (1998) find that the effective number of parties in India at the 
district level is around 2.5, thus close to the Duvergerian norm. However, this 
number at the national level has been much larger. They argue that this happens 
because of the independent effects of the federal distribution of powers. They rely 
on data from Indian parliamentary elections to argue that the degree of economic and 
political centralisation can influence the number of national parties. According to 
them, party systems are formed on the basis of voters’ and candidates’ incentive to 
coordinate on common party labels. And, as national governments exert more 
political and economic control over local areas, candidates will have greater 
incentives to join national parties, and voters have greater incentives to abandon 
locally competitive parties in favour of nationally competitive parties. As a result, 
there will be “greater similarities in party systems across different levels of vote 
aggregation (national, state, national)” (Chhibber and Kollman, 1998: 329). If this 
logic holds, greater federal centralisation will lead to number parties at national level 
to decrease, and tend to the number of parties at the local level -  2. They explain 
that since both institutional rules, and social cleavages do not tend to change much in 
a polity, changes in number of parties within a polity overtime, can be better 
understood by the federal distribution of powers.
Chhibber and Kollman (1998) point out that most empirical work on the size of the 
party system considers number of parties at national level as a simple aggregation of
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the number o f  parties at the district level (Rae, 1971 and Lijphart, 1994). The 
conclusions drawn from the national level are then used to state whether Duverger’s 
Law is followed or not (Palfrey, 1989:69). However, the situation is more complex, 
since Duverger’s Law deals with a district level phenomenon (Cox, 1997; Cox and 
Monroe, 1995; Gaines, 1999; Sartori, 1986; Wildavsky, 1959). And therefore, as 
Chhibber and Kollman (1998: 330), point out that “the focus o f  attention for national 
party systems therefore should be on what we term party aggregation, or the 
coordination o f  voters across electoral districts into national political parties.” Their 
theoretical analysis is supplemented by an empirical analysis involving a visual 
(graphical) comparison o f  the average number o f effective parties at national level 
and at the district level. This is reproduced as Figure 3-1 below.
Figure 3-1 Effective number of parties at the national and district level 
FIGURE 2. Effective Number of Parties at the National and District Level in India
?
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Source: Chhibber and Kollman (1998: 332)
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Using the above graph, they conclude that that on an average, the number of national 
parties is higher than the number of parties in the districts. Further, the average 
number of parties in the districts is around 2.5, and they conclude that even though 
the number of candidates has not exactly been 2, it has been nevertheless much 
smaller than the number of social cleavages in Indian society. Finally they relate the 
changes in the number of parties at the national level to the degree of political and 
economic centralisation by the national government.
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) do not tell us if the degree of national 
aggregation is same for all states, i.e. whether all states and regions respond to the 
degree of federal centralisation similarly or not. Studying the differences in states’ 
response is important since the federal centralisation and decentralisation should 
theoretically affect all states equally. And therefore, going by their argument, the 
trend in the number of parties at the district level in different states should follow the 
degree of federal centralisation.
Their work is based on using a single average number of parties in India at a district 
level, and then comparing it to the average number of parties at the national level. It 
is however important to investigate whether number of parties at district level in all 
Indian states exhibit similar trends. It could be that the average number of parties at 
district level, for India as a whole, actually hides a large range of variation across the 
Indian states. If that is the case, the simple conclusion drawn by Chhibber and 
Kollman, that party aggregation at the national level is affected by federal 
centralisation or decentralisation will need further examination. Further, it is 
important to find if the effects of centralisation and decentralisation are uniform, i.e.
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whether they are have equally strong effect on the level of aggregation. Finally, it can 
be useful to find ways of empirical and quantitative validation of their findings.
I argue that the effects of centralisation and decentralisation are far more complex 
than is implied by Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004). My results (Chapter 6) reveal 
that Indian states do not show the same level of aggregation and do not respond 
uniformly to the forces of federal centralisation. I also argue that the response of each 
state to federal centralisation is conditioned, among other things by its dependence on 
the national government. I show (Chapter 6, 7) that the states that are highly 
dependent on the national government respond more strongly to federal centralisation
Having analysed the main focus of research on Indian party systems, I now 
summarise important empirical studies that have either included Indian data, or have 
exclusively studied the size of the Indian party systems.
3.6 Empirical studies
Many earlier studies in the comparative research literature on party systems focus on 
Western democracies, exclude India from the empirical analysis (for example, Rae, 
1971; King and Janda, 1985; Taagepera and Shugart, 1993), treating it as an outlier 
to the established determinants of the party systems. Subsequent studies have 
included India in their empirical analysis, taking it as a single data point at the 
national level (for example, Lijphart, 1994, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994, 
Amorim and Cox, 1997, Golder, 2002, Anckar, 1999 2000). Chhibber and 
Kollman’s (1998, 2004) empirical work includes analysis of aggregation of parties
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between district and national level, while Chhibber and Noorudin (2004) study the 
effect of the party systems in the Indian states on the provision of public goods.
Pamerkar (2002) is the only study which investigates the effects of both the
institutional and the sociological factors, but this pertains only to 1999 elections.
Pamerkar divides the electoral process into pre-entry and post-entry phase and her 
results indicate that both institutions and society play an important role in explaining 
the variation in the effective number of parties.
In the pre-entry phase, India’s ‘first past the post’ 
electoral structure tends to depresses the number of 
entrants into the electoral fray by encouraging party
alliances, while certain types of cleavages tend to
encourage the number of entrants. In the post-entry 
phase, the evidence indicates that the electoral 
structure encourages local bipartism by setting up 
incentives for voter strategizing while some social 
cleavages discourage such calculations by voters.
(Pamerkar, 2002:3)
She finds evidence for the mechanical effect and the psychological effect in the 1999 
parliamentary elections. Regarding the effects of social cleavages on the number of 
entrants, Pamerkar (2002) finds that a percentage increase in the proportion of SC in 
a district is associated with a 13.4 % increase in the number of competing candidates 
while a percentage increase in the proportion of Muslims results in a 3.4% increase 
in the number of entrants. Further, in the post-entry phase, the electoral structure 
encourages local bipartism by setting up incentives for voter strategising while some 
social cleavages discourage such calculations by voters. Thus, both the pre-entry and 
post-entry stage of politics is important although as Cox (1997) argues “The question 
of the relative importance of strategic reallocation of votes in the mass electorate as
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opposed to the strategic reallocation of other resources in the elite strata remains 
open.”
In general, there has not been a systematic comparative examination of the 
determinants of the party system in India. I find extensive work that looks at a single 
or few parties, single or few states; there is no study that detects the general patterns 
that are common to party systems in the Indian states. My research is a contribution 
towards the examination of variation of party systems across India, using 
institutional, sociological and contextual explanations.
3.7 Conclusions
Analysing Indian party system has often proved problematic for political scientists. 
The institutionalist approach has focused on the application of Duverger’s Law to the 
Indian case, and India has often been considered a deviant case law at the national 
level. However, there has not been any comprehensive examination of this 
especially at the state and district level. Scholars have also used the number of issue 
dimensions, and social heterogeneity to study the size of Indian party system, but 
here again, one notices a lack of an empirical analysis that relates the size of the 
Indian party system to the degree of social heterogeneity. Furthermore, no 
systematic study to evaluate the effects of both social heterogeneity, as well as 
institutional factors on the size of Indian party system has been attempted.
Finally, the attempts to study the Indian party system are dominated by studies that 
focus on the national level, and no comparative work has been done to investigate the
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reasons for variations in the party systems across Indian states. In particular, there is 
lack of empirical work based on data from all Indian states and elections, so that the 
results can be applied to study the party systems in India, as a whole. Specifically, 
existing research does not clearly explain -  what causes the number of parties to 
differ across Indian states.
In the next three chapters of my research, I undertake a systematic and 
comprehensive investigation into the determinants of the size of the India party 
systems at the sub-national level. I use theory to identify the likely determinants in 
the Indian context, formulate them in working hypotheses, and test those using 
statistical techniques. The findings from state and district level analysis also provide 
fresh insights into the aggregation effects in the formation of national party system in 
India.
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4 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
In this chapter, I identity and evaluate the effects of important institutional factors 
affecting the size of the Indian party system I first provide precise measures of the 
size of the Indian party system at the national, state and the district level. These are 
computed on time-series J>y election-years) and cross-sectional (by districts and 
state) basis. I compile and use a comprehensive data set covering the period from 
1951 to 2004, and resolve analytical difficulties of the treatment of independent
'X 0candidates. Based on the determination of the size of the Indian party system, I 
evaluate the often-made claim that India does not follow Duverger’s Law at the 
national level, but does so at the state and the district level. I then move to the main 
focus of this chapter which is to conduct a comparative analysis of the institutional 
determinants of the party systems in the Indian states. For doing so, I formulate my 
dependent and independent variables, investigate their individual trends, and the 
general patterns in the relationship between them. These relationships are then tested 
through statistical analysis to obtain the measures of the direction and the strength of 
the relationship, and the overall explanatory power of the institutional model in the 
Indian context.
The existing scholarship tells us that institutions have an important effect on party 
system in a polity. Empirical research too, has confirmed this result. The effect of 
institutional variables however, varies across countries, and different institutional
32This period covers all the general elections held in India. For my computations o f the effective 
number of parties, I include vote-share o f each independent candidate separately, rather than clubbing 
them together as one category.
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variables affect the different stages of the electoral process. Below I discuss the 
important institutional factors that affect the Indian party system.
4.1 Institutional variables and the Indian party system
I argue that institutional variables have an independent effect on the Indian party 
system Although India currently follows a plurality based electoral system with 
single-member districts, there are and have been some institutional variations across 
the Indian states. For example, the Assembly Size, defined as the number of seats 
allotted to each state, varies across them. Further, the Indian Constitution provides 
for reservation of seats in the Legislature for certain sections of the society -  SC and 
ST, and the number of these reserved seats varies across the states depending on the 
population percentage of these groups in different states. Furthermore, although India 
currently has single-member districts, many of its districts in the 1951 and 1957 
elections were multi-member.
The importance of institutional factors in explaining the size of the Indian party 
system, and its variation across Indian states and districts becomes clear from 
analysing the mechanism through which institutions affect party systems. Duverger 
(1954) identified mechanical and psychological effects that underlie the tendency of 
the number of parties to converge to two under plurality rule. The mechanical effect 
deals with the squeeze that a plurality based system puts on small parties leading to 
disproportionality between the share of votes and seats won by political parties. 
Lijphart (1994) finds that the degree of disproportionality (between votes secured 
and seats won by a party) depends on institutional variables such as the Assembly 
Size and the Effective Threshold. Thus, it can be argued that the mechanical effect
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can vary within a plurality based electoral system, if the institutional variables such 
as the Assembly Size and Effective Threshold vary within a country. Through my 
empirical analysis, I show that the degree of disproportionality does vary across the 
Indian states. I also show that Effective Threshold varies across the Indian states and 
negatively affects the size of the party systems in the Indians states.
Coming to the psychological effect, it is argued that voters, party-workers, political 
donors desert parties that have little or no chances of winning the elections. Voters 
therefore, will not waste their vote on their most preferred candidate if that candidate 
is unlikely to win, and will choose out of those candidates that are likely to have a 
chance of winning the elections. This then will lead to two parties getting all or most 
of the votes. In this sense, a voter, a political worker, and political donors behave 
rationally and strategically. For this assumption to hold, voters need to have the 
same expectations about how the candidates will finish. In reality however, the 
presence and the level of strategic voting depends on the information gathering 
capacity of voters, political workers and donors, as well as the efforts of the political 
parties in communicating their strengths and likelihood of winning the elections. 
Therefore, the final consequence of the psychological effect can vary depending on 
factors such as the mobilisation and communication strategies of candidates, the 
availability of information on the chances of different parties, as well as the rational 
behaviour of the voters in using the information available in determining the chances 
of winning. Therefore, within a plurality-based system, the effect of psychological 
factors can vary depending on various factors, some of which have been outlined 
above. Further, contexts vary between countries, and within the same country. 
Factors such as the degree of urbanisation, literacy rates, and the degree of federal
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centralisation can influence institutional variables to affect the size of the party 
systems, causing intra-country variations in party systems.
Based on the above arguments, I infer that the effect of institutional factors to explain 
intra-country variations in party systems needs to be examined empirically. I start 
my empirical analysis by examining the size of the Indian party systems at different 
levels, and testing whether India follows Duverger’s Law.
4.2 The size of the Indian party system and Duverger’s Law
Duverger’s Law is one of the most well-known generalisations in the comparative 
politics literature. It has facilitated and stimulated research into an appropriate 
measure of the size of party systems, and has motivated empirical studies on the 
relationship between electoral rules and party systems (for example, Lijphart, 1994). 
However, the Law is not sufficiently clear on certain issues, including the level at 
which it should apply. In other words, is two-party competition, as predicted by the 
Law, supposed to occur at the national, regional, district or all levels? The empirical 
studies investigating the existence of Duvergpr’s Law most often focus on the 
national level, ignoring the fact that national party systems are aggregations of the 
state and the district level party systems. Due to the aggregation effects, we may 
actually expect Duverger’s effect to be more visible at the state and the district level, 
particularly in large and heterogeneous countries. Existing scholarship claims that 
India violates Duverger’s Law at the national level, but follows it at the state and the 
district level (for example, Sridharan, 1997; Chhibber and Kollman, 1998, 2004). 
However, my analysis of a comprehensive data set of Indian elections reveals that
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even at the state and the district level, there is no unequivocal support to the 
predictions of Duverger’s Law, and a non-trivial number of Indian elections involve 
many rather than just two parties.
4.2.1 Theoretical and empirical issues
Duverger (1963) argued that the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the 
two-party system and also that both the simple-majority system with second ballot 
and proportional representation favour multi-partism. However, the debate over the 
application of the law has often overlooked examination of electoral data, and even 
where this has been done, it has mostly been done at the national level. This focus at 
the national level assumes that the mechanical and psychological effects that operate 
at the regional and district levels in causing two-party competition, also work in the 
same manner as at the national level. This is a debatable assumption, especially in 
the case of heterogeneous and large countries. Furthermore, we have to consider the 
fact that this law came into existence not in the form of a formal model, but more as 
an empirical observation.
Many models of voter-behaviour take into account the Duvergerian logic in 
predicting two-party system at the national level. However, these models in most part 
pay little attention to the issues of aggregation of votes from district to region to 
national level. Riker (1976: 94) views Duverger’s Law as a prediction about district- 
level competition, and he disregards cases, where the country has more than two 
parties because the pair of parties offering candidates varies from constituency to 
constituency as minor exceptions. His empirical analysis is based on a single national
33Riker (1982) points out some examples anticipating Duverger’s Law, from 19th Century onwards.
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constituency, and his conclusions are based on generalisations rather than on data 
analysis. Palfrey’s (1989: 71) model of Duverger’s Law describes competition in a 
single district, and he does not say how it relates to national party systems. 
Fedderson, et al. (1990) and Fey (1997) too, disregard the distinction between 
competition in multiple districts and competition in a single political unit. Cox 
(1994) models rational voter behaviour for elections using the single, non- 
transferable vote system (of which plurality elections are a special case). However, 
his analysis does not include aggregation issues while examining national rather than 
district data when evaluating the accuracy of Duverger’s Law. His empirical analysis 
relies on the SF ratio -  the ratio of second-loser to first-loser vote totals. He expects 
values of SF near 0 to signify Duvergerian equilibrium, and its value of 1 to show 
non-Duvergerian equilibrium, where voters were unable to coordinate, leaving the 
two losers nearly tied. However, as Gaines (1999) points out in the context of 
Canadian elections, Ihis interpretation of Duverger’s Law is however, not exactly 
what the law postulates. Further, the SF values too, do not unequivocally indicate 
whether the party systems they refer to, is a multi-party or a two-party system.
Consider the illustration using the results of Indian district level elections taken from 
different years shown in Table 4-1.
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Table 4-1 SF ratio illustration
S.No. Year District Vote share of parties (%) SF Ratio
1 2 3 4 5 Balance
1. 1984 Rae Brailey 70 13 11 2 1 3 0.91
2 1991 Khed 61 19 17 1 1 1 0.90
3. 2004 Mamupuri 64 17 15 1 1 2. 0.91
4. 1967 Tenali 35 25 23 9 7 1 0.93
5. 1999 Lakhimpur 34 27 25 2 1 11 0.92
6. 2004 Aonla 29 27 27 9 3 5 0.97
It can be seen that SF ratio for all the districts are close to 1, and should therefore 
represent non-Duvergerian party competition. However, contrary to this expected 
result, SF ratios which are close to 1 represent both multi-party (Tenali, Lakhimpur 
and Aonla), as well as a two or less party (Rae Brailey, Khed and Mamupuri) 
competition. For example, in Rae Brailey, the winning party received 70% of votes, 
while the first and the second runner up together received 24%, while the balance 6% 
was shared by the remaining parties. The SF ratio is 0.91, which according to Cox’s 
formulation should show a situation closer to a non-Duvergerian equilibrium, or a 
multi-party system. However, as is clear from the distribution of votes, this is not the 
case, and this case is an example of a two or less-than two party competition. 
Therefore interpreting the nature of party competition solely from the SF ratio has its 
limitations.
In my analysis, I rely on Laakso-Taagepera’s (1979) index of effective number of 
parties (E7VP), computed on the basis of vote-shares, to study the application of 
Duverger’s Law in India. I also use Nagayama diagram (1997) as well as statistical
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analysis to provide further insights into this phenomenon as applied to the Indian 
situation.
As pointed out earlier in this section, most of the empirical literature making use of 
ENP applies it to the national totals (e.g. Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera and Groftnan, 
1985; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Examples where district level analysis has been 
attempted are Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) for India, and Gaines (1999) for 
Canada. However, Chhibber and Kollman only use mean measure of ENP at district 
level, which hides the range of values it takes in Indian regions and districts. Further, 
their analysis does not include trends at the individual district level.
Another limitation of the analyses using the national elections data is the treatment of 
the vote share of small parties including independents, which is usually clubbed as 
‘others’. If this share is treated as the share of a party, then the value of ENP 
calculated will not be a correct representative of the number of parties and their vote 
shares. Taagepera (1997) suggests methods to improve the accuracy of this measure 
in the absence of lull data on the vote share of smaller parties. In my analysis, I use 
the vote share of all the parties getting votes, and hence take care of this ambiguity 
comprehensively. I now determine the size of the Indian party system and 
investigate whether Indian party system confirms to Duverger’s Law.
4.2.2 Does India confirm to Duverger’s Law?
For all parliamentary elections in India, I compute the ENP at the national, state, and 
the district level. This is calculated by using the vote share of each party at these 
levels, and applying Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) method for calculating ENP.
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The state level and the district level measures are the averages of ENP calculated for 
individual states and districts respectively, for each election year. Table 4-2 provides 
measures of ENP at national, state and district level in India averaged for each 
election-year.
Table 4-2 Effective electoral parties in India by election
National State District
Year level level level
1951 4.5 3.4 3.3
1957 4.0 3.6 3.0
1962 4.4 3.7 2.8
1967 5.2 3.6 2.9
1971 5.2 3.2 2.4
1977 3.4 2.8 2.1
1980 4.2 3.2 2.7
1984 3.8 2.9 2.4
1989 4.8 3.1 2.5
1991 5.1 3.3 2.9
1996 7.1 3.6 3.0
1998 6.9 3.6 2.7
1999 6.7 3.5 2.6
2004 7.6 3.6 2.8
Average 5.2 3.3 2.7
Minimum 3.4 1.0 1.0
Maximum 7.6 10.0 9.3
Std. Dev. 1.3 1.3 0.9
N 14 401 7174
As can be seen in the Table 4-2, ENP at the national level is consistently higher than 
2. The minimum ENP at this level is 3.4 in 1977, while the average is 5.2. In the 
last elections in 2004, the national measure has risen to its maximum level at 7.6. 
Even in the period 1952-1967 when INC dominated the Indian political scene, the 
party system at the national level comprised many parties. Furthermore, the size of 
the party system has seen a sharp rise since the 1991 elections. It is clear that the 
Indian party system at the national level does not confirm to the Duvergerian logic 
by a large margin. It is clearly a multi-party system, despite following a SMPS. The 
ENP at the state level represents the average of size of party systems in all Indian 
states in an election. Unlike the national measure, it has not increased sharply in the
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recent elections. The state level measure of ENP is also however, consistently above 
2. The minimum it falls to is 2.8 in 1977, while its average value is 3.3.
Table 4-3 shows the frequency distribution of ENP at the state level. As can be seen, 
only 12.7% of cases have ENP of 2 or less, and 53.1% of the cases have ENP of 2.5 
and above. Thus, even at the state level, Indian party system does not clearly 
conform to the two-party norm.
Table 4-3 Frequency distribution of Effective number of parties at the State level
(1 9 5 1 -2 0 0 4 )
Categories Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
1 0 -2 51 12.7% 12.7%
2 2-2 .5 137 34.2% 46.9%
3 2 .5 -4 114 28.4% 75.3%
4 4 - 5 60 15.0% 90.3%
5 >5 39 9.7% 100%
Total 401 100%
Further, I use language and geography as two criteria to divide India into six regions. 
Hindi is the most-widely spoken language in India, and all Hindi-speaking states are 
included in one region which includes some of the largest states in India both by 
population and size. The four regions defined in terms of geography are South, West 
and East and North East regions. Finally, non-Hindi speaking regions of North India 
are categorised into a North region. My categorisation of Indian regions is consistent 
with that of Rudolph and Rudolph (1987).34 When I sub-divide the state level ENP
34The states contained in the six regions are as follows -  Hindi belt: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, 
Uttaranchal, Haiyana, Madhya Pradesh, Chhatisgarh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh. North: Punjab, 
Chandigarh, Jammu and Kashmir; West: Maharashtra, Gujarat, Goa, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. East: 
Andaman and Nicobar Island, West Bengal, Assam, Orissa, Jharkhand; South: Andhra Pradesh,
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into these 6 regions in Table 4-4, it is seen that in none of the regions, the average 
ENP in any election falls below 2.
Table 4-4 Effective number of parties at state level by region by year
Year
India
Total
East Hindi belt North North East South W est
1951 3.4 4.1 3.2 3.9 4.5 3.4 2.5
1957 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.1 4.4 3.6 3.8
1962 3.7 3.3 3.9 4.6 3.7 3.6 3.1
1967 3.6 4.0 4.3 3.5 2.5 3.2 3.5
1971 3.2 3.5 3.1 2.7 3.6 3.2 3.2
1977 2.8 2.9 2.0 3.6 2.6 3.3 2.7
1980 3.2 2.8 3.3 3.6 3.0 3.4 2.9
1984 2.9 3.3 2.6 2.8 2.5 3.1 3.0
1989 3.1 2.8 3.4 4.1 2.5 3.0 3.2
1991 3.3 4.2 3.8 4.0 2.4 3.2 2.9
1996 3.6 3.4 4.0 4.9 2.9 3.8 3.2
1998 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.9 3.1 3.8 3.5
1999 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.7 4.2
2004 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.3
Average 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.0 3.4 3.2
Minimum 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.9
Maximum 10.0 7.8 6.4 6.6 10.0 7.6 9.7
Std. Dev. 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.3
N 401 52 103 36 75 79 56
The same result is seen in Figure 4-1 which plots histogram of ENP at the state level 
in the six regions with the distribution being well-spread and with a substantial part 
falling beyond 2 and even 3.
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry; North East: Arunachal Pradesh, 
Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Tripura. My categorisation is consistent with that 
o f Rudolph and Rudolph (1987).
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Figure 4-1 Histogram of E N P  at state level in the Indian regions 1951 -2004
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The results at national and state level have prompted some to conclude that Indian 
party system does not conform to Duverger’s Law (for example Sridharan, 1997). 
However, the sub-national politics in India also includes electoral competition at the 
district level. Taagepera and Grofman (1985) refer to the importance o f  local politics 
in shaping the size o f the party systems. Since district is the basic electoral unit 
where voters vote and parties contest elections, the effect o f  Duverger’s Law should 
most clearly be seen at this level, a view that is supported by Chhibber and Kollman 
(2004:32), who argue that “Properly understood its modem form, the Law predicts 
(and explains why) two parties will capture all the votes in district-level elections in 
countries with single-member, simple-plurality rules”. In the Indian context, it could
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mean that the real effect o f the plurality system is felt at the district level, because it 
is here that candidates get elected, and voters exercise their votes. I examine this 
hypothesis by a detailed empirical analysis using alternative methods.
Party competition in the Indian districts
Table 4-2 shows that the average ENP at the district level for all the elections taken 
together is 2.7. However, this average measure hides the distribution, inter-temporal 
and inter-state variations in ENP. Figure 4-2 plots the histogram o f ENP in the 
Indian single-member districts for all the elections taken together. The histogram 
bars are drawn on the basis o f  the percentage o f  districts falling in a given frequency 
interval, while the curve shown represents the Kernel density estimates.35 The x-axis 
represents N, while the y-axis represents the percentage o f  districts with a particular 
level o f ENP and the density.
Figure 4-2 Histogram o f  E N P  a t  district level 1951 -2004
3 4 5 6
E ffe c tiv e  n u m b e r  o f p a r t i e s
35The kernel density curve represents a ‘smoothed histogram’, calculates the density at each point as it 
moves along the x-axis.
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Figure 4-2 shows that although there is a concentration of data points around 2, there 
is also a large percentage of the elections in the Indian districts which witness 
competition between more than two parties.36 The highest concentration of ENP is 
between 2 and 3, and the density curve is relatively a low one, which peaks at around 
18%. Furthermore, there are many districts that have more than 3 parties. However, 
as Reed (2001:314) points out “...equilibrium generalizations, such as Duverger’s 
law, posit tendencies, not certainties...Clearly, there is no reason to expect an 
electoral system to reach equilibrium n the first election. Rather, I should expect 
trends over time to reflect pressures toward two-party competition.” Figure 4-3 
shows the histogram and kernel density curve for ENP in each of the 14 
parliamentary elections in India.
36Literature uses different cut-offs for effective number of parties to evaluate Duvergerian 
equilibrium. I do not use a specific cut-off but study the distribution o f E N P  to evaluate the 
Duverger’s Law especially at the district level.
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Figure 4-3 Histogram of Effective number of parties by election
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Although the shape of the distribution for different elections shown in Figure 4-3 
varies from year to year, the general result is that many districts in India witness 
competition between more than just two parties.
The distribution for 1952 elections is low and relatively flat, and it can be seen that 
there is a large percentage of districts where the competition is between more than 
just two parties. However, since 1952 elections were the first elections in India 
after independence, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the nature of party 
competition from these results alone. The distribution in 1957 elections is higher and 
peaks around 2, indicating that a higher percentage of districts witness two-party 
competition compared to the 1952 elections. This might indicate a movement 
towards Duvergerian equilibrium. However, the shape of the 1957 distribution also 
shows a long right tail indicating the districts with more than 2 parties in 
competition. The 1962 elections show a distribution with a lower peak than in 1957, 
and one which skews more sharply towards the right signifying multipartism in a 
larger number of districts. The distribution for 1967 elections is remarkably similar 
to that of 1962, which is low and with a long right tail. The 1971 elections show a 
reversal of trend, where the distribution becomes narrower, peaks around 2 and most 
of the districts fall into the range of 2-3. The 1977 elections seems to represent a 
move towards a Duvergerian equilibrium, where a much larger percentage of the 
districts witness competition between 2 parties, and the distribution is narrow and 
relatively high. The next three elections in 1980, 1984 and 1989 however do not 
produce such extreme results, even though the distribution is generally narrow with 
heavy concentration of data points around 2.5. The question is whether elections in
37Here, 1952 data refers to elections held in 1951/52.
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1970s and to some extent in the 1980s reflect a consistent movement towards a two- 
party norm. The subsequent elections in the 1990s and in 2004 however, disprove 
this hypothesis, and the distributions of ENP during this period are more well-spread 
with a long right tail. From this discussion, it is clear that Indian elections have not 
consistently produced a two-party system at the district level.
To provide further evidence, Table 4-5 provides precise distribution of ENP in the 
Indian districts by election, dividing them in four categories: those with ENP of 2 or 
less, between 2 and 2.5, between 2.5 and 3, and ENP greater than 3. It also provides 
mean ENP and the number of districts for each election-year
Table 4-5 Distribution of Effective Number of Parties at district level by election
Election
year
Less than or 
equal to 2
2-2.5 2.5-3 >3 Mean Number of 
Districts
1952 19% 22% 30% 29% 2.73 310
1957 41% 23% 20% 15% 2.39 312
1962 18% 23% 30% 29% 2.77 494
1967 15% 24% 25% 36% 2.92 520
1971 28% 36% 19% 17% 2.45 518
1977 51% 40% 8% 2% 2.05 542
1980 9% 40% 23% 28% 2.67 529
1984 18% 50% 17% 15% 2.43 542
1989 13% 50% 18% 19% 2.52 529
1991 7% 37% 25% 31% 2.86 537
1996 1% 29% 27% 43% 3.05 543
1998 3% 40% 29% 27% 2.69 543
1999 6% 48% 22% 40% 2.64 543
2004 4% 45% 21% 30% 2.76 543
All elections 16% 37% 22% 25% 2.64 7005
It is seen from Table 4-5 that for all the elections taken together, only 16 percent of 
the districts have two or less than 2 Effective number of parties, and even after taking 
a cut-off of 2.5, 47 percent of the districts do not follow the Duverger’s Law. Further,
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a sizeable 25 percent of districts have more than 3 parties in competition. Only in 
1977, Indian party system is close to following Duverger’s Law, where 51 percent of 
the districts have 2 or less than 2, and 91% of districts have less than 2.5 Effective 
number of parties. For all the other elections, majority of the districts have more than 
2, and a non-trivial percentage of districts have more than 2.5 and even 3 effective 
number of parties. In particular, elections held in the 1990s and 2004 have witnessed 
the percentage of districts with less than 2 to fall well below 10 percent, while the 
percentage of more competitive districts has increased manifold. For example, the 
percentage of districts having more than 3 parties is 31%, 43%, 27%, 40% and 30% 
in 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2004 respectively (average of 34% during this 
period).
Thus, the analysis of the distribution of ENP in the various Indian elections shows 
that a two-party system is not the rule in the Indian districts, and a large number of 
districts witness competition between many parties. Further, movements towards the 
Duvergerian equilibrium have been frequently interrupted, with elections in the 
1990s witnessing an increase in the ENP in the Indian districts.
Inter-region and inter-state variations at the district level
Studying inter-region variation in the size of the party system in the Indian districts is 
especially important for a country of India’s size and heterogeneity. Table 4-6 shows 
distribution and mean values of ENP at the district level in the Indian regions as 
defined above, for all elections taken together.
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Table 4-6 Distribution of Effective number of parties at district level by region 1951 -  2004)
Regions Less than or 
equal to 2
2-2.5 2.5-3 >3 Mean Number of 
Districts
%of
Total
Hindi Belt 12% 27% 21% 40% 2.90 2943 42%
South 21% 47% 22% 10% 2.38 1736 25%
West 20% 46% 22% 12% 2.40 999 14%
East 14% 41% 28% 16% 2.55 968 14%
North 12% 34% 27% 27% 2.71 241 3%
North East 28% 29% 15% 28% 2.70 118 2%
Total 16% 37% 22% 25% 2.64 7005 100%
Table 4-6 reveals regional patterns in the distribution of ENP. The Hindi belt is a 
clear exception to Duverger’s Law with 61% of districts having more than 2.5 
parties, and as many as 40% of the districts having 3 parties in competition. In 
particular, the Hindi belt region includes a high proportion of districts which do not 
exhibit a two-party competition envisaged in Duverger’s Law, and since this region 
includes the maximum (42% during 1951-2004) number of electoral districts in 
India, it deviation from the two-party norm can not be dismissed just an aberration. 
The North region and the North East regions also have relatively large percentage of 
districts with more than 2.5 and 3 parties. The situation in the balance three regions 
i.e., West, East and South too shows that a sizeable percentage of districts have more 
than 2.5 parties, although the exception to Duverger’s Law for these regions is not as 
clear as for example in the Hindi belt. Table 4-6 also shows that average ENP in all 
Indian regions except the West and South regions is above 2.5, and for the largest 
region -  Hindi belt, it is 2.9, signalling a deviation from the prediction of Duverger’s 
Law. These trends can be seen visually in Figure 4-4 which plots histogram of ENP 
at the district level for the Indian regions.
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Figure 4-4 Histogram of E N P  in the Indian regions at district level 1951 -  2004
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In particular, one can see that Hindi belt region has many parties in competition in 
contradiction with Duverger’s Law. Figure 4-5 shows the histogram o f  ENP in two 
large states in the Hindi belt: Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.
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Figure 4-5 E N P  in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar at district level
1951-2004
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In the state o f  Uttar Pradesh which has the highest rumber o f  electoral districts in 
India (15% in the most recent elections), most o f  the distribution o f  ENP falls beyond 
3, with the average during 1951-2004 being 3.2, and during the last 5 elections 
(1991-2004) being as high as 3.7. Similarly, in Bihar a substantial proportion o f  
observations lie beyond 2.5 and a sizeable beyond 3 parties, with the average being 
2.9.
Nagayama diagram
Nagayama diagram represents an alternative method to analyse Duverger’s Law. 
While analysing the pre-war Japanese elections, Nagayama (1997) plotted the 
percentage o f  the vote received by the winning candidate (VI) against the percentage 
received by the runner-up candidate (V2). He noticed that all the plots took the form 
o f a triangle, bound between two lines representing VI — V2 = 0 and VI + V2 = 1.
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The former line segment represents data points where the winner and the runner-up 
party have equal vote shares; the latter line segment includes data points where no 
third party receives any votes. Thus, the left comer area of the triangle corresponds 
to the presence of multiple contestants (since the combined vote-share of the top two 
parties is less than 100%), while the right comer represents single or two-party 
dominance. The peak of the triangle reflects two-party competition with limited third 
party-strength. Thus, the Nagayama diagram enables a comparison of the electoral 
outcomes for different elections in terms of the degree of competition between the 
top two vote-getting parties, and the extent to which smaller parties are getting a 
substantial share of votes.
Reed (2001) uses Nagayama diagrams to study the working of Duverger’s Law in the 
Italian elections of 1994 and 1996, while Taagepera (2004) illustrates the use of the 
Nagayama diagram for assessing party strength. Figure 4-6 plots the Nagayama 
diagrams for elections in the Indian districts. It can be seen that different periods 
show different types of party-competition and the distribution of votes amongst 
parties. The 1950s diagram shows a large concentration towards the middle and left 
of the triangle, signifying competition between many parties. However, there also is 
significant number of data-points towards the right side of the triangle, depicting 
competition between two parties. The concentration of the data points shifts towards 
the left in the 1960s, showing a move towards competition between many parties. 
The 1970s show a reversal, where most of the data points stack up on the right hand 
side, signifying dominance of one or two parties. In the 1980s, the data points seem 
to be equally divided between the left and right sides, while the 1990s and 2004 see a 
majority of data points moving towards the top left comer, thereby signalling multi-
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party competition. The analysis of Nagayama diagrams also shows the wide 
variation in the size of party systems in the India districts.
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Figure 4-6 Nagayama diagram for Indian elections at the district level
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Trends at the individual district level
The previous analysis at the district level has focussed on the aggregate measures of 
district-level effective number of parties. It does not undertake an analysis of 
changes for an individual district. Such an analysis is important because it will 
reveal whether the individual districts conform to the Duvergerian equilibrium 
between different elections or not, irrespective of the trends at an aggregate level. To 
determine the inter-election trends, a paired /-test is done on the difference in 
effective number of parties fir each district between two successive elections.38 To 
check the robustness of the results, a regression model is also specified, taking 
effective number of parties at the district level as the dependent variable, and the 
time (election-year) as the independent variable. Following Gaines (1999) and 
Baltagi (1995), the following fixed-effects model is specified.
Equation 4-1 OCj ~t~Tj1
In Equation 4-1, i represents an individual district, / the time variable, representing a 
particular election year. The intercept a t represents the normal number of effective 
parties for an individual district, while r)t represents the time trend, for a particular 
election year. Thus, if the data set includes two successive election years, the 
coefficient of rft will reflect the inter-election movement in ENP, controlling for the 
differences in the individual districts (through a district-level intercept). Thus, while 
a negative coefficient of r}t reflects a movement towards Duvergerian equilibrium, a
38Paired comparison is done for those districts where clear successors/predecessors are available. This 
is done to take into account reorganization o f districts in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and situations 
where elections were not held (for example, Assam in 1989).
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positive coefficient represents no such trend between successive elections. The 
results of both the paired Mest and the regression are shown in Table 4-7. For the 
paired-comparison, results include mean difference in effective number of parties 
between two successive elections and the t statistics for this mean difference. For the 
regression, the t statistic for the time-trend (variable Tft ) is also shown.
Table 4-7 Inter-election trends at the district level
Election-
period
Paired comparison
Fixed Effects 
Regression
Mean Difference 
in N
t-statistics of mean 
difference
t-statistics of 
time trend
1952- 1957 -0.7 -8.1 -6.9
1957- 1962 -0.3 -3.9 8.8
1962- 1967 0.2 4.0 4.2
1967- 1971 -0.5 -10.3 -10.3
1971 - 1977 -0.4 -11.9 -11.8
1977- 1980 0.6 19.7 19.8
1980- 1984 -0.3 -11.4 -11.8
1984- 1989 0.1 4.3 4.3
1989- 1991 0.3 9.4 9.6
1991 - 1996 0.2 5.4 5.3
1996- 1998 -0.4 -11.4 -11.5
1998- 1999 -0.1 -1.9 -2.0
1999 - 2004 0.1 4.2 4.5
The results in Table 4-7 show that t statistics of both the mean difference in effective 
number of parties and the inter-election time-trend are statistically significant. 
However, their signs are not uniform across the elections. A spell of negative inter­
election trend has not lasted for more than two election cycles, and as such there is 
no consistent movement towards Duvergerian equilibrium at an individual district 
level.
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The analysis at the individual district level can also identify how many districts 
consistently deviate from, and how many only show random blips over the 
Duvergerian norm. This analysis is undertaken by studying trend of effective 
number of parties over different elections for an individual district. I use two 
alternative cut-offs of 2.5 and 3.0 effective number of parties to measure how many 
districts are over or fluctuate around it and have not stabilised below the cut-off, and 
how many have just one or two random blips over it. The results from this analysis 
are shown in Table 4-8.39
Table 4-8 Effective number of parties -  Trends at the individual district level
(1951-2004)
Cut-off N = 2.5 Cut-off N  =3
No. of districts % No. of districts %
(1) Districts over/fluctuating around cut-off 261 49% 128 24%
(2) Districts below cut-off with occassional 
blips over cut-off
235 44% 305 57%
(3) Districts stabilised below cut-off 35 7% 98 18%
Total 531 100% 531 100%
Table 4-8 shows that for a substantial 49% of districts, effective number of parties 
has consistently been over or fluctuated around the cut-off of 2.5 signalling deviation 
from Duverger’s Law. Even for a cut-off of 3, a non-trivial 24% of the districts 
consistently witness competition amongst many rather than just 2 parties. 
Furthermore, a large proportion of districts show occasional blips over both the cut­
offs, and only a relatively small percentage (7% and 18% respectively) have 
stabilised around a Duvergerian equilibrium. Thus, even at a micro-level there is no
39The number o f electoral districts in India has varied across the elections, and currently stands at 543. 
This analysis includes 531 districts which have sufficient number of observations to identify the 
trends of effective number of parties over time.
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unequivocal evidence that district level party systems in India represent, or are 
moving towards bipartisan competition.
Overall, my analysis reveals that there are significant variations in the size of party 
systems within each region signifying inter-state differences. This is not unexpected 
because of heterogeneity of Indian states, and also because parties fight elections on 
a state-by-state basis. Thus, there are not only large inter-region, but also inter-state 
differences in the size of party systems, and many Indians states (for example Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar) do not represent a typical two-party competition as predicted by 
Duverger’s Law. This finding implies that it is difficult and possibly inappropriate to 
make generalisations about the applicability of Duverger’s Law to the Indian case, 
and that conclusions based on average measures for the country as a whole, and not 
studying the trends at the individual district level, and for different states are 
misleading.
I now turn to provide explanations for the size of the party system in India. But 
before that, I need to clearly establish the appropriate unit of my analysis.
4.2.3 Unit o f  empirical analysis
I argue that the choice of the level depends on four factors: (1) The institutional 
factors one wants to study, (2) The degree of variation in the size of party systems at 
different levels, (3) The importance of a particular level to the formation of party 
system, (4) The organisation of parties at different levels. I discuss these factors in 
the context of the Indian party system.
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Key institutional factors affecting the size of party system include features of 
electoral system such as the District Magnitude, Electoral Threshold, as well as 
factors such as Assembly Size. The effect of District Magnitude is better studied at 
the district level since it is at this level this factor can vary in an intra-country 
analysis. Although currently all India elections are contested within single-member 
districts, many districts in the 1951 and 1957 elections were multi-member. 
Accordingly, I study the effect of this institutional factor on the Indian party system 
at the district level. Another factor which needs to be studied at the district level is 
the effect of the reservation of seats for SC and ST in the legislature, since this 
reservation is provided at this level.
Electoral Threshold is another key electoral featire, which means the minimum 
percentage of vote share required for a party to win a seat or gain representation in 
the legislature. In general, Electoral threshold can take the form of a legally 
prescribed minimum share of votes, or Effective or observed threshold which is the 
outcome of other features of an electoral system. In the Indian context, there is no 
legally prescribed electoral threshold, and any attempt to study it has to rely on a 
measure of observed Effective Threshold. Taagepera (1998) develops an analytical 
method of computing Effective threshold which can be used to measure this factor 
for the Indian states in different elections. Using this method, this factor in the Indian 
context can be studied at the state level. Assembly Size or the seats allotted to each 
state in the legislature is another institutional feature affecting the party system. In 
India, this varies across states, and this enables its inclusion in the empirical analysis. 
Since seats are allotted on a state-by-state basis, this factor can only be studied at this 
level.
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Next, it is important to note the extent of variation of party systems in the Indian 
states and districts. Using a self-computed database of Effective number of parties 
consisting of 401 data points at the state level and 7174 at the district level, I find 
that the variance at the state level is 1.7, while at the district level it is 0.8. Thus, one 
can conclude that there is much higher variation in the size of party systems across 
the Indian states than is found in the Indian districts. This point is also supported by 
my earlier analysis of Duverger’s Law in India where I report that the district-level 
distribution for effective number of parties for many elections is narrowly 
distributed. Furthermore, the verdict on the application of Duverger’s Law is a mixed 
one, and the South and West regions come closes to observing the two-party norm, 
and not showing large inter-district variation. I also run a variance components 
model which sub-divides the variance in effective number of parties at the district 
level.40 The results are shown in Table 4-9.
Table 4-9 Components of variance in Effective number of parties at district level
Variance components Variance %
Inter-district variation 0.03 4%
Inter-state variation 0.11 15%
Variances due to other factors 0.61 81%
Total variance at district level 0.75 100%
Table 4-9 confirms that the state level accounts for a much large variance than the 
district level for explaining the variation in the size of the Indian party system at the 
state level. The district level accounts only for 4%, while the state level explains 
15% of total variance at the district level. Thus, 15% of the variance at the district
40The variance component model is run taking E ffe c t iv e  n u m b e r  o f  p a r t i e s  as the dependent variable, 
and the districts level and the state level as random factors representing source o f variation in the size 
o f the party system at the district level.
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level exists only because a district belongs to a particular state, while only 4% o f the 
variance is explained by inter-district differences. The higher variance at the state 
level, as well as the variance components analysis at the district level thus indicates 
that state level is more appropriate level for conducting a comparative analysis to 
study the effect o f  various explanatory factors for the size o f  party system.
Finally, my choice o f the unit o f analysis is influenced by its importance in shaping 
Indian party system and politics, and on the way parties organise themselves to 
contest elections. In India, party system has developed along regional lines, and the 
parties tend to organise themselves and decide their electoral strategy on a state-by- 
state basis. The electoral alliances between parties have also been made at the state 
level, and as such state level politics has a decisive influence on shaping the Indian 
party system. The importance o f  the state level in the Indian political scene is also 
demonstrated by the vote share o f the state parties, which increased from 8% in the 
1951 elections to 29% in the last elections in 2004. The vote share o f  state parties by 
election-year is shown in Figure 4-7.
Figure 4-7 Vote share of state parties
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Based on the discussion in this section, it is clear that state level is an appropriate 
unit of analysis for carrying out a comparative study of the size of the Indian party 
system District-level analysis on the other hand, should focus on studying the 
specific factors rather than to detect general patterns. Accordingly, my empirical 
analysis focuses on the state level, and uses aggregate measures of the dependent and 
independent variables at this leveL District-level analysis is conducted to study 
specific factors such as District Magnitude and electoral reservation for SC and ST. 
The following analysis undertakes an empirical analysis of the size of the Indian 
system using the institutional determinants discussed earlier in this section.
4.3 Dependent variables
For my empirical analysis using institutional factors, I use five dependent variables. 
Three out of these are formulations of the lumber of parties, while the other two 
measure the degree of fragmentation and the disproportionality of the party system 
respectively. These are explained below.
4.3.1 Effective number o f electoral and legislative parties (ENP, ELP)
These two variables have been used extensively in the existing literature to study the 
determinants of the size of party systems. The different ways of counting the 
effective number of parties, and their respective strengths and weaknesses have 
already been elaborated earlier (section 2.3) in this thesis. In my analysis, I use the 
Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) method of counting the effective number of parties 
using vote share (ENP) and seat share (ELP).
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4.3.2 Number o f  contesting parties (NCP)
This is a simple count of the number of parties that contest elections. All independent 
candidates are counted as separate contesting parties. Many existing empirical
studies use both effective as well as a simple count of parties as a dependent variable.
Studying this variable is important, because this is the basic level where social, 
political differences in the population manifest themselves in terms of the number of 
contesting parties in an election.
4.3.3 Degree o f support for the wining party
This is defined by the vote share of the winning party in an election. The vote share 
received by the leading party indicates the degree of fragmentation and 
disproportionality in the system. As Anckar (1999:104) puts it, “The larger this 
degree of support, the more homogenous is the country in terms of political 
attitudes.” Dahl and Tufte (1973) point out the importance of this variable in one of 
their hypothesis: the larger the size of a political unit (in terms of population and 
area), the smaller the electoral support for the leading party operating within that 
unit. Anckar (2000) uses this variable in an empirical study of the determinants of 
party system of 70 countries. In addition to this measure of party system 
fragmentation, I also use a measure of the disproportionality of the electoral system.
4.3.4 Degree o f disproportionality
Blais and Carty (1991) point out that mechanical and psychological effects are two 
distinctly different mechanisms. The mechanical effect is measured in terms of the
153
CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
disproportionately of the electoral system. Electoral system characteristics are 
thought to affect the effective number of parties through the degree of 
disproportionality. The more proportional the electoral system, the better the chances 
of smaller parties of gaining representation and the more fragmented the party 
system. It is however possible that both electoral system characteristics and 
disproportionality have an independent effect on party system fragmentation 
(Anckar, 2002). In plurality systems, the degree of disproportionality is affected by 
malapportionment, turnout differences and the geographic distribution of party vote 
shares (Grofman et al, 1997). Therefore, the extent to which different electoral 
systems produce disproportional results is an empirical matter.
Lijphart (1994, 75-77) finds that disproportionality was negatively linked to the 
effective number of parliamentary parties, but not to the effective number of electoral 
parties. However, tie strengths of association were nevertheless rather weak and 
Lijphart suggested that his might be explained by fact that the relation was not 
monocausal.
Disproportionality decreases multipartism but, to at least some 
extent, multipartism increases disproportionality (Lijphart 
1994: 76).
Lijphart (1994) uses Gallagher disproportionality index as a dependent variable, in 
his empirical analysis of political systems. Benoit (2002) uses the Gallagher 
disproportionately index as a measure of the mechanical effect of the electoral 
system in reducing the effective number of seat-getting parties. Anckar (2002) uses
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the Gallagher disproportionality index as independent variable to explain the 
effective number of parties in a study of effect of electoral systems in 80 countries.
In my analysis, I use a measure of disproportionality as a dependent variable. A 
number of measures of proportionality have been proposed (e.g. Rae 1971; 
Loosemore and Hanby 1971; Gallagher 1991, 38-40). High values of these indices 
denote a low correspondence between shares of votes and shares of seats and vice 
versa. The relative merits and demerits of the different methods of measuring 
disproportionately have been discussed in Lijphart (1994: 58-62) who uses 
Gallagher’s index in his empirical analysis noting that it is “...the most sensitive and 
faithful reflection of the disproportionality of election results...” (pp 62).41 
Gallagher index is computed using the following method: the vote-seat share 
differences for each party are squared and then added; this total is divided by two; 
and finally, the square root of this value is taken. This is shown in Equation 4-2.
Equation 4-2
Gallagher disproporionality index = ^ ^ ( v ,  —sty
An important advantage of the Gallagher index is that it produces higher values for 
more disproportional situations, and therefore is a suitable measure of 
disproportionality for an empirical study. Furthermore, since it is a commonly used 
measure of disproportionality, I use this index in my study as a dependent variable 
(Disproportionality). I now depict trends and key statistics of my dependent variable.
41 Lijphart (1994: 66-67) computes values o f disproportionality indices using alternative methods in his 
empirical analysis, and reports that they are highly correlated. Thus, one can expect that using 
alternative measures will make little difference to an empirical analysis.
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4.3.5 Trends o f the dependent variables
For each dependent variable, I trace the trends o f these variables over time, across 
the Indian states and regions, and their frequency distributions.
Effective number of electoral and legislative parties (ENP, ELP)
As can be seen in the time-series chart plotted in Figure 4-8, the average ENP at the 
state level has fluctuated over the years. In 9 out o f  14 elections, it has been higher 
than the overall average o f  3.3 during the period 1951 -  2004, while in the balance 5 
years, it has been lower. In 1977 and 1984, the ENP was at its lowest at 2.8 and 2.9 
respectively. The general trend o f the ENP has been that between the first four 
elections, i.e. between 1951 and 1967, it shows an upward trend, and in the next 5 
elections, i.e. between 1971 and 1989, the ENP saw a decline. Finally, in the five 
elections between 1990 and 2004, the ENP has in general, been increasing, although 
within a small range between 3.3 and 3.6.
Figure 4-8 Average E N P  at state level over time
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Figure 4-9 plots ENP on a regional basis. From the examination o f  the chart, we can 
see that although ENP varies across the Indian regions, this variation is much less 
than is visible at the state level. North region has more parties compared to other 
regions at 3.7, while the North East region has the lowest ENP at 3.0. The ENP in 
the other three regions -  Hindi belt, South and West regions are close to the average 
for all the states o f  3.3.
Figure 4-9 Average E N P  at the state level by region 1951 -2004
I now turn to the cross sectional depiction o f  ENP in the Indian states. Since Indian 
regions consist o f  different number o f  states which are heterogeneous, it is useful to 
analyse party systems for each state. Figure 4 1 0  shows average ENP in 21 Indian 
states from 1951 -  2004.42 As can be seen in the figure, ENP varies across the Indian 
states. Further, with the exception o f few cases, all the states have more than 2 ENP, 
and many o f  them have more than 3 ENP. Many states have over four and even five 
parties in competition.
42These states account for over 95% of electoral districts in India. I exclude smaller states to improve 
graphical presentation. My empirical analysis includes all states in India.
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Figure 4-10 Average E N P  in the Indian states 1951 -2004
In addition to the average measures o f  ENP, it is important to study its distribution 
for appreciating the heterogeneity o f  party systems in the Indian states. Figure 4-11 
shows the histogram and kernel density curve o f ENP in the Indians states. It can be 
seen that the distribution is relatively low and well spread out, with a large 
percentage o f  data points falling between 2 and 4.
Figure 4-11 Histogram of E N P  1951 -2004
E ffec tiv e  e le c to ra l p a rt ie s
I now proceed with depiction o f  ELP. Figure 4-12 shows the time series bar chart o f  
the ELP. The trend is broadly similar to that o f ENP; this measure rises from 1.6 in
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the first elections to 1.9 in the 1967 elections. Between 1971 and 1989, ELP fells 
and is in the range o f 1.3 -  1.6. Finally, the ELP rises again in the 1990’s and has 
stabilised around 1.9 in the last four elections. The average ELP for all the states 
through this period is 1.7.
Figure 4-12 Average E L P  at state level over time
Figure 4-13 shows the regional variations in ELP. East region has the highest 
number o f  average ELP at 2.0, while the North East region has the lowest ELP at 1.2. 
The inter-regional variation in ELP is lower than what is seen in ENP.
Figure 4-13 Average .CLP in Indian regions 1951 -2004
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Figure 4-14 shows the cross sectional distribution o f ELP in the Indian states. As 
can be seen that, number o f ELP at the state level vary, with maximum being 3.3 
parties that won seats in the elections. Kerala in the south region has highest number 
o f ELP, while smaller states such as Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh in the North East 
region have only 1 ELP.
Figure 4-14 Average E L P  in the Indian states 1951 -2004
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Number of Contesting Parties (NCP)
The time-series plot o f average NCP at state level in Figure 4-15 shows a movement 
in a narrow range o f  28 -  34 in the first three elections till 1962. In the next three 
elections, from 1967 -  1977, the NCP increased to a range o f  38 -51, but it was the 
next five elections starting in 1980, that it increased substantially, reaching its peak at 
349 in 1996. In the last three elections, average NCP has stabilised in the range o f  
75-85. The mean for all the states and all the elections is just over 100 parties. Thus, 
this measure o f party systems has varied substantially over time in the Indian 
elections.
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Figure 4-15 Average N C P  at state level over time
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Figure 4-16 shows regional patterns o f NCP, and it can be seen that the Hindi belt 
region has substantially more contesting parties than the other Indian regions, while 
other regions has far fewer number o f  contesting parties. North-East region is an 
outlier, with significantly lower number than the other regions.
Figure 4-16 Average N C P  in Indian regions 1951 -2004
Figure 4-17 shows that NCP vary substantially even between states within a region. 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in the Hindi belt have the highest NCP at 625 and 338
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respectively, while North Eastern states such as Arunachal Pradesh Tripura have less 
than 10 NCP. Overall, there is large inter-state variation in NCP in the Indian party 
system.
Figure 4-17 Average N C P  in the Indian states 1951 -2004
127126122
The above analysis reveals that not only do we see inter-state variation, but also 
inter-regional variations and variation over time, in the number o f contesting parties
Disproportionality
One can see from the time series plot in Figure 4-18 that Disproportionality in the 
Indians states rose gradually but consistently in the five elections starting in 1962. 
Thereafter, it seems to have stabilised in the range o f  0.29 to 0.31, even though in 
1989, it was 0.34. The overall average for all the states for all the elections is 0.29.
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Figure 4-18 Average Disproportionality at state level over time
Figure 4-19 shows the average Disproportionality in the Indian states, and it can be 
seen that there is a fair degree o f  variation in this variable in the Indian states.
Figure 4-19 Average Disproportionality in the Indian states 1951 -2004
In terms o f  regional break-up shown in Figure 4-20, one can see that North East 
region witnesses the highest Disproportionality at 0.36, while this measure for the 
other regions are in the range o f  0.26-0.30. Many North Eastern states have very
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few seats allotted to them, and therefore, Disproportionality can be expected to be 
high there.
Figure 4-20 Average Disproportionately in the Indian regions 1951 -2004
Finally, I plot histogram o f  Disproportionality in the Indian states for all elections in 
Figure 4-21. The distribution is close to being a normal distribution, and the 
distribution is well-spread signifying variation in this variable in the Indian elections. 
Most o f  the data points fall between 0.2 and 0.4.
Figure 4-21 Frequency histogram of D is p r o p o r t io n a l i ty  1951 -2004
tS a lla g h e r  "  6d isp ro p o rtio n a lity  ind ex
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4.4 Independent variables
My independent variables represent key institutional dimensions of the Indian 
electoral system. These include District Magnitude and Electoral Threshold, 
Assembly size, the geographical size, and the number of voters or population. I
provide specific formulations of these variables, and the study their effects on the
dependent variables discussed in the previous section.
4.4.1 District Magnitude
District Magnitude refers to the number of representatives elected in an electoral unit 
(district in the Indian context). Rae (1967) finds a strong influence of this variable on 
Disproportionality and multipartism. In general, the empirical literature has 
confirmed the proposition given by Hogan (1945) more than half a century ago: 
“(the) larger the constituency, that is, the greater the result approximate to 
proportionality.” In the same vein, Taagepera (1998: 393) stresses that
Arguably the most important aspect of an electoral 
system is the degree of squeeze it puts on 
representation on small parties, which influences the 
number of parties and is reflected in deviation from 
proportional representation (PR).
As mentioned earlier, for two elections held in 1951 and 1957, many districts h 
India were multi-member. However for the subsequent 12 national elections, India 
shifted to single-member districts. Thus, we can study the effect of multi-member 
districts on the size of the party system in 1951 and 1957 elections. The effect of 
District Magnitude in the Indian districts is shown in Table 4-10 which compares 
average ENP in the single-member districts with those with multi-member districts.
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Table 4-10 Average E N P  in the Indian districts by District Magnitude
D is t r i c t  M a g n i tu d e !  
Election Years
1 2 3 Total
1951 2.7 5.6 6.8 3.4
(310) (81) (1) (392)
1957 2.4 5.1 _ 3.0
(312) (87) (399)
1962 -  2004 (12 elections) 2.6 - - 2.6
(6383) (6383)
Total 2.6 5.4 6.8 2.7
(7005) (168) (1) (7174)
Note: Figures in the parenthesis are number o f districts
Table 4-10 shows that in 1951 elections, 82 out of 392 districts were multi-member, 
and the average ENP in these districts was much higher than in single-member 
districts. Thus, as against average ENP of 2.7 in the single-member districts, the 
ENP was 5.6 for two-member and 6.8 for three-member districts. Similar results are 
obtained for elections in 1957, and it is clear that multi-member districts have a much 
higher average ENP thus indicating adherence to the theoretical predictions.
I now run regressions taking ENP at the district level as the dependent variable and 
District Magnitude as an independent variable. In the first regression (models 1A and 
IB), I only include 1951 and 1957 elections (elections when some districts were 
multi-member). In the second regression (models 2A and 2B), I include all elections. 
The results of the regression are shown in Table 411, where I report regression 
coefficient of District Magnitude variable, lagged dependent variable and their t 
statistics.
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Table 4-11 Regression o f  E N P  and District Magnitude in Indian districts
1951 and 1957 elections All elections
Dependent: Model 1A Model IB Model 2A Model 2B
E N P
OLS OLS with PCSE, OLS OLS with PCSE,
lagged dependent lagged dependent
District 2.79** 2.35** 2.70** 1.67**
Magnitude (38.5) (16.3) (46.1) (17.8)
ENP lagged 0.05 0.31**
(1.3) (23.7)
Constant -0.23 -0.12 -0.06 0.11
R square 0.65 0.64 0.23 0.20
N 791 312 7174 6463
** refers to significance at 95% confidence interval
The coefficient for District Magnitude variable is positive and statistically significant 
for all the regressions. This variable alone explains a very large percentage of 
variance in the district-level ENP in the 1951 and 1957 elections. Even for the 
regression results for all the elections, District Magnitude explains 20%- 23% of the 
variance in ENP. The regression results further confirms the theoretical prediction 
about the effect of District Magnitude on the size of the party system in the Indian 
context; the regression results reported in Table 4-11 show that higher District 
Magnitude leads to increase in ENP in the Indian districts.
4.4.2 Electoral Threshold
Another important dimension of the electoral system is the electoral threshold or the 
minimum share or level of votes that is required to gain representation. This can 
either be provided specifically as a legal threshold, or can be inferred as an observed 
threshold, from the other dimension of the electoral system (Taagepera and Shugart, 
1989). As Lijphart (1994:12) also points out “Low ( district) magnitudes have the
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same effect as high thresholds: both limit proportionality and the opportunities for
small parties to win seats legal thresholds and district magnitude can be seen as
two sides of the same coin.” Taagepera and Shugart (1989) introduced the following 
measures of effective threshold and district magnitude as rough measures of a given 
electoral system on small-party representation.
Equation 4-3 Effective Threshold (T’) = 50%/ District Magnitude (M),
Equation 4-4 Effective Magnitude (M ’) = 50%/T
Lijphart (1994) used a different averaging formula for calculating T , which is given 
by
Equation 4-5 T’ = 50% /(M+l) + 50%/(2M), for M>1
Lijphart uses the threshold for M=1 at 35% for his empirical analysis, while
Taagepera suggested the following equation to apply to all (including M=l) types of 
magnitudes:
Equation 4-6 T’ = 75% /(M +l)
This equation yields T’=37.5%, which is close to 35% used by Lijphart (1994) in his 
empirical analysis. Thus, electoral threshold and district magnitude are closely 
related to each other, and based on the formulations discussed above, if we know one 
of these variables, the other can be computed.
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Taagepera (1998: 399) proposes a methodology to measure the effective threshold 
for polities with single member districts. He defines
the observed effective threshold T* at district level as the votes 
share at which the number of candidates winning with less 
than T’ equals the number of candidates losing with more than 
T \
Since this method provides an analytical way of computing electoral threshold for 
polities with single-member districts, it can be used in the context of the Indian party 
system. Using this method, an effective threshold can be computed for the country as 
a whole (for all the districts in the country), or for different Indian states (by only 
including districts in specific states in the analysis). Below, I explain the mechanics 
of this methodology for my empirical analysis.
I first provide a hypothetical electoral threshold (T’) at the district level, which 
represents the share of votes required to win the seat in a particular year. Based on 
this threshold, and share of votes received by the winning candidate, all the losing 
candidates, and the number of losers in each district, I compute the number of 
candidates who can win (A) despite getting less than T* (in face of fragmented 
competition) and the number of candidates who lose despite getting more than that 
T* (B). Thus, the observed probability of winning a seat (P*) with a given T’ is given 
by A/(A+B), and following Taagepera (1998), P’ should equal 50% at the effective 
threshold. Using iterations taking different values of T’, I arrive at a value of T* at 
which P’ equals 50%. This then represents the effective threshold of winning a seat 
in an Indian district in the chosen election year. Similarly, I compute the Effective 
Threshold in the Indian districts for the other election-years.
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For computing the Effective threshold for a particular Indian state, I repeat the 
computation process described above, but only including districts from the chosen 
state so that the arrived value o f Effective Threshold is for that state. The measures 
o f  effective threshold so computed for all the Indian states and election years become 
my data points for the empirical analysis. This way, an abstract formulation for T* 
for M = l ,  can be in practice computed and used in empirical models. Figure 4-22 
shows a graphical illustration o f  this method o f computing Effective Threshold in the 
Indian districts in the 2004 elections.
Figure 4-22 Effective Threshold in Indian districts in 2004 elections
Effective threehold ■ 31.5% 
Probability of winning = 50%
20% 25% 40%30%
Percentage of votes received
35%
The horizontal axis shows that percentage o f  votes received by a party in a district, 
and the vertical axis shows the probability o f winning a seat, corresponding to that 
percentage o f  vote received, computed as per the method described earlier. At 25% 
vote share, the probability o f  winning a seat is almost zero. At around 27% vote 
share this probability is about 25%. At vote share o f 31.5%, this probability is 50%, 
and therefore, this is the effective threshold for winning a seat in an average Indian 
district. For my analysis, I compute Effective threshold for each Indian state for each 
election, and use it as an independent variable.
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4.4.3 Assembly size
Rae (1967, 1971) calls the ‘Assembly Size”, that is, the number of seats in the 
legislature a ‘generally neglected variable’, whose effects on party systems have not 
been systematically studied. However, he still does not enter it in his empirical 
analysis. One reason for relative neglect of this variable as pointed out by Lijphart 
(1994) is that Assembly Size is seen as a characteristic of legislatures elected 
according to particular electoral systems rather than reflecting a feature of electoral 
rules.
Taagepera (1973) refers to the ‘cube law’ which holds that if, in a two-party systems 
and plurality single-member district elections, the votes received by the two parties
'X lare divided in a ratio of a:b, the seats that they win will be in the ratio of a :b . He 
shows that the exponent of 3 applies only in special circumstances, and that it goes 
up (and disproportionality increases), as the number of voters increases and/or 
assembly size decreases. Thus, according to this view, in plurality-based electoral 
system, the degree of disproportionality tends to increase, as the size of legislature 
decreases. This proposition has been confirmed in Lijphart’s (1990) study of 
plurality elections in small legislatures of the Eastern Caribbean countries. Lijphart 
(1994) includes Assembly Size as an independent variable in his study of 
disproportionality and party systems. As Lijphart (1994:12) puts it,
if electoral systems are defined as methods of translating votes 
into seats, the total number of seats available for this 
translation appears to be an integral and bgitimate part of this 
translation.
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Thus, there is theoretical justification to include this variable in the research. For my 
empirical analysis, I include Assembly Size - the number of seats allotted to each 
state as one of the institutional explanatory variables. Indian states have different 
‘Assembly Size’, and this enables studying the effect of this factor on the size of the 
party system in the Indian states.
4.4.4 Reservation o f districts for SC and ST
India has a system of reserved districts for certain sections of society -  Schedule 
Castes (SC) and Schedule Tribes (ST) to improve their representation in the political 
process. Currently, there are 79 reserved seats for the SC and 41 reserved seats for 
the ST in the legislature out of total of 543 seats. Since the candidates in the 
reserved districts can only be from these sections of the society, one can expect the 
number of parties in these districts to be lower than in the non-reserved districts. 
One can also hypothesise that this happens mainly because of decline in the number 
of independent candidates contesting elections, and winning votes and seats. 
Furthermore, if this logic holds, the larger parties should remain relatively unaffected 
because they can find SC and ST candidates within their parties to contest elections, 
or can attract these candidates into their party. In Table 4-12,1 present the average 
ENP, NCP and the number of independent candidates separately for the reserved and 
unreserved districts in the Indian elections.
Table 4-12 Effect of Electoral reservation in the Indian districts 1951 -  2004
District type No of 
districts
Average
ENP
Average
NCP
Average no. of 
Independent 
Candidates
Reserved for SC 996 2.70 7.44 3.34
Reserved for ST 497 2.68 5.71 2.13
Unreserved 5681 2.71 9.88 5.79
All districts 7174 2.71 9.25 5.20
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Table 4-12 summarises the effect of electoral reservation for SC and ST on the size 
of party system in the Indian districts. As can be seen, ENP remains relatively 
unaffected due to the reservation factor with both reserved and unreserved districts 
showing similar ENP. This is in line with expectations, since I expect that large 
parties can find candidates from these social groups to contest elections under their 
party label, and therefore, the number of vote-getting parties remains unaffected due 
to electoral reservation However, the analysis also reveals that the NCP in the 
districts reserved for SC and ST is lower than in unreserved districts. This also 
confirms the hypothesis that since electoral rules put restrictions on who can contest 
elections, the number of contesting parties goes down. The average NCP in an 
unreserved district is close to 10, while it is 7 and 6 for districts reserved for SC and 
ST respectively. Furthermore, the number of independent candidates is substantially 
lower for the reserved districts. This is in line with predicted results since with 
electoral reservation, only SC and ST independent candidates can contest elections, 
and this restriction reduces the number of independent candidates in Indian districts.
Thus, electoral reservation which is a key part of Indian electoral system reduces the 
number of contesting parties, and the number of independent candidates, but does not 
affect the ENP at the district level Also, electoral reservation does not seem to be 
affecting large parties which can always attract candidates from the SC and ST 
communities to contest elections on its behalf.
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4.4.5 Geographical size and population
Dahl and Tufte (1973) discuss the link between size and party systems, suggesting 
that the size of political entities affect fragmentation of the party system. The main 
reason for the expected link relates to organisational diversity and complexity; a 
large unit presupposes a wide range of organizations and institutions, which produce 
a high degree of specialisation and complexity. Therefore it is reasonable to expect 
that an increase in size leads to an increase in attitudinal diversity (Dahl and Tufte, 
1973: 30-40). According to Dahl and Tufte, it is reasonable to expect that the link 
between size and party system fragmentation can exist only in very small political 
systems situated within a single country. The assumption is that the patterns of 
conflict management vary a great deal between countries, and historical uniqueness 
can therefore limit the association between size and party system fragmentation. 
Dahl and Tufte also presume that the arguments derived from social-psychological 
theory-building only applied to very small units; countries are therefore too large to 
constitute test cases (Dahl and Tufte, 1973: 94-7). Further, they argue that the 
presumed effect of plurality electoral systems fragmentation might blur the 
relationship between size and party system fragmentation (p. 100).
Anckar (1998) shows that size contains explanatory power at the inter-state level and 
also among countries using majoritarian electoral systems. Using the same insight, 
Anckar (2000) develops and tests two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The larger the size of a political unit (in terms of population and area), 
the larger the number of political parties operating within that unit.
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Hypothesis 2: The larger the size of a political unit (in terms of population and area), 
the smaller the electoral support for the leading party operating within that unit. He 
summarises his findings as follows:
the results clearly show that factors traditionally 
brought forward as determinants of party system 
fragmentation contain little or no explanatory 
value compared to size. Concerning the effective 
threshold, there is a weak relationship between 
this variable on the one hand and the electoral 
support for the leading party, as well as the
effective number of parties, on the other..............
1. The larger the size of a country, or a unit 
within a country, the higher the number of 
parties. The rule applies irrespective of electoral 
system.
2 The larger the size of a country, the lower the 
electoral support for the leading party. The rule 
applies irrespective of electoral system.
3 The larger the size of a country, the higher the 
effective number of parties. The rule applies 
irrespective of electoral system, (pp. 315,319)
My research design includes political units (states) within one country (India), and 
this allows me to test the effect of the ‘size’ factor on the size of party system. The 
size variable can be represented by the geographical size, the population, or the 
number of voters of the individual Indian states.
4.4.6 Electoral reforms
In the Indian context, electoral reforms also constitute an important part of the 
electoral rules and structure. Various reforms have been introduced over the years, 
which aim at strengthening the electoral process, improve the overall fairness of the 
electoral results. The reforms that have been introduced over the years include 
appointment of election observers, fixing ceiling on campaign expenditure, anti­
defection laws, codes of conduct, control on officials conducting elections, etc. I
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trace the key Eforms carried out in India since independence and based on it, 
construct a score of free and fair elections.43 Electoral reforms have both 
encouraging and discouraging effect on the number of parties. They discourage non- 
serious candidates due to changes such as increase in the forfeiture amount. 
However, since reforms ultimately mean a level playing field, they encourage more 
number of candidates to contest elections and get votes.
4.4.7 Malapportionment
Gallagher (1991) points to the possibility of malapportionment affecting the degree 
of proportionality of election outcomes. In single member districts, this means that 
districts have substantially unequal voting populations. Malapportionment can 
systematically favour one or more parties and therefore contribute to electoral 
disproportionality. According to Lijphart (1994), Malapportionment often takes the 
form of rural or regional overrepresentation, and therefore can affect the size of party 
system in a polity.44 Farrell (2001: 13) points out that malapportionment can happen 
“as a matter of course, by population shifts not being compensated for by a 
redrawing of constituency boundaries. But it can also be engineered on purpose”.
I now proceed to provide precise formulations and trends of my explanatory 
institutional variables.
43My criteria consists o f a list o f 19 electoral reforms. I follow Goodwin-Gill (1994) in defining 
criteria for Free and Fair Elections in India. Mendez (2000) uses a similar approach for studying 
electoral reforms in Mexico.
44Lijphart (1997: 130) finds that when the influence of effective threshold is controlled for, 
malapportionment turns out not to be a factor o f any significance for party system variables. 
Accordingly, he does not include it in his empirical analysis.
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4.4.8 Trends o f the independent variables
In this section, I provide and interpret summary statistics and trends o f  my 
independent variables. I focus on Effective Threshold, Assembly Size, Number o f  
Voters and Electoral Reforms.
Effective Threshold
Figure 4-23 shows a time-series plot o f  Effective threshold in India, which is 
computed using method explained in section 4.4.2.
Figure 4-23 Effective Threshold in (all) Indian states over time
The average Effective Threshold for all the years is 44.4%, which is much higher 
than 35%, which is assumed by Lijphart (1994) for all countries which have single­
member districts.45 The Effective Threshold shows an increase between 1951 and 
1977 elections, moving from 39.5% to 50%. Subsequently, it has declined, and in 
the latest 2004 elections it is 31.5% thus indicating the fragmentation o f  the party
45The maximum Effective Threshold is 50.1%, as this vote share guarantees winning the election.
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system. I now plot the variation o f  Effective Threshold across the Indians states in 
Figure 4-24.
Figure 4-24 Average Effective Threshold in Indian states
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The cross-section plot o f  the Effective Threshold shows that it varies between Indian 
states, and takes values between 33% and 50%. Most o f  the threshold values are 
greater than 40%, again proving that parties require a reasonable high share o f  votes 
to win a seat in the legislature. The inter-region variation in threshold are however, 
not very significant, as is shown in Figure 4-25.
Figure 4-25 Average Effective Threshold by region
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Assembly Size
Each Indian state has been allotted a specified number o f  seats in Lok Sabha -  the 
main legislating body. These seats are allotted on the basis o f  a formula based on the 
population o f  each state. Accordingly, the number o f  seats allotted to each state 
varies, and this has also varied over time, depending on the overall size o f  the 
national parliament. However, since census is held only every 10 years in India, the 
distribution o f  seats does not change as per corresponding changes in population 
(since elections are held every 5 years). In fact, there has not been any change in the 
seats allotted to different states since the 1971 census, and therefore, the current 
distribution o f  seats does not reflect the changes in population o f  different states after 
this census. For my empirical analysis, I use the Assembly Size as defined above, o f  
each state for each election year as a data point, as shown in Figure 4-26.
Figure 4-26 Assembly Size in the Indian states
As can be seen, Assembly Size varies substantially across the Indian states. Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal send 
relatively large numbers o f  representatives (ranging from 40-85) to the legislature,
179
CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
while smaller states such as Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura have been 
allotted as few as 2 seats.
Number of electors
The number o f  electors in the Indians states is meant to measure the effect o f  the 
‘Size’ factor as well as the effect o f malapportionment on the party systems in the 
Indian states. Following I plot a time-series chart o f  this variable in Figure 4-27.
Figure 4-27 Average number of electors in the Indian states
As can be seen an average Indian state has large voting population, the average size 
o f  the electorate in an Indian state stood at around 7 million in 1951. It has been 
rising ever since, and stood at 19 million in the recently concluded 2004 elections. 
Figure 4-28 plots the number o f electors in the Indian states on a cross-sectional 
basis.
180
CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Figure 4-28 Average number of Hectors in the Indian states 1951 -  2004
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It can be seen that there are large variations in voting population across the Indian 
states, with the overall average being 14 million voters at the state level during 1951- 
2004. Voting population in many large states are comparable to the population o f  
many European countries reflecting the heterogeneity and the complexity inherent in 
the party politics in India. To illustrate this point further, the voting population in the 
2004 elections in some large Indian states is shown in Figure 4-29.
Figure 4-29 Voting population in some large Indian states
Note: Based on 2004 election statistics
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Electoral reforms
As discussed in section 4.4.6., I construct an index of electoral reforms based on 
measures introduced at different times. Each reform is given a score of one.46 The 
score for different election years are shown in Table 4-13.
Table 4-13 Index of Electoral Reforms
Elections Index of 
Electoral 
Reforms
1951 -1957 (2) 11
1962 - 1977 (4) 12
1980 (1) 13
1984-1991 (3) 15
1996 - 1999 (3) 16
2004 (1) 18
Note: Numbers in parenthesis reflect number o f elections
I use the Reforms as an explanatory variable so that the effect of the reforms carried 
out can be controlled in the regression analysis.
4.4.9 Methodology for the empirical analysis
I conduct correlation and analysis, and cross-tabulation of my dependent and 
independent variables to detect the general patterns of their relationship. For my 
regression analysis, I focus on the variables that manifest themselves at the state 
level. Further, I exclude variables which are highly interrelated to minimise the 
multi-collinearity problem. The details of my dependent and explanatory variables 
for the regression analysis are given below in Table 4-14.47
46Details o f the reforms introduced are shown in Appendix B. 
47A snapshot o f my data points is given in Appendix C.
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Table 4-14 Description of variables for regression analysis
Variable Description Method of computation
Dependent
N C P Number of contesting parties in 
a state
Simple count o f parties contesting 
elections
E N P Effective number o f electora 1 
parties in a state
Following Laakso and Taagepera’s 
(1979), using vote share o f each party
E L P Effective number o f legislative 
parties in a state
Same as E N P , but computed using seat 
share
Winning Share Vote share o f the Winning Party Votes received by winning party / Total 
votes polled
Disproportionality Index measuring disproportionality 
between votes and seats in a state
Following Gallagher (1991)
Independent
Assembly Size Number o f seats allotted to each 
state in the legislature (L o k S a b h a )
Using natural Log
Effective Threshold Effective electoral threshold in a 
State
Computed using Taagepera (1998)
Electors Number of voters in a state Using natural log
Reforms Electoral reforms index Based on an index of electoral reforms
My hypotheses are in the form the expected direction of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. These are summarised in Table 4-15. The 
columns show the dependent variables, while the rows show the independent 
variables. I show the sign of the hypothesised relationship through a *+’ (positive 
relationship) or a (negative relationship).
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Table 4-15 Expected direction of relationship between variables
NCP ENP ELP Winning Disproportionality
Dependent Party Share
Explanatory
Assembly Size + + +
Effective Threshold - - + +
Electors + + +
Reforms + + +
4.5 Correlations and cross-tabulation
In this section, I present correlation analysis and cross-tabulation of my dependent 
and independent variables. The objective is to detect general patterns in the data, 
which can be further tested using multivariate regression I start by providing a 
correlation matrix between the three measures of the size of the party systems in
Table 4-16.
Table 4-16 Correlation between dimensions of party system
Correlations
No. of
Contesting
parties
Effective
electoral
parties
Effective
legislative
parties
No. of Contesting parties 1.00
Effective electoral parties 0.20" 1.00
Effective legislative parties 0.27" 0.62" 1.00
"Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
The correlation is positive and significant between all the three measures, but the 
strongest relationship is between the ENP and the ELP, which have a correlation of 
+0.62. This indicates that the ENP provides a sort of upper bound to the ELP, and it 
is the domain of the electoral rules to convert the vote-getting parties into seat-
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getting parties. It also points to the fact that same set of factors are at work in the 
determination of the three measures of the size of the party systems, especially ENP 
and the ELP. The NCP however, is also affected by many factors that do not affect 
the other two measures. Continuing with the correlation analysis, I present the 
correlations between the three measures of the size of the party system, and the 
degree of support for the leading party, and Disproportionality.
Table 4-17 Correlation between party system, winning party share and Disproportionality
Correlations
Winning 
party share
Disproportionality
index
No. of Contesting parties -0.26** -0.26**
Effective electoral parties -0.75** -0.16**
Effective legislative parties -0.65** -0.66**
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
The correlation results are in line with the theoretical predictions; the three party 
system variables are negatively related to the winning party share and 
Disproportionality. The winning party share has a particularly strong negative 
relationship with effective electoral parties and effective legislative parties 
(correlation of -0.75 and -0.65). Thus, the support for the leading party has a 
significant downward effect on the effective electoral as well as legislative parties. 
Disproportionality has the strongest relationship with effective legislative parties 
(correlation of -0.66). This reflects the mechanical effect of the electoral rules on the 
effective number of legislative parties. One should recall here that the mechanical 
effect of electoral rules reduces the number of vote-getting parties into seat-getting 
parties, and since India follows a plurality winning formula, there is a high negative
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correlation between Disproportionality and the number of legislative parties. In 
general, the results show that the Indian states with higher Disproportionality have 
fewer number of contesting, vote-getting and seat-getting parties.
In Table 4-18,1 summarise the average values for my dependent variables which are 
measured at the state level, and averaged by region. The total values represent 
averages for all Indian states taken together.
Table 4-18 Average dimensions Indian party systems at state level by region
No. of Effective Effective Winning Dis­
Contesting electoral legislative Party proportionality
Region parties parties parties Share index
East 54 3.50 2.01 44.49 0.26
Hindi belt 217 3.37 1.76 46.30 0.26
North 50 3.71 1.76 43.18 0.31
North East 6 2.99 1.22 54.69 0.37
South 113 3.40 1.93 45.93 0.28
West 92 3.24 1.59 48.12 0.30
Total 104 3.33 1.70 47.54 0.29
N 401 401 401 401 401
Thus, on an average there are about 104 parties or candidates that contest election in 
an Indian state. Out of these only 3.3 are vote-getting parties, and only 1.7 are 
successful in winning elections. The winning party gets an average of 48% of the 
votes, and the average Disproportionality for the whole country at the state level is 
0.29.
I now present cross-tabulation of my dependent and independent variables. I start 
with cross-tabulation of the dependent variables with Effective threshold, which is 
shown in Table 4-19.
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Table 4-19 Cross-tabulation of Effective Threshold and Party system
Effective
threshold
categories
No. of 
Contesting 
parties
Effective
electoral
parties
Effective
legislative
parties
Winning
Party
Share
Dis­
proportionality
index
<0.31 88 4.72 2.12 39.28 0.28
0.31-0 .35 203 4.30 2.01 38.62 0.29
0.36- 0.40 138 4.08 2.00 39.24 0.28
0.41 - 0.45 143 3.54 1.78 44.93 0.28
0.46 - 0.5 69 2.79 1.51 52.80 0.31
Total 104 3.33 1.70 47.53 0.29
Table 4-19 reveals two general patterns. First, higher thresholds are associated with 
lower ENP and ELP. For threshold values up to 0.30, the average ENP is 4.72 and 
the average ELP is 2.12. As threshold values increase, the corresponding ENP and 
ELP values see a decline. Thus, for thresholds greater than 0.45, the average ENP 
and ELP fall to 2.79 and 1.51 respectively. The second pattern emerging from Table
4-19 is that higher thresholds are associated with a higher share of winning party and 
higher Disproportionality. Thus, while for threshold levels less than 0.31, the 
average vote share won by the winning party is 39.28%, and Disproportionality is 
0.28, but these increase to 52.8% and 0.31 respectively for thresholds greater than
0.45. Both these patterns are consistent with the theoretical predictions about the 
relationship between the number of parties on one hand, and Effective threshold and 
Winning Share and Disproportionality on the other. The relationship between the 
number of contesting parties and threshold does not give us a clear pattern. 
Sometimes the number of contesting parties increase with increase in threshold, but 
on other occasions they show a decline with the increase in electoral threshold.
Table 4-20 presents cross-tabulation of the dependent variables with Assembly Size.
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Table 4-20 Relationship between Party system and Assembly size
Assembly size 
categories
No. of 
Contesting 
parties
Effective
electoral
parties
Effective
legislative
parties
Winning
Party
Share
Dis­
proportionality
index
1 -5 9 2.86 1.18 52.88 0.37
6 - 1 0 101 3.55 1.79 45.29 0.28
1 1 -20 60 4.23 2.42 39.79 0.23
21 -50 171 3.40 2.00 44.83 0.22
> 50 462 4.26 2.34 39.54 0.22
Table 4-20 shows that in general, the relationship between Assembly size and the 
number of parties is positive. Thus, states with larger assemblies tend to have higher 
number of ENP and ELP. For states with Assembly size between 1 and 5, the 
average ENP is 2.86, and ELP is 1.18. The corresponding numbers for states with 
Assembly Size greater than 50 are 4.26 and 2.34 respectively. The number of 
contesting parties too tend to increase with increase in the Assembly size. For states 
with Assembly size less than 6, there are average of 9 parties that contest elections, 
while for states with Assembly size greater than 50, the number of contesting parties 
increases manifold to 462. The share of winning party decreases as the Assembly 
size increases, but it stabilises around 0.22 for states with Assembly size greater than 
20. The relationship between Assembly Size and Disproportionality is also negative,
i.e. states with larger Assembly Size tend to have lower levels of disproportionality. 
For example, while for states with Assembly Size less than 5, the average 
Disproportionality is 0.37, while for states with Assembly size over 50, it is 0.22. 
Thus, in general the pattern of the relationships follows the direction predicted by 
theoretical models.
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I now turn to verify the direction and strength of the relationships between my 
dependent and independent variables through regression analysis.
4.6 Regression Analysis
Using multivariate regression, I test the hypothesis about the relationship between 
the dependent variables representing the Indian party system at the state level, and 
the hypothesised institutional explanatory variables. Since Assembly Size and the 
Electors are highly correlated (with correlation coefficient of 0.94), these are used in 
different regression models. Accordingly, my first regression model uses five party 
system dependent variables and the explanatory variables - Assembly Size, Effective 
Threshold and index of electoral reforms. In the second regression model, I replace 
Assembly Size with Electors. For each regression, I report the intercept for the 
dependent variable, regression coefficients, t statistics, R-square, and the number of 
observations.
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Table 4-21 Regression of Party System, Assembly Size, Effective Threshold, Reforms
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent -> 
Independent
ENP ELP NCP Winning
Share
Disproporti onality
Assembly size 0.27** 0.30** 70.2** -3.3** -0.05**
(8.9) (14.7) (8.6) (8.2) (11.4)
Effective -9.24** -2.69** -257.9* 84.2** -0.03
Threshold (9.0) (4.7) (1.7) (8.8) (0.29)
Reforms 0.03 0.05** 25.2** -1.3** 0.00*
(1.4) (3.2) (5.8) (5.0) (1.8)
Intercept 6.4 1.6 -279.3 35.4 0.33
R square 0.40 0.37 0.29 0.37 0.29
Adj. R square 0.39 0.37 0.28 0.37 0.28
N 401 401 401 401 401
Table 4-22 Regression of Party System, Electors, Effective threshol4 Reforms
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent -> 
Independent
ENP ELP NCP Winning
Share
Disproportionality
Electors 0.18** 0.20** 43.7** -2.2** -0.03**
(8.9) (15.2) (8.7) (7.8) (10.2)
Effective -9.2** -2.64** -260.4 83.4** -0.04
Threshold (9.1) (4.6) (1.6) (8.7) (0.37)
Reforms 0.00 0.01 16.9** -0.93** 0.01**
(0.03) (0.9) (4.6) (3.6) (4.0)
Intercept 7.2 2.4 -69.5 26.1 0.20
R square 0.39 0.36 0.26 0.37 0.28
Adj. R square 0.39 0.36 0.25 0.37 0.27
N 401 401 401 401 401
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In general, the regression results in Table 4-21 and 4-22 are in line with the 
theoretical predictions. I focus on results in Table 4-21.
Assembly Size has a positive effect on all the three dependent variables that measure 
the size of the party system. Therefore, larger the Assembly Size, larger is the size of 
the party system in that state. This variable has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on all three measures of the size of the party systems -  the ENP, ELP and 
NCP. Assembly Size has negative effect on the other two dependent variables -  the 
vote share of the winning party and the degree of disproportionality. The regression 
coefficients of Assembly Size for these two dependent variables are negative and 
significant, thus confirming the theoretical prediction that larger Assembly Size 
enable a more competitive party system with reduced vote share for the winning 
party, as well as reduced degree of disproportionality between votes and seats. The 
effect of Assembly Size variable on the size of Indian party system has not been 
examined empirically before, and the fact that it has significant effect on both the 
size and competitiveness of the party system in the Indian states is an important 
result.
The broader implication of this result is that if Indian states were to be sub-divided 
into smaller units with smaller Assembly Size, it is likely to result into reduction in 
the number of parties at the state level. This reduction in the number of parties at 
state level can have important administrative, economic and social consequences. For 
example, Chhibber and Noorudin (2004) report that Indian states with fewer parties 
are likely to provide more public goods than the ones with multiparty competition. 
This happens because in two-party systems parties draw support from many social
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groups and therefore need to provide more public goods to win elections. In 
multiparty systems on the other hand, parties need only a plurality to win an election, 
and therefore are more likely to use private goods rather than public goods to 
mobilise support.
The regression results for the second explanatory variable -  Effective Threshold are 
also broadly in line with the theoretical predictions - this variable has a negative 
effect on the size of the party systems in the Indian states. Thus, states having higher 
thresholds have fewer parties, and vice-versa. The regression coefficient is negative 
and significant for regressions run on ENP, ELP and NCP. These results in general 
confirm the hypothesis that high Effective Thresholds constrain the size of party 
system in a polity. This variable has the expected positive effect on the vote share of 
the winning party, and its coefficient is statistically significant. The results show that 
Effective Threshold does not have a statistically significant effect on the degree of 
disproportionality in the Indian states.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is difficult to theorise about the likely effects 
of electoral reforms on the size of Indian party system. On one hand, it may result 
into a more level playing field, and lead to more parties contesting elections and 
gaining votes and seats. On the other hand, it can also lead to reduction in the 
number of parties by measures such as anti-defection laws, strict monitoring of 
elections, measures to ensure integrity of polling and counting of votes. Table 4-21 
shows that Electoral reforms have positive effect on the size of party system in the 
Indian states, with the regression coefficient being positive for the three size of the 
party system variables, but having significant effects only for ELP and NCP. This
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factor is also significant to explain the vote share of winning party, and reforms have 
led to lower share of winning party. Results also show that electoral reforms have a 
positive effect on disproportionality. This might happen because reforms carried out 
have only affected the electoral rules which govern the carrying out of the elections, 
rather than affecting the basic electoral system (SMPS) and the disproportionality 
associated with it.
The R square and the adjusted R squares in all the five regressions in Table 4-21 are 
of reasonable magnitude (in the range of 0.28 to 0.39), and I conclude that 
institutional variables have important and significant effect on the size of the party 
systems in the Indian states. Both Assembly Size and Effective Threshold are 
important and significant variable s in affecting the size of the party system at the 
state level. States with large Assembly Size and lower Effective Threshold have 
more number of parties. The results reported in Table 4-22 which uses Electors 
instead of Assembly size as an explanatory variable produces very similar results to 
the ones reported in 4-21.
The above regression results are based on OLS. I also run these regressions using 
method recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) in light of TSCS nature of my data. 
This involves using OLS with PCSE and a lagged dependent variable as one of the 
independent variables. The results of the se regressions for the three size of the party 
system variables (ENP, ELP and NCP) are shown in Tables 4-23 and 4-24. As can 
been seen that these results are consistent with OLS results discussed earlier. 
Further, the lagged dependent variable in these regressions is both positive and
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significant thus indicating that previous election results affect the results of 
subsequent elections.
Table 4-23 Regression of Party System, Assembly Size, Effective Threshold, Reforms 
OLS with PCSE and lagged dependent variable48
1 2 3
Dependent -> ENP ELP NCP
Independent
Assembly size 0.15** 0.21** 70.6**
(5.3) (8.3) (7.1)
Effective -7.63** -2.10** -300.5*
Threshold (9.3) (3.9) (1.8)
Reforms 0.01 0.06** 25.5**
(0.6) (3.2) (4.8)
Lagged 0.43** 0.31** 0.09
dependent (9.3) (5.5) (0.6)
variable
Intercept 4.8 0.9 -272.4
R square 0.57 0.46 0.30
N 358 358 358
Table 4-24 Regression of Party System, Electors, Effective Threshold, Reforms 
OLS with PCSE and lagged dependent variable
1 2 3
Dependent ENP ELP NCP
Independent
Electors 0.10** 0.13** 43.1**
(5.3) (8.9) (7.1)
Effective -7.6** -2.1** -283.9*
Threshold (9.2) (3.8) (1.7)*
Reforms -0.00 0.03** 16.5**
(0.2) (2.0) (3.2)
Lagged 0.43** 0.32** 0.12
dependent (9.5) (5.8) (0.8)
variable
Intercept 5.2 1.4 -65.2
R square 0.57 0.45 0.27
N 358 358 358
* shows significance at 90% confidence interval 
** shows significance at 95% confidence interval
48REM also produces consistent results.
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4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I provide measures of the size of Indian party system, and study the 
effects of important institutional factors on it.
I find that India is an exception to the Duverger’s Law at the national and state 
levels. I also find that even at the district level, the support for Duverger’s Law is 
not unqualified, and elections in a non-trivial number of districts involve competition 
between more than two parties. Furthermore, one does not see a clear movement 
towards Duverger’s equilibrium of a two-party system even at the district leveL In 
particular, two largest Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are clear exceptions to 
the Duverger’s Law. My findings show that it is difficult to generalise the application 
of Duverger’s Law to the Indian case because effective number of parties vary across 
Indian states and regions.
I show that institutional variables matter in explaining the variation in the size of the 
Indian party system At the district level, I study the effect of District Magnitude and 
electoral reservation. I show that District Magnitude increases the number of parties 
in the Indian districts (in the 1951 and 1957 elections), and that the reduction in 
District Magnitude (to one) after the 1957 elections led to a substantial reduction in 
the effective number of parties. I also show that electoral reservation for SC and ST 
has a downward effect on the number of parties, especially for independent 
candidates who contest elections in the Indian districts. Overall, these results are in 
line with my hypotheses for these variables.
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The comparative analysis at the state level, which is my main focus of this chapter 
shows that the size of the party systems across the Indian states varies, and this 
variation is affected by institutional variables such as the Assembly Size, Effective 
Threshold, and Electoral reforms. While the Effective Threshold reduces the number 
of parties in an Indian state, the Assembly Size has positive effect on it. The results 
for these two variables are in line with my predicted institutional hypotheses, and are 
also statistically significant and robust.
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5 RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL HETREOGENEITY
In this chapter, I investigate whether and to what extent are the party systems in the 
Indian states shaped by the degree of social fragmentation, measured by the effective 
number of religious and social groups.
5.1 Introduction
India is composed of a huge variety of ethnicities, religions, languages, races and 
classes. All the major religions are represented in the country. According to the 2001 
census, there are 827 million Hindus (80.5%), 138.2 million Muslims (13.4%), 23.4 
millions Christians (2.3%), and 19.2 million Sikhs (1.9%) in the Indian population. 
The break up of population according to the religion over the years is shown in Table
5-1.
Table 5-1 Indian population percentage by religion
Religious
communities 1961 1971 1931 1991 2001
1 2 3 4 5 6
All religious 
com m unities
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Hindus 83.4 82.7 82,6 82.0 80.5
Muslims 10.7 11.2 11.4 12.1 13.4
Christians 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3
Sikhs 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9
Buddhists 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
Jains 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Others 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6
Religion not stated Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg.
Source: Census of India, various years 
Note: Neg. means negligible.
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Although Hinduism s by far the majority religion, there are inter-state differences, 
and in many states other religious communities have a much larger proportion of the 
total population. For example, Muslims form a significant proportion of the total 
population in Jammu and Kashmir (67%), Assam (30.9%), West Bengal (25.2%) and 
Kerala (24.7%); Sikhs form a majority of the total population in Punjab (59.9%) and 
are present in sizeable numbers in Chandigarh (16.1%); Christians form a large 
proportion of population in Nagaland (90%), Mizoram (87%), Meghalya (70.3%), 
Manipur (34%), Goa (26.7%), Kerala (19%), and Andaman and Nicobar islands 
(21.7%). Buddhists are mainly present in Sikkim (28.1%).
Thus, while at national level, Hindus are clearly the dominant community, in many 
states other religious communities are present in significant numbers, and form a 
major social and political group, that affects the party systems in those states. India 
is also very diverse linguistically. Table 5-2 provides the percent of population 
speaking the main languages as per the Indian Constitution.
Table 5-2 Population percentage in terms of languages spoken
Language Percentage
Hindi 40.22
Bengali 8.30
Telugu 7.87
Marathi 7.45
Tamil 6.32
Urdu 5.18
Gujarati 4.85
Kannada 3.90
Others 3.71
Malyalam 3.62
Oriya 3.35
Punjabi 2.79
Assamese 1.56
Nepali 0.25
Sindhi 0.25
Konkani 0.21
Manipuri 0.15
Kashmiri 0.01
Sanskrit 0.01
Source: 1991 census49
49The data on languages from the 2001 census is still not released from the Census o f India.
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Hindi is the most commonly spoken language on a national basis. However, as in the 
case of religion, this hides the inter-state variation in the languages spoken. One of 
the reasons for large share of Hindi-speakers is that Hindi is the main language in 
some of the most populous Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan In many other states however, the level of linguistic 
heterogeneity is much higher. Further, the above list does not include a large number 
of languages which are spoken by small groups and communities across India.
Caste is a major social cleavage in India. The Indian society is divided into a large 
number of social castes and sub-castes. Chhibber and Kollman (1998:1991) cite 
Powell (1982) in stating that “the ethnic variety of India is so great that one only has 
an 11 per cent chance of picking two individuals at random and finding them to be of 
similar ethnic groups (in the United States, there is a 50 per cent chance of randomly 
selecting two people from the same ethnic-linguistic group).” These divisions have 
the potential of causing political divisions, and even conflicts. Pai (2002) argues that 
parties based on caste, religion and geography have not been able to aggregate public 
opinion, and this has led to political instability, lack of incentive for development, 
and a low level of developmental expenditure in the politically important Indian state 
of Uttar Pradesh.
The literature on party systems in India is dominated by treating it as a reflection of 
the social cleavages. These well-known divisions in the Indian society include 
differences in social characteristics such as religion, language, caste and geography. 
The constitutional categories of SC and ST are two major social groups, which have 
been gaining in importance following the growing importance of caste factors in
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Indian politics in the recent years. Scholars have mainly focussed on the effect of 
caste factors on the party systems (Brass 1965, 1984; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; 
Chandra, 2004). The rise of BJP has brought the effect of religion back into focus as 
scholars (Jaffrelot, 1995) have explained its rise to the exploitation of religious 
cleavages. Since Indian party system has developed on regional lines, as against 
ideological or national lines (Wallace, 2000), regional parties have also used it to 
advance the interest of a particular region, as a part of their electoral strategy.
5.2 Social cleavages and the Indian party system
The existing literature on sociological effects of the party system does not clearly 
point out the process by which cleavages result into parties. This omission from the 
literature leaves many questions unanswered. For example, when and under what 
circumstances will cleavages result into a political party? How many parties will 
form as a result of the presence of cleavages? Further, research linking cleavages 
and the number of parties also stress the importance of other variables in being 
important in politicisation of cleavages. Rudig (1990) points out that the mere 
presence of social cleavages will not lead to a party. The work of Cox (1997), 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), Golder (2003) shows the interactive effect of 
institutional and social variables on the party system.
I am in agreement with scholars that the presence of social cleavages does not 
axiomatically result into political groupings and parties. However, the presence of 
these cleavages is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for these cleavages 
to be transformed into politicised cleavages and political parties. And therefore,
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despite the absence of a clear theoretical link between social cleavages and party 
formation, scholars have tested the social cleavages theory by relating the number of 
social cleavages in a polity to the number of parties. I too, follow this tradition.
In India, there are multiple and overlapping social cleavages. At the basic level, there 
are religious cleavages. Hindus by far are the majority community. However, the 
next biggest religious group is Muslims, which have a significant proportion of 
population. This cleavage is also important, because in some states they have 
significant presence, and influence electoral results substantially. The other religions 
are relatively small in number, although in some states Christians and Buddhists are 
present in significant numbers. Within each religion, there are further sub-divisions. 
For Example, Hindus are made up of a huge number of castes and sub-castes (Singh, 
1994). Then, there are cleavages based on region and language. The multiplicity of 
these cleavages gives rise to overlapping social and religious groupings in the Indian 
states, and as Chhibber and Petrocik (1989:192-193) point out,
The litany of divisions and dispute is easy to 
exaggerate. The uniqueness of India does not lie in 
the existence in these conflicts - equivalent social 
differences have occasioned inter-group conflict in 
most societies -  but in the variety of salient 
differences, castes within religion, language within 
class, class within religion, class within language, 
class within caste, caste within language, etc. The 
puzzle, given all these cleavages and their 
divisiveness, is the weak link that has been found 
between social cleavages and party 
support....correlation between social characteristics 
and partisanship varies with the number, salience and 
political significance of its cleavages, and it is from 
the perspective of this relationship that India is 
anomalous.
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The above comments were made in the context of a single party’s dominance in 
Indian politics, despite India’s social heterogeneity. Chhibber and Petrocik 
(1989:205), while investigating this anomaly find that inter-state differences in the 
nature of cleavages created inter-state differences in the social group constituency of 
the same party. They argue that nation-wide political party like the Congress has an 
exceptionally heterogeneous social base at the national level, but at an individual 
state level, it has a more homogenous voter clientele. Therefore, the electoral 
support and success of the INC depends on district social groups, but the groups vary 
by state, and “an aggregation at the national level masks a cleavage alignment which 
is almost precisely what the social cleavage theory of party systems expect to find.”
Chhibber and Petrocik (1989) analyse the effect of social cleavages on the support 
for INC, and find that the political significances of the social cleavages is state 
specific. Thus, while at national level, religion, caste and class-based cleavages 
explain only 2% variance in votes for INC, at state level 20% of variance can be 
explained by these factors. Thus, the inter-state differences in social cleavages 
appear as being paramount in seeing the effect of social cleavages on the party 
system. This analysis supports our objective of studying the effect of the social 
fragmentation on the size of the party system in the Indian states. The importance of 
inter-state differences in social cleavages, and their effects has been pointed out by 
many authors. Consider the following comment by Chhibber and Petrocik (1989: 
201)
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Given the territorial nature of social cleavages in 
India, we expect that: (1) At the national level, where 
a voters lives -  his or her state -  should be a far 
stronger predictor of the vote than social factors such 
as caste, religion or social class observed nationally.
(2) However, because caste, class and religion are 
major points of conflict within India, each will have 
a strong correlation with party support when 
examined at the level at which these social factors 
are politically significant; that is, within each state.
(3) The political significance of group conflicts 
varies by State so the strength of the link between 
particular social cleavages and party should vary 
across the States.
Therefore, one can hypothesise that higher the degree of social fragmentation in a 
state, higher will be the number of parties.
5.3 SC and ST population in the Indian states
These two groups represent prominent social cleavages, which are defined in the 
Indian Constitution, and ha\e special privileges in terms of political representation, 
job reservation, and other forms of affirmative action to ensure their interests are 
adequately protected. Political parties in India have tried to win the support of these 
groups, and the caste-based politics especially involving the SC has become more 
intense. Since these two groups comprise a large percentage of the total population 
(24% according to the 2001 census), their voting pattern can influence the electoral 
outcomes, especially in states where they are in large numbers. However, the effects 
of the presence of these two groups in a state’s population are complex and depend 
on many factors. First, it depends on how large is the share of their population in the 
total population of the state. SC are scattered in varying strength all over the 
country, and their dispersal then constitutes a disadvantage for their voting power. 
Further, a relatively small percent of SC live in the urban areas, and the balance still
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lives in rural areas where the influence of traditional institutions and prejudices is 
stronger. This coupled with their internal heterogeneity, has led to difficulties in 
translating their population numbers into political power. The rise of BSP has led to 
some consolidation of SC vote behind it, but still the fact remains that the influence 
of BSP is limited outside its traditional stronghold of the state of Uttar Pradesh
However, it also depends on other factors such the distribution of their population in 
electoral districts. If their modal density in the electoral districts,, where the elections 
are actually fought and won, is relatively low, they will have less influence on 
electoral outcomes. However, in districts where there are located in large numbers, 
they will affect the electoral outcomes more successfully. My focus here is not on 
the party preferences of these social groups, but instead on what is the effect of the 
presence of SC and ST population on the number of parties in a state. On one hand, 
this will have a positive effect on the number of parties, since it will mean a more 
fragmented population, and different social groups (including SC and ST) will have 
incentives to represent the interests of their groups, and use their caste-based support 
to win elections. On the other hand, a large enough population of SC and ST can 
also have a depressing affect on the number of parties, because then the parties will 
field candidates only from these communities, and parties perceived to be dominated 
by other castes will be less successful in mobilising electoral support. Due to these 
reasons, the influence and effect of these variables can vary across the Indian states.
Roy (1990) points out that SC face a dilemma that arises out of democratic politics. 
Democratic politics stresses the role of citizens in addressing the larger questions of 
public policies, governance and the maintenance of democratic political order. This
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role requires the citizens to think beyond their partisan concerns, and to give priority 
to the society’s interests as a whole. At the same time however, democratic 
functioning also means competition between social and political groups to safeguard 
their socio-economic interests. Thus, while democratic politics aims at narrowing the 
gap between individual and society’s interests, the intensity of competition which is 
its essence, also works to sharpen social divisions and increase conflicts. This 
paradox is visible in the case of SC and ST. Thus, on one hand, SC can seek the 
solution of their problems in conjunction with other members of the society, as a part 
of the solution to the larger, national problems. However, if the social impediments 
to their social and economic progress remain in the society, it can erode their faith in 
the democratic politics, and move them towards the path of protest (Roy, 1990:49). 
The rise of BSP has consolidated the position of SC, especially in UP, and it seems 
that SC seem to be favouring a party which exclusively caters to their interests.
Chandra (2004) defines an ethnic party as a party that overtly represents itself as a 
champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of categories to the 
exclusion of others, and that makes such a representation central to its strategy of 
mobilising voters. Her main argument is that an ethnic party is likely to succeed in a 
patronage-democracy when it has competitive rules for intraparty advancement and 
when the size of the ethnic group(s) it seeks to mobilise exceeds the threshold of 
winning or leverage imposed by the electoral system50 She uses the case studies of 
three ‘ethnic’ parties in India: the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
among Hindus across Indian states in 1991; the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham
50Chandra (2004) defines patronage democracy as a democracy in which the state monopolises access 
to jobs and services, a n d  in which elected officials have discretion in the implementation o f laws, 
allocating the jobs and services at the disposal o f the state. She defines success in terms o f the degree 
to which a party is able to capture the votes of members of its target ethnic category.
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(DMK), a linguistic party, among Tamil speakers in Tamil Nadu in 1967; and the 
pro-Jharkhandi Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), a regional party, among 
“Jharkhandis” in 2000.
She explains the variation in the performance of the BSP across the three states under 
study either as the consequence of variation in the relative representational 
opportunities offered by the BSP and its competition to SC elites, or to the variation 
in the ability of SC voters to take the BSP past the threshold of winning or leverage 
through coordinated action, or by a combination of the two conditions. Thus, 
Chandra (2004) finds that the relative opportunities for representation given to elites 
from across the spectrum of the target ethnic groups, combined with the expectations 
of the efficacy of the voters whose elites found representation, prove to be a more 
plausible explanation for the performance of the ethnic parties.
Chandra (2004) recognises the importance of both sociological and institutional 
variables on the party system. She includes population percentage of selected social 
groups, as well as threshold of wining the election to explain the performance of the 
ethnic parties in India. Thus, implicitly, she recognises the importance of both 
sociological and institutional factors in shaping party systems in India, which is also 
the key theme of my thesis. My focus is on the other hand, to explain the variation in 
the size of the party system as a whole, and for my analysis of the effect of 
sociological factors, I use the percentage of population of religious and specified 
social groups to represent this diversity in the population.
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The effect of ST population on the party system is somewhat different from that of 
SC. First, overall, they represent a much smaller proportion of the total population. 
However, they are present in large numbers in specific areas and states of the 
country. To that extent, they have a major influence on the electoral outcomes in the 
districts reserved for them. Accordingly, one can expect the number of parties to be 
lower, since there are limited chances of success of non-tribal candidates. Over the 
years, tribal political leaders have tried to integrate their tribal identities into a more 
broad-based regional identity. This has led to them including many non-tribals into 
their fold, especially the backward non-tribal communities living in tribal areas. 
Due to one such movement, a new Indian state Jharkhand was formed out of the 
erstwhile state of Madhya Pradesh. This state was formed in 2000 out of a long 
agitation for an independent state by JMM, a tribal party, which later developed their 
movement into a movement for a region, and not just for tribals.
The other concentration of ST is in the North Eastern region. Here, already the size 
of different states is very small, and the possibility of new states being carved out of 
existing states is low. Further, since these states are heavily dependent on the 
national government, most of the tribal leaders have either joined the national parties, 
or have formed alliances with them. In general, therefore, one can expect to witness 
a depressing effect of ST on the number of parties.
5.4 Measuring social heterogeneity in the Indian states
Broadly, there are two approaches to measure the social heterogeneity for an 
empirical study. Either, one can identify important social cleavages in the society,
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and compute their proportions in the entire population, and use these as independent 
variables to study the size of the party system in a state or district The resultant 
regression coefficient will then tell us the strength and significance of each cleavage 
used in our analysis. This approach is useful because it helps to identify which social 
cleavages affect party systems, and which do not, and using this information, one can 
try to build up a theory of the process of politicisation of specific cleavages into 
political groups and parties. This approach requires limited data on specified social 
groups, and is therefore, attractive from the point of view of availability and 
collection of data. This approach however, also suffers from two main shortcomings. 
Firstly, the choice of which social cleavage to include and which ones to exclude is a 
subjective exercise. In the Indian context, this is especially problematic, since the 
number of castes vary across states and are very large in number. Further, including 
only few castes can introduce an ‘omitted variables’ bias in the analysis. The second 
approach is to include all the social cleavages in the analysis, either in the form of an 
index of social cleavages, or number of effective groups. However, this approach is 
difficult to apply in practice, because often, the data on all the social groupings is not 
available.
Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994:108) point out “...no single index can serve as a 
wholly satisfactory measure of every aspect of social heterogeneity....”. Thus, while 
the theory behind the effect of social fragmentation on the size of party systems is 
sound, testing it empirically is problematic. Measuring social heterogeneity in the 
Indian context is especially complex, given the nature of overlapping cleavages as is 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Further, different types of cleavages dominate in 
different Indian states. For example, Kerala is homogenous in terms of language, but
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has-much more heterogeneity in terms of religion. Rajasthan is homogenous in terms 
of religion, but heterogeneous in terms of castes and sub castes.
For my empirical analysis, I focus on two major dimensions of social cleavages: 
religion and caste.51 According to Goyal (2003), these two factors are the major 
factors that influence the electoral outcomes in the Indian elections. I use alternative 
approaches in depicting these factors, and then study the effect of these factors on the 
size of party systems in the Indian states.
5.4.1 Measuring religious fragmentation in the Indian states
For depicting religious heterogeneity in the Indian states, one can construct a 
religious fractionalisation index following Taylor and Hudson (1972), Easterly and 
Levine (1997) and Annet (2000). The formula for computing the religious 
fragmentation index (REL) is given below.
Equation 5-1
Here, N  and «,• refer to total population, and the population belonging to the ith 
religious group respectively. This index is a measure of the probability that two 
randomly drawn people in a specific country (Indian state in the context of my study) 
will not belong to the same religious group. Therefore, more the number of religious 
groups in the society, higher will be the value of this index. Another way of
5,Fukumi (2004) uses a similar approach in measuring social heterogeneity in 14 large Indian states 
using Census of India 1981 and 1991.
IVl
REL = 1 -  X
I — 1 N
,i = l  M
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computing the degree of religious fragmentation is to compute the effective number 
of religious groups, using the method (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) used to compute 
the effective number of parties, but replacing vote or seat share with the share of 
population of the various religious groups. The formula for computing the effective 
number of religious groups (ERL) is given below:
Equation 5-2 ERL = ---------- -
M (  „  \ 2
As is clear from the above formulae, both REL and ERL use different formulation 
based on percentage of different religious groups, and are closely correlated, and as 
such either of the two can be used as a measure of the degree of religious 
fragmentation. To compute religious fragmentation in the Indian states, I use the 
decennial census data which provides the population proportion of different 
religions.52
Figure 5-1 plots a scatter chart of effective number of electoral parties and effective 
number of religious groups (ERL). The x axis represents effective number of 
religious groups, while the y  axis denotes effective number of parties in the Indian 
states. The figure shows that in general, there s a positive relationship between the 
two variables, i.e. states with more number of religious groups also tend to have
52Census has been carried out in 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001. I use the data for the most 
proximate census (to an election year) to compute the effective number of religious groups. For 
example, for 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections, I use 2001 census data, while for 1989 elections, I use 
1991 census data, and so on.
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higher effective number o f  parties, thus supporting the views o f  the sociological 
school o f  party system.
Figure 5-1 Scatter chart of Effective number of parties and religious groups in Indian states
E f fe c tiv e  n u m b e r  o f  r e l ig io u s  g r o u p s
The ERL variable is both a relevant and an objective measure o f social heterogeneity 
in the Indian states, and since data on the religious groupings in India is readily 
available, this variable is particularly suitable for inclusion in an empirical analysis. 
Many cross-country studies on the determinants o f  the size o f  party system include 
religious heterogeneity in their empirical analysis to represent social cleavages (See 
for example, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994, Anckar, 2000, and Vatter, 2003).
As mentioned earlier, the effect o f sociological factors can also be studied for 
individual social groups. One can thus study whether and how a particular religious 
group affects the size o f  party system in an Indian state. In my thesis, I study the 
effect o f the presence o f Muslim population on the size o f  party systems in the Indian 
states. Muslims form the largest minority religious groip in India (population 138
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million, 13.4% o f  the total), and are present in even larger proportions in many 
Indian states. Therefore it is important to study the effect o f Muslim population on 
the number o f  parties in an Indian state. Accordingly, I define MUS as an 
independent variable representing the proportion o f Muslims in the population in an 
Indian state. Figure 5-2 shows that Muslims comprise a large proportion o f  the 
population in many Indian states. Also, the Muslim population varies substantially 
between the Indian states, and as Figure 53 shows, across the Indian regions. 
Therefore, it is important to study if  the variable MUS affects the size o f  the Indian 
party system.
Figure 5-2 Proportion of Muslim population in Indian states 
(2001 census)
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Figure 5-3 Proportion of Muslim population by region 
(2001 census)
5.4.2 Caste-based fragmentation
The quantification o f  caste-based fragmentation is more complex, since caste-based 
Census has not been carried out since 1931. The population structure, the boundaries 
o f the states have undergone a major change since then, and therefore, the 1931 caste 
data is o f limited use for current research. What constitutes a caste is another difficult 
question in the Indian context. Further, there is no other single source o f information 
on the population percentage o f caste-based groups in India. This leads to a problem 
o f  ensuring consistency between the data obtained from differert sources o f  
information. The task is made more complex by the multiplicity o f  caste and sub- 
caste groupings, and overlaps between various religious, ethnic and caste-groupings 
in the Indian states. Some comparative studies that include India present some data 
on the number o f  social groups in India, but most often this is on a country rather 
than state level, and do not capture the overlapping and multiple social cleavages in 
India.
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, SC and ST constitute two constitutionally 
defined social categories based on caste, and these (especially SC) have become 
increasingly politicised and have an important effects on the electoral outcomes in 
many Indian states. Thus, it is important to study the effect o f  the presence o f  SC 
and ST population on the size o f  party systems in the Indian states. Further, reliable 
and consistent state level data is available for SC and ST population, and 
accordingly, it can be used as independent variable for determining their effects on 
the size o f  party systems in the Indian states. Accordingly, two variables -  SCP and 
STP reflecting the percentage population o f  SC and ST respectively can be used as 
independent variables in the empirical analysis o f  sociological factors affecting party 
system in India. These variables are shown below.
SCP = The proportion o f scheduled castes to total population in a state 
STP -  The proportion o f scheduled tribes to total population in a state
Figures 5-4 and 5-5 present the data on SCP in the Indian states and regions 
respectively
Figure 5-4 Proportion of SC population in Indian states (2001 census)
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Figure 5-4 shows that the proportion o f  SC population varies substantially across the 
Indian states. For example, Arunachal Pradesh only has 1% SC population, states 
such as West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab have large SC population ranging 
between 23% and 29% o f  the total population. The average percentage o f  SC 
population over all Indian states is around 12%. Figure 5-5 shows the inter-region 
variation in the proportion o f  SC population in India.
Figure 5-5 Proportion of SC population percentage by region (2001 census)
1
As is seen in Figure 5-5, Hindi belt and North regions have the highest while North 
Eastern and West regions have the lowest proportion o f  SC population. Figure 5-6 
and 5-7 show proportion o f  ST population in Indian states and regions.
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Figure 5-6 Proportion of ST population in Indian states (2001 census)
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Figure 5-6 shows ST population is less evenly distributed in the Indian states as 
compared to SC population. For example, the North Eastern states o f  Arunachal 
Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura, and other states - Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan 
have relatively higher proportion o f ST population. The average percentage o f  ST 
population over all Indian states is around 20%. Figure 5-7 shows the inter-region 
variation in the proportion o f ST population in India.
Figure 5-7 Proportion of ST population by region 
(2001 census)
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It is clear from Figure 5-7 that states in the North Eastern region in particular have 
very high proportion o f ST population, which is more clearly seen in Figure 5-8.
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Figure 5-8 Proportion of ST population in North Eastern states (2001 census)
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The above discussion shows that Indian states and regions vary in terms o f  the 
proportion o f  SC and ST distribution, and this presents an interesting agenda for 
studying the effects o f  this cross-sectional variation on the size o f  the party systems.
5.4.3 Effective number o f social groups
As mentioned earlier, caste based census has not been carried out in India since 
1931, and therefore, reliable current information about population o f  different castes 
in the Indian states is not available. As an approximation, I use the information 
available on the religious groups and the SC and ST population to compute a 
measure o f Effective number o f  social groups (ESG) in the Indian states. This is an 
attempt to include the effect o f  both religious and caste-based (SC and ST) 
fragmentation in the Indians states. In general, the measure estimates non­
overlapping population percentage o f  religious and SC and ST groupings, and then 
uses these to compute the ESG. The methodology o f  constructing this measure is 
shown in Appendix D. Figure 5-9 shows a scatter plot between ERL and ESG, and it 
is clear that both these measures show high positive and statistically significant 
(0.54) correlation.
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Figure 5-9 Scatter chart of Effective religious and social groups
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Figure 5-10 plots a scatter chart between the ENP and ESG. It is clear from the figure 
that that there is a positive relationship between the two variables.
Figure 5-10 Scatter chart of effective number of social groups and electoral parties
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5.5 Data on social and religious groups
Figure 5-11 provides a cross-sectional depiction o f  the effective number o f  religious 
and social groups.
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Figure 5-11 Effective Number of religious and social groups in the Indian states
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The chart shows that there are cross-sectional variations in terms o f  social and 
religious heterogeneity in the Indian states. The effect o f  this variation on the size o f  
the party system thus represents an interesting area o f  investigation. Tables 5-3 and 
5-4 provide summary statistics o f  ERL and ESG grouped in terms o f  Indian regions.
Table 5-3 Effective number of religious groups by region
Regions Mean Minimum Maximum StandardDeviation
N
East 1.56 1.06 2.13 0.32 52
Hindi Belt 1.27 1.08 1.61 0.12 103
North 1.85 1.54 2.05 0.17 36
North East 1.64 1.22 2.25 0.32 75
South 1.46 1.11 2.42 0.43 79
West 1.42 1.10 1.97 0.30 56
Total 1.50 1.06 2.42 0.56 401
Table 5-4 Effective number of social groups by region
Regions Mean Minimum Maximum StandardDeviation
N
East 2.53 1.21 3.03 0.42 52
Hindi Belt 2.17 1.81 3.10 0.25 103
North 2.46 2.02 3.02 0.42 36
North East 2.25 1.11 3.56 0.92 75
South 2.00 1.12 3.04 0.54 79
West 1.94 1.31 2.63 0.27 56
Total 2.18 1.11 3.40 0.59 401
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The correlation between the two social cleavages variables and the three dependent 
variables is shown in Table 5-5.
Table 5-5 Correlation between social cleavages and party system variables
Effective no of 
Religious groups 
(E R G )
Effective no of 
Social groups 
(E S G )
E N P 0 .3 1 * * 0.31**
E L P
0.18** 0.27**
N C P
-0.12** 0.06
Winning share
-0.19** -0.25**
N = 401
In general, the above correlations show that social cleavages have significant effect 
on the party system variables. Both ERL and ESG have a significant and positive 
correlation with ENP and ELP, and a significant and negative correlation with share 
of winning party. This result is expected since ERL and ESG are highly correlated, 
and is also in line with theoretical predictions. The results for number of NCP is not 
uniform, a result which again shows that it is difficult to assess the determinants of 
this variable.
5.6 Regression Analysis
In line with Ihe sociological explanation of party systems, I expect the degree of 
religious and heterogeneity in the Indian states to be positively related to the number 
of parties. Thus, a state with more social and religious cleavages will have a greater 
number of parties. Mere presence of a social cleavage will not lead to a political 
party. It needs to be cohesive, it has to have sufficient mass, and the issue concerning 
its members has to be sufficiently relevant. Existing theory is inadequate to explain
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the process of this politicisation of social cleavages. In India’s context, many social 
cleavages have become more politicised in recent years. Therefore, although these 
very cleavages were present in the society, they remained politically dormant. Many 
of these cleavages have now become politicised and this has led to increase in the 
number of parties, and the fragmentation of the party system. Literature uses 
measures of social heterogeneity in a polity as an independent variable to validate the 
sociological deavages theory of the size of the party system. I too, follow this 
tradition.
In my first regression, I study the effect of the three sociological cleavages - SCP, 
STP and MUS (representing proportion of SC, ST and Muslim population 
respectively in a state) on the size of party systems in the Indian states. In the second 
regression, I include ERL, while in the third regression I use ESG as my independent 
variables representing social heterogeneity.53
Following I present regression analysis using explanatory variables of religious and 
social cleavages in India.54 The general hypothesis is that increased social and 
religious heterogeneity leads to increase in the size of the party system. While the 
first regression shown in Table 5-6 includes specific caste and religious groups, the 
next two regressions shown in Tables 5-7 and 5-8 include effective number of 
religious and social groups respectively as independent variables.
53E R L  and E S G  cannot be both included in the same regression because o f high positive correlation 
between them.
54These results are based on OLS with PCSE and lagged dependent variable. Regressions using OLS 
and REM produce results consistent with the reported results.
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Table 5-6 Regression of Party System, SC, ST and Muslim Population
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent E N P E L P N C P
S C  p o p u la t i o n -0.01 0.01 5.5**
(0.1) (1.4) (2.3)
S T  p o p u la t i o n -0.02** -0.00** -0.51**
(3.3) (3.5) (2.3)
M u s lim 0.01** 0.01** 0.63**
p o p u la t i o n (2.0) (3.8) (2.4)
L a g g e d 0.58** 0.42** 0.28*
d e p e n d e n t (11.8) (8.7) (1.9)
v a r ia b le
Intercept 1.6 0.9 25.5
R square 0.43 0.37 0.15
N 358 358 358
Table 5-7 Regression of Party System, Effective religious groups
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent E N P E L P N C P
E f f e c t iv e 0.54** 0.26** -64.3**
R e l ig io u s (3.3) (2.0) (3.5)
G r o u p s
L a g g e d 0.57** 0.48** 0.34*
D e p e n d e n t (12.2) (10.6) (2.2)
V a r ia b le
Intercept 0.6 0.5 178.1
R square 0.42 0.33 0.12
N 358 358 358
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Table 5-8 Regression of Party System, Effective social groups
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent E N P E L P N C P
E f f e c t iv e 0.30** 0.20** 16.4*
S o c ia l (3.1) (3.2) (1.9)
G r o u p s
L a g g e d 0.58** 0.47** 0.34**
D e p e n d e n t (12.2) (9.8) (2.3)
V a r ia b le
Intercept 0.7 0.4 45.4
R square 0.42 0.33 0.12
N 358 358 358
The results in Table 5-6 show the effect of the population of specified social groups 
on the party system. Presence of large SC population does not have a significant 
effect on the effective number of electoral and legislative parties, but does have a 
significant positive effect on the number of contesting parties. Since SC population 
is spread over the Indian states, its influence on the proportion of votes won by 
different parties, and therefore on ENP is relatively limited. The results for ST 
population in regressions shown in Table 5-6 are more robust and clear. This 
variable is significant for all the dependent variables. The presence of large ST 
population decreases the number of electoral, legislative and contesting parties. The 
explanation for this can be, as Macmillan (2003) reports that ST population is 
concentrated only in small geographical areas. And therefore, they have a more 
decisive effect on the voting patterns and the outcome of the elections. This result is 
also consistent with the findings in Chapter 4, where I reported that electoral 
reservation for ST has led to a large decrease in the number of contesting parties and 
independent candidates in the reserved districts. The effects of the presence of
223
CHAPTER 5 
RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL HETREOGENEITY
Muslim population is reported in Table 5-6 show that this factor leads to increase in 
the size of party system in the Indian states. This variable is significant for explaining 
the variation in all the three party size variables.
Table 5-7 reports regression results based effective number of religious groups and a 
lagged dependent variable as independent variables. The coefficient for the effective 
number of religious groups has positive and significant effects on ENP and ELP. 
Thus the Indian states with more religious heterogeneity tend to have higher number 
of parties. A surprise result is that this factor reduces the number of contesting 
parties. This may be explained by the domination of one religious group -  the Hindus 
in the overall population of India. Thus, even if a state has a higher number of 
religious groups, the relative dominance of Hindus in terms of their population does 
not lead to increase in the number of contesting parties. As expected however, 
higher religious fragmentation increases the effective number of electoral parties 
which is line with theoretical predictions. This result also reflects the difficulty of 
modelling the determinants of this factor.55
Finally, Table 5-8 repeats the regression reported in Table 5-7, but now using 
effective number of social groups instead of effective number of religious groups as 
the independent variable. The results are in line with predicted results, and the 
presence of larger number of social groups increases the size of the party system 
This variable is significant for explaining the three party-size dependent variables.
55Please refer to Figure 4-15 (Chapter 4) which shows that number o f contesting parties have not 
followed a consistent pattern in the Indian elections.
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This result also shows the general robustness of the effect of social heterogeneity on 
the size of the party systems in the Indian states.
5.7 Conclusions
In general, the discussion and results in this chapter show that the degree of social 
and religious fragmentation in Indian states have important effects on the party 
system. In general, more fragmentation leads to more number of parties. However 
the presence of ST population has the opposite effect on the party system in the 
Indians states. Pamerkar (2002) while citing Pushpendra (2001) points out that on an 
average, scheduled caste (and Muslim) voting behaviour tends to be more difficult to 
predict than the voting behaviour of scheduled tribes. Accordingly, in the presence 
of a large SC and Muslim population, candidates have to make decisions regarding 
strategic entry under greater uncertainty, and this also indicates difficult in predicting 
the effect of these groups on the size of party system. It is also important to note that 
the effects of SC and ST population on the party system are also affected by the 
electoral reservation for these groups, and in particular presence of large ST 
population tends to reduce the number of parties in the reserved districts.
Although the literature is still without a clear theory linking the number of social 
cleavages in a polity to the party system, my results show that the presence of these 
cleavages itself is an important determinant of the size of the party system in the 
Indian states. I argue that these general results should apply to other polities, and that
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the cross-sectional variation in the party systems can be explained reasonably well by 
the sociological school.
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6 PARTY AGGREGATION AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
In chapters 4 and 5 ,1 have shown how institutional and sociological factors affect the 
size of Indian party system. The discussion in these chapters has revealed that the 
formation of party systems is a complex phenomenon, and that the number of parties 
vary substantially between different elections and states. Although a large proportion 
of this variance is explained by the differences in the institutional and sociological 
factors discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, a comparative study of party systems also 
needs to take into account the difference in the contexts in which the elections take 
place. One can generally interpret contextual factors as the overall environment in 
which the elections take place. In the Indian case, important contextual factors 
include characteristics of a state, changes in relationship between the national and the 
state governments, and politicisation of social cleavages. Although it is difficult to 
measure and model contextual variables, ignoring them altogether renders any 
comparative analysis of party systems incomplete. This chapter explores the effects 
of important contextual factors that affect party systems in the Indian states.
Why is the context important?
The context is important because different elections are fought under specific set of 
circumstances which influence voter behaviour and electoral competition, and hence 
the party system. These circumstances or the contextual factors have an independent 
effect on election outcomes. At the same time, the presence of these contextual 
factors presents a challenge in carrying out comparative studies especially when 
cross-sectional units vary substantially in terms of these factors. The fact remains
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that whether or not it is possible to accurately measure and include contextual factors 
in a multivariate analysis, a comparative study also needs to consider these factors 
while drawing its conclusions.
In a comparative study involving cross-sectional units within one country, this 
problem should normally be less acute as many contextual factors will be common to 
all the cross-sectional units in an election, even though they might vary between the 
different elections. However, since India is a highly heterogeneous country, the 
effect of contextual factors can vary across the cross-sectional units (states). It is 
argued (see for example Chhibber and Kollman, 2004) that since electoral rules and 
the effect of social cleavages within a polity remain relatively stable, the change in 
the number of parties over time also indicates the importance of contextual effects. 
In the Indian states, the contextual factors gain importance also because the political 
environment here is fluid, where political alliances keep changing between elections.
Below, I discuss the effect of important contextual factors on the size of Indian party 
system. The focus is primarily on the party aggregation phenomenon, but I also 
discuss the importance of factors such as politicisation of social cleavages, 
differences in literacy rates and urban population across Indian states, and the 
expectation of the formation of a coalition government.
6.1 The party aggregation phenomenon
Most of the existing accounts of the party systems assume that the factors that affect 
the district level party system affect the national party system in an almost axiomatic
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way. This assumption has led to comparative studies that focus on the national level 
to test the determinants of the size of party systems. However, recently scholars have 
pointed out that the formation of national party system involves coordination by 
voters and parties across a country’s districts and states, and therefore the national 
party system is also affected by the strength of the ‘aggregation’ or ‘linkage’ between 
the national and district level party systems. Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) use 
the term ‘aggregation’, while Cox (1997) uses the term ‘linkage’ to describe the 
relationship between party systems at district and national levels.56 Similarly, Jones 
and Mainwaring (2003:140) point out that a party system is “highly 
nationalized...[when] the major parties’ respective vote shares do not differ much 
from one province to the next. In weakly nationalized systems, the major parties’ 
vote share vary widely across provinces.” The scholarship on the differences 
between the national and sub-national party systems implies that the determinants of 
national level party system go beyond the traditional sociological and institutional 
explanations. Below I summarise the arguments which have been put forward to link 
the party system at the national level to the party system at the sub-national level.57
6.1.1 The Projection argument
Most existing studies assume that electoral rules not only affect district level but also 
the national (and the state) party system, because voters coordinate their efforts in 
favour of party labels, and national parties link politicians across different districts
56I primarily use the term ‘aggregation’ to denote the relationship between the national and sub­
national party systems.
57Most o f this discussion focuses on the linkage between the district and the national party systems. 
However, as I discuss in this chapter, party aggregation or linkage also affects state level party 
systems, and the arguments about party aggregation at the national level also apply to the state level 
party systems.
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for the purpose of electoral campaigning. Although Duverger (1954) recognised that 
the true effect of simple majority system was limited to district as opposed to 
national bipartism, he also suggested that increased centralisation of parties and their 
national perspective favoured a two-party system at even the national level. 
However, Wildavsky (1959) argues that this ‘projection* argument is tautological 
and therefore does not provide a sound explanation of the relationship between the 
district and national party systems.
Leys (1959:1942) extends the projection argument by arguing that strategic voting 
“occurs in favour not of the two parties which are in the lead locally, but in favour of 
the two parties which have the largest number of seats in parliament, regardless of 
their local strength.” According to this view, voters want to influence the electoral 
outcome at the national level rather than merely the district level, and this leads to 
the elimination of nationally uncompetitive parties. However, Cox (1997:183) 
correctly points out that Leys overstates the importance of national as opposed to 
local competitiveness, since “voting for a locally hopeless party never makes 
instrumental sense, even if it is nationally competitive and voters care only about the 
disposition of forces in parliament.” Cox argues further that “electing a nationally 
hopeless party’s candidate increases the probability of a hung parliament (and thus of 
participation in a coalition government), and decreases the probability that one of the 
nationally competitive parties will secure a majority, both things that some 
instrumentally motivated voters may want to do.” Thus, overall, Leys argument fails 
to provide an adequate support for Duverger’s projection argument for the national 
party system.
230
CHAPTER 6
PARTY AGGREGATION AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Sartori (1968: 281) also attempts to link local bipartism to national bipartism by 
arguing that ‘plurality systems have no influence (beyond the district) until the party 
system becomes structured.” A structured party system consists of at least some 
mass parties which is characterized by “(1) the development of a stable and 
extensive....organization throughout the country, and (2) the fact that it presents 
itself to the electorate as an abstract entity (ideologically or programmatically 
qualified) that allows stable identifications” (Sartori, 1986:293). Sartori merely 
implies that more nationalised the parties, the fewer the number of parties in the 
party system, and as Cox (1997:184) points out, “If there are reasons for politicians 
to link across districts, and they therefore do link across districts, then this will 
reduce the number of parties from 2D. But the number remaining may still be well 
about 2, unless the definition of a ‘national party’ is that it fields candidates in every 
district.... If we do not assume national parties field candidates in every district, 
then how close the national party system gets to the theoretical minimum of 
2 . . . depends on something other than the district-level electoral structure.”58
Sartori’s arguments also emphasise the notion of loyalty to a party requires an 
electorate that is capable of abstraction, and therefore, the ‘mass stage ’ cannot be 
entered until an adequate spread of literacy allows “capacity for abstraction” 
(Sartori, 1968:293). Cox (1997:185) counters this argument by pointing out that 
illiteracy need not be a limiting factor for building political loyalty, and cites Indian 
example, where parties often resort to ‘symbolic politics’ to appeal to the large 
section of population that is illiterate.
58Here D represents number o f districts.
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Overall, the attempts to ‘project’ Duverger’s Law as a district level effect, to the 
national party system assume the presence of rather than theorise about the party 
aggregation phenomenon. As Cox (1997:185) argues, “...Duverger’s Law at the 
district level is a theoretical proposition, while Duverger’s Law at the national level 
is an empirical generalization, and one to which there are many exceptions at that.”
Extending the above arguments to the Indian state level, the projection argument also 
fails to explain the differences between the state level and the district level party 
systems in India. Thus, although the district level party systems in India are directly 
affected by Duverger’s psychological and mechanical effects due to SMPS, the state 
level party systems need not axiomatically tend towards two party systems because 
of the party aggregation phenomenon at the state level.
6.1.2 Electoral coordination argument
Cox (1997) approaches the party aggregation at the national level by focusing on the 
linking together of like-minded individuals from different districts into parties, while 
Chhibber and Kollman (2004:62) emphasise “the process of assessing party strength 
nationally or regionally [which]...entails adding up votes of party candidates across 
districts.” They state further (73-74) that “Candidates want to coordinate across 
districts to influence national politics, and they want to adopt recognizable national- 
party labels because voters understand the need for co-ordination to accomplish
policy goals At the national level, Duvergerian effects, where the number parties
is reduced due to strategic voting, are found when national policies matter a lot to 
voters.”
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Cox (1997) discusses five reasons for a phenomenon whereby a pre-existing national 
group induces the would-be legislators from different districts to join a party label. 
These reasons are “enacting laws, electing a president, electing a prime minister, 
securing seats distributed in a national upper tier, or securing campaign finance” (pp 
186-7). Cox’s analysis thus focus on the benefits of ‘economies of scale’ in forming 
a large national party to gain various political and economic objectives, and that 
these benefits motivate the legislators to unite under a common party label, and thus 
strengthen the process of linkage across a country’s districts. Cox points out further 
(pp 193) that as in the case of district level, the number of parties at the national level 
also depend on the interaction of social and electoral structure. Finally, Cox notes 
(pp 198-9) that a national party finds it easier to form factions within itself which 
bargain and agree on a series of reciprocal withdrawls to maximise its electoral 
gains. Since the bargaining takes place at the national and not a district level, a 
national party has a higher range of benefits that can be allocated to factions that 
withdraw, and overall the whole market for entry at the national level is more liquid, 
and gives more power to the national leaders. Such gains typically favour organised 
and national groups.
Cox (1997, 201) rewrites the Duverger’s Law as under: “If a system (1) elects 
legislators by plurality rule in single-member districts; (2) elects its chief executive 
by plurality rule in single-member districts; and (3) holds executive and legislative 
elections concurrently, then it will tend to (a) have at most two viable candidates in 
each legislative district, (b) have at most two viable candidates for executive office, 
and (c) have a national two-party or one party-dominance system.”
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Overall, Cox’s arguments imply that only under specific circumstances does the 
district level party system resemble the national party system. This line of reasoning 
can also be extended to the state level party systems in India. For example, Cox’s 
‘economies of scale’ applies to the Indian situation since there are clear benefits for 
parties to organise at the state level. An important advantage of doing so relates to 
the bargaining power with national level parties in terms of electoral alliances and 
seat-sharing arrangements. This is evident in the Indian situation by the growing 
power and negotiation ability of state level parties, and the fragmentation of the 
Indian party system at the national level.
6.1.3 Federal distribution o f powers argument
Anckar (1999) points out that federal states tend to have more fragmented party 
systems than unitary states because they are highly heterogeneous in different 
respects. This heterogeneity is likely to generate political parties with support rooted 
to a group specific to a particular region. Anckar (1999:101-102) point out the 
importance of division of powers between federal and the sub-federal governments 
as an important variable effecting party systems
With elections to a regional assembly with 
substantial legislative power, one can assume that 
there is a special niche for regionally concentrated 
parties... since the power of the legislature at the sub 
national level is substantial, there is also supposedly 
great incentives to found political parties with the 
ambition to operate solely at the local level, 
concentrating mainly, or even exclusively, on 
questions concerning local matters. This will 
possibly have a spill-over effect on national parties 
as well. When voters grow accustomed to voting for
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regional parties in regional elections, the threshold 
for voting for a regional party is lowered.
Consequently, parties with a regional base should 
have a better chances to survive in federal states than 
in unitary states....By gaining representation at the 
regional level, a party can, at least to a certain extent, 
carry some weight when it comes to shaping national 
party outcomes.
In a federal system of government, both national and state levels (and possibly sub- 
state or local levels) share fiscal and administrative powers. However, this division 
of powers in a federal country does not remain uniform, and can vary over time with 
some periods seeing more powers being vested with the federal government.
According to Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004), the degree of fiscal centralisation 
affects the incentives of both voters and political parties. When the federal 
government holds more power than the federal states, voters will have higher 
incentives to vote for a candidate from or affiliated to a national party. On the other 
hand, when the federal distribution of power gives more power to the states, voters 
have less incentive to vote for a national party. Therefore, in the first case where 
there is relative centralisation of powers at the national level, there will be greater 
aggregation of parties at the state level, leading to lower number of parties at the 
national level. Using the same logic, in the second case where power is relatively 
decentralised, aggregation of parties at national level will be relatively weak. In a 
period of federal centralisation, the parties will seek to merge, form alliances so that 
they are able to influence the policy making and politics, are perceived as being able 
to do so by voters. On the other hand, if federal distribution of powers provides 
more power to the states, smaller parties and independent candidates will have 
incentives to contest elections without seeking affiliations or alliances with larger,
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national parties. Thus, the key argument made by Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 
2004) is that party aggregation is easier under conditions of federal centralisation, 
and once party systems are determined by institutional and sociological variables, the 
change in party system moves in line with federal centralisation and decentralisation.
The research on the party aggregation in India has focused on linkages between the 
district and the national party systems, while paying limited attention to the 
intermediate state level aggregation. By extending the party aggregation argument to 
the state level party systems in India, I argue that Duverger’s Law need not apply to 
the state level also because of the party aggregation phenomenon between the state 
and the district level. Thus, the size of Indian party system at the state level is 
affected not only by institutional and sociological factors, but also because of the 
changes in the degree of party aggregation or linkage between the district and the 
state level. The state with higher number of local parties at the district level will 
have lower level of party aggregation, while states where district party systems are 
dominated by fewer parties will a higher level of party aggregation. Thus, the first 
state is likely to have higher number of parties than the second one.
6.2 Federal Distribution ofpowers and party aggregation in India
Using data from Indian parliamentary elections between 1957 and 2001 for 16 Indian 
states, Chhibber and Kollman (1998) find that, on an average, the number of national 
parties in India is higher than the number of parties in the districts. Chhibber and 
Kollman (2004:174) define the difference between the effective number of parties at 
the national level and the average effective number of parties in districts for an
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election as the measure o f party aggregation, and point out that “the number of 
parties and party aggregation (in India) have fluctuated, although there have not been 
concomitant changes in India’s religions, linguistic, and caste diversity.”
Chhibber and Kollman (2004) recognise the difficulty in measuring the degree of 
centralisation and decentralisation, and point out that (pp 105) “it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible to rely too much on aggregate economic data...to assess 
the degree of concentration of power to the national government... Centralization and 
its converse, provincialization, of political or economic authority are n>t easy to 
measure quantitatively in any systematic manner... ”. They cite various limitations 
to use quantitative information to measure the degree of centralisation, which include 
lack of comparable economic data on federal and provincial spending, difficulty in 
factoring conditions attached with the grants by the national government, changes in 
categorisation of transfer of resources between the level of the government, difficulty 
in separating accounting changes from the real political and economic changes. 
Therefore, for determining these periods, they rely on qualitative criteria to 
categorise the Indian post-independence history into centralising or decentralising 
periods as shown in Figure 6-1.59
59These criteria include changes in constitutional-legal authority, threats to the integrity o f the nation­
state that invite responses by governments, fluctuations in the economic role, and alterations in the 
size of governments at different levels.
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Figure 6-1 Summary of periods in India’s post-independence history
Centralising or Decentralising or Ambiguous
Centralised periods Decentralised periods periods
1952- 57 (6 years) 1964- 69; 1991 -  present 1957-64; 1978- 91
Unifying the Nation State-Level Regulation Devolution, but
Centre Holds Resources
1970-77 (8 years)
Indira Gandhi’s Authority
14 years 18 years 20 years
Source: Chhibber and Kollman (2004:163)
Chhibber and Kollman’s (1998, 2004) key thesis is that in periods of federal 
centralisation, more decisions about matters affecting a voter are taken at the national 
level. Therefore, if voters want to influence these decisions, they need to vote for 
larger parties (party labels). In the periods of federal decentralisation, the need for 
party labels is much less, and voting for a local candidate or state parties is good 
enough to be able to influence policy choices affecting the voters. The nature of a 
country’s party system therefore depends on whether state parties link together to 
form regional or national parties. In some periods in some countries, they aggregate 
to form regional or national parties, and in other periods in these same countries, they 
do not. In an even more complicated variation, during the same periods in some 
countries, select states or provinces have party systems that mirror the national party 
systems, and other states or provinces do not. Contemporary India is a prominent 
example of this variation.
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Figure 6-2 shows the trends h average ENP at the national, state and the district 
level in different election years.60 The periods have been categorised into 
centralising, decentralising and ambiguous phase as defined by Chhibber and 
Kollman (2004).
Figure 6-2 E N P  at national, state and district level by election year
National level 
District level
C = Centralising periods; D = Decentralising period; A = Ambiguous periods 
Bars are ordered as follows: 1. National level 2. State level 3. District level
As can be seen in Figure 6-2, the average ENP at the district and state level remain 
relatively stable over the years, while the number of parties at the national level tend 
to follow the changes in federal distribution of powers. Thus, number of parties at the 
national level decline during the centralising phase of 1971 -  1977, and increase 
during the decentralising phase starting in 1991. The changes in the number of 
parties at the state level relative to the national level are smaller, and in particular, 
one does not see much change in the number of parties at the state level in the
60I extend the data set used by Chhibber and Kollman (2004) by adding 1951/2 and 2004 elections, 
and including all states and union territories -  currently 32 (instead of 16 states included in their data 
set).
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decentralising periods. Finally, the number of parties at the district level remain 
relatively stable and do not change in response to the changes in federal distribution 
of powers.
Chhibber and Kollman’s (2004: 200,205-6) use these trends to support their 
argument about the relationship between party aggregation and the federal 
distribution of powers. They explain this stability of the number of parties at the 
state as follows: “something systematic and palpable occurred in the 1990s when the 
aggregation measure [Nn — D«] shot up to the levels not seen in the other countries in 
the twentieth century.. .Ethnicity and caste are important factors in any full 
explanation of electoral and political outcomes in India, but they cannot explain the 
dynamics in the party system over the past fifty years...In the late 1990s, the state- 
level (aggregation) measure actually drops. What this means is that starting in the 
1980s, and gaining momentum in the 1990s, when power was rapidly devolving to 
the states, the party system was fragmenting into many state-level party systems with 
little aggregation across these states...fragmentation in the Indian party system in 
recent decades is due to the failure of state-level parties to coordinate across state- 
boundaries”.61
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) imply that that once party systems are 
determined by institutional and sociological variables, the change in the party system 
moves in line with federal centralisation and decentralisation. While drawing their 
conclusions, they rely on the relationship between average effective number of
6'Here, [N« -  D«] refers to the difference between effective number of parties between National and 
District level, while the ‘state level measure’ refers to the average effective number o f parties at the 
state level.
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parties at the national level and the district level, and do not explicitly measure the 
measure of party aggregation at the state level, an important omission especially 
because these states vary greatly in terms of political situation, economic condition, 
social heterogeneity, etc.
Following Chhibber and Kollman’s (2004) arguments, the aggregation trends 
between national and district level should be consistent with aggregation trends 
between the state and the district level. This is likely to happen because it is at the 
state level that the effect of federal centralisation and decentralisation is felt, and 
therefore, for example, we should expect the number of parties to decrease (higher 
degree of aggregation) during the periods of federal centralisation not only at the 
national level but also at the state level, as voters prefer to vote for national parties. 
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) do not investigate whether this is the case, and 
only compare average number of parties at the district level (for all the districts in 
the country) with the average number of parties at the national level. Although they 
recognise the importance of state level politics, but do not study party aggregation at 
the state level. In the following section, I identify and discuss factors that affect 
party aggregation in India. The focus is on the party aggregation at the state fevel, 
although national aggregation is also discussed to complete the analysis.
6.3 Party aggregation in India -  an extended analysis
I argue that that party aggregation in India is better understood and explained by 
studying it at two levels: one between district and state level, and second, between
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state and the national level.62 I argue that studying the process of party aggregation 
into these two levels enables a better insight than is achievable by studying it only as 
a national level phenomenon. Building on this argument, I provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the party aggregation phenomenon, especially at the state 
level.
I define Party Aggregation as a process by which the number of parties at the district 
level is aggregated at the higher (state and national levels).63 I define two types of 
aggregation that can take place in a federal system. The first type of aggregation 
takes place at the State level and can be measured by the difference (or the) ratio of 
effective number of parties at the state level (Ns) and the effective number of parties 
at the district level (Nd).64 Thus, state level aggregation takes place when one or few 
parties win the elections in various districts of a state. The second type of 
aggregation takes place at the national level and can be measured by difference (or 
the ratio) between effective number of parties at the national level (TVh) and the 
effective number of parties at the state level (Ns). Thus, national level aggregation 
takes place when one or few parties are dominant in different states of a country. 
Figure 6-3 shows a simple illustration of the effect of voting behaviour on party 
aggregation at the state and the national levels.
62Here I assume that there are two levels o f government in the federal state: National and state. This 
analysis can be extended to cases where there is one more level (local government) of government.
63 Aggregation is a matter o f degree. Thus, one can expect to see higher degree o f aggregation in the 
periods of federal centralisation, and lower degree o f aggregation in the periods o f federal 
decentralisation
64State level aggregation takes place if  voters vote either for a state or for a national party in 
preference to a local or district level party.
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Figure 6-3 Voting patterns and party aggregation
Voting behaviour Degree of Party Aggregation
Case District level State level National level
1 Vote for a national party High aggregation High aggregation
2 Vote for a state party High aggregation Low aggregation
3 Vote for a local party Low aggregation Low aggregation
In case 1, if voters favour voting for national parties, it will reduce the number of 
parties both at the state and the national level, and is likely to result into high party 
aggregation at both these levels. If however, voters prefer voting for a state party 
(case 2), it will result in reduction in the number of parties in a particular state (since 
voters in all districts of that state vote for state parties rather than local candidates), 
but increase the number of parties at the national level because different parties 
dominate in different states. This then leads to high party aggregation at the state 
level, but low aggregation (or party fragmentation) at the national level. Finally, in 
case 3, where voters prefer to vote for a local candidate in the district, it leads to 
increase in the number of parties both in the state and at the national level, which is 
likely to result into low party aggregation both at the state and the national levels. 
Thus, high aggregation at state lewl is necessary but not sufficient condition for 
national level aggregation.
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) focus their main attention on aggregation 
between national and the district level, but as I have argued, aggregation at the 
national level is better understood, and is a consequence of the aggregation of the 
two types outlined above. I now turn to a more detailed explanation of the factors 
affecting party aggregation at the state level. Since this aggregation takes place
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within a state, it is affected by a combination of state specific factors as well as 
factors that affect all the states.
States ’ dependence on the national government
The effect of federal distribution of powers on the party aggregation phenomenon 
has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. I argue that although federal 
distribution of powers is an important factor affecting party aggregation, its effect is 
better studied on a state-by-state basis, since the response of each state to the changes 
in the federal distribution of powers is shaped by various other factors. I argue that 
in a state which is less dependent on the central government for grants, resources and 
support, voters are less likely to be influenced by the degree of federal centralisation 
and decentralisation.65 Thus, the aggregation of parties from state level to the 
national level will represent the weighted responses of different states, arising from 
their respective positions, including their dependence on the national government.
Based on above argument, I present the hypothesised relationship between the 
federal distribution of power and states’ dependence on the national government in a 
matrix shown in Figure 6-4.
65Dependence can be a combination o f economic and political dependency, where states depend on 
resources and political alliances with the national parties and government.
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Figure 6-4 Effect of federal centralisation and states’ dependence on party aggregation
Degree of states’ dependence on 
national government
High
Degree of federal Moderate to High High party
centralisation party aggregation aggregation
Low party Moderate to low
Low aaareaation party aaareaation
Low____________________________ High
Figure 6-4 shows, one needs both a high degree of federal centralisation and a high 
dependence of a state on the national government to have a high degree of party 
aggregation at the state level Similarly, if both the degree of federal centralisation 
and a states’ dependence on the federal government are low, one is likely to witness 
low level of aggregation of parties. The two intermediate categories do not give 
clear-cut results. I expect the federal centralisation variable to dominate the 
dependence variable, since all states are dependent on the national government to 
some extent. And, therefore, when the degree of federal centralisation is high, but 
the state’s dependence is low, we are likely to see ‘Moderate to High’ aggregation of 
parties at the national level. What makes the result ambiguous is the relative force of 
state’s dependence and federal centralisation. In a centralising phase, party 
aggregation can either be moderate, since higher federal centralisation is neutralised 
by low dependence of a state. However, if the federal centralisation affects the states 
through various formal and even informal ways, high aggregation can still occur. 
Also, where the federal tightening takes place in an unusual situation -  say war or 
natural disaster, aggregation is expected to be high, despite low dependence of a 
state. The second intermediate case, where federal centralisation is low, but 
dependence is high is expected to lead to moderate to low aggregation. This
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expectation is understandable, as lower centralisation and higher dependence 
together produce a moderate degree of aggregation. However, if the low degree of 
centralisation leads to delegation of important powers to the states, even a higher 
dependence could still lead to low degree of aggregation, higher number of parties at 
the state level.66
Thus, the dependence and the centralisation factors affect party aggregation, and in 
particular, states which are more dependent on the national governments are likely to 
witness higher degree of party aggregation in times of federal centralisation, than the 
ones which are less dependent. If one looks at the Indian states, it becomes very 
clear that there is a wide disparity between them in terms of economic development, 
income, level of employment, infrastructure, and so on. These differences, I argue, 
can manifest themselves on the political system. Voters in a relatively rich state will 
have different incentives than in a relatively poor state. For example, for a state 
which is relatively rich, less dependent on the central government for grants, 
resources and support, the voters and candidates are likely to be less influenced by 
the degree of federal centralisation and decentralisation. And therefore, although the 
degree of federal centralisation and decentralisation affects the party aggregation 
phenomenon, its impact will vary in different states, as voters in different states are 
affected differently by this factor, and will respond differently.
To conclude the discussion in this section, one is likely to see party aggregation at 
the state level if (1) there is centralisation of federal powers at the national level; (2) 
states become more dependent on the national government for financial and other
66This can happen especially in a situation where financial powers are delegated to the states, so that 
they become less dependent on the national government to raise resources.
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resources. Similarly, one is likely to see party disaggregation at the state level if (1) 
there is decentralisation of federal powers at the national level; (2) states are less 
dependent on the national government for financial and other resources; (3) some or 
all states see an enhanced politicisation and mobilisation of social cleavages.
I can now summarise the limitations of the existing literature on party aggregation as 
applied to Indian party system. One, the effect of federal centralisation on the party 
aggregation is treated rather simplistically. In reality, this effect is conditioned by 
changes in social, political and economic variables described in this section. Second, 
the response of different federal units to federal centralisation and decentralisation is 
shaped by different specific economic and political factors. Therefore, drawing 
conclusions from aggregate mean measure of national and district level party system 
does not provide a complete picture of the effects of the federal distribution of 
powers. Third, responses of the different political units to the federal centralisation 
and decentralisation need not be uniform in their effects. Fourth, existing research 
does not differentiate between aggregation at different levels of governance, thus 
ignoring the diversity of Indian states.
Figure 6-5 presents party aggregation trends in 19 Indian states. The line shown in 
the chart is a measure of aggregation at the state level defined as the ratio of ENP at 
the state level to the ENP at the district level {Ratio).61
67Chhibber and Kollman (2004) use the difference between the effective number o f parties at different 
levels (national, district) to measure party aggregation. I prefer to use the ratio between the effective 
number o f parties rather than the difference, since it also takes into account the difference in the 
absolute number of parties in different states. Using the ratio instead of the difference does not affect 
my basic argument that it is important to formally include party aggregation at the state level to 
understand the party aggregation phenomenon.
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Figure 6-5 Party Aggregation trends at state level in India
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Figure 6-5 illustrates that the aggregation trends at the state level do not follow the 
same path, and looking only at the averages for all the states (as in Figure 6-2) hides 
these differences. A higher Ratio indicates a higher number o f  parties at the state 
level, and therefore higher fragmentation o f  party system at the state level. 
Following Chhibber and Kollman’s (1998, 2004) basic idea, one should expect 
higher Ratio in times o f  federal decentralisation and lower Ratio in times o f  federal 
centralisation. If one focuses on the decentralising phase starting from 1991, it can
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be seen that states show different aggregation trends. While some states such Bihar, 
UP, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra witness higher Ratio, or lower 
aggregation as expected in the decentralising phase, other states such as Haryana, 
Gujarat and MP see stable or even declining Ratio, implying higher aggregation 
between state and district level party systems.
I extend the argument relating to party aggregation by suggesting that this 
phenomenon is important not only at the national level but also at the state level in 
the Indian context. This is the case because state is the intermediate level that links 
the district and the national level politics in India. Thus, the size of party systems in 
a state can increase or decrease depending on whether and to what extent are voters 
and parties able to co-ordinate their decisions and strategies across the districts of 
that state. If this co-ordination is high, voters in the districts will vote for party labels 
(national or state parties rather than local or district parties) resulting in a decrease in 
the number of parties at the state level -  high aggregation. On the other hand, if this 
co-ordination is low, voters in the districts do not vote for party labels, resulting in an 
increase in the number of parties at the state level -  low aggregation. Differentiating 
party aggregation at these two levels also helps in incorporating the effect of the 
heterogeneity of the Indians states on the formation of national party system, 
something which is not addressed adequately in the previous literature on party 
aggregation.
I present an empirical analysis of party aggregation in the Indian states in the 
following sections.
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6,3,1 Party aggregation in Indian states -  an empirical analysis
Figure 6-6 shows the trends in the size of party system in important Indian states in 
four elections between 1962 and 1977.68 The period between 1964 and 1969 was a 
federal decentralising period, while between 1970 and 1977, India witnessed federal 
centralisation of powers. Thus, it is useful to analyse the trends in the size of party 
system during this period for evaluating the effect of federal centralisation.
68For the sake o f space, I limit the graphical analysis to 18 large Indian states, which cover more than 
90% of Indian districts.
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Figure 6-6 Size of party system in the Indian states 1962 - 1977
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As can be seen in Figure 6-6, the dominant trend between 1962 and 1967 elections 
shows an increase in the number of parties in most of the states in line with the 
decentralisation of federal powers between 1964 and 1969. In particular, the states 
of Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa witness a large increase in the number of 
parties. However, the number of parties in Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and 
Rajasthan show a decline during this period. Thus, there are no consistent trends in 
the number of parties across the Indian states in this period of decentralisation.
Moving on to the period 1970-1977, which saw substantial centralisation of powers 
in the hands of the national government, one can see that 12 out of 18 states shown in 
Figure 6-6 witness a decrease in the number of parties, which is consistent with 
theory of party aggregation. The largest decrease is in the states of Bihar, Orissa, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Contrary to the expectation however, some states such 
as Maharashtra, Jammu and Kashmir and Tamil Nadu witness an increase in the 
number of parties in this centralising phase.
Figure 6-7 plots the Ratio of ENP at the state level to the ENP at the district level in 
the Indian states.
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Figure 6-7 Party aggregation in the Indian states 1962- 1977
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Figure 6-7 shows that in general, the direction of change in the aggregation follows 
the changes in federal distribution of powers. Thus, decentralisation leads to 
increase in the Ratio between 1962 and 1967 elections, while centralisation between 
1971 and 1977 elections leads to a decrease in the Ratio in many Indian states. 
However, as seen in the trends in ENP in Figure 6-7, some states also show trends 
opposite to the theoretical expectations. For example, the Ratio in Tamil Nadu 
increases from 2.0 to 2.4 between 1971 and 1977 showing greater disaggregation in a 
centralising period. Furthermore, the reactions to the changes in Federal distribution 
of powers are more pronounced in some states than the others. Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh are two prominent examples of this phenomenon.
I now analyse trends in the size of party systems, and the party aggregation in the 
Indian states during the decentralising period 1991- 2004. Figure 6-8 shows the size 
of party systems in the Indian states in the decentralising period of 1991 -  2006.
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Figure 6-8 Size of party system in the Indian states 1991 - 2004
A n d h r a  P r a d e s h
00 -  
©  -  
'T -
CM -  
O
3 . 1  3 6  3 5  2  8  3 . 4
I I I  I I
CO 
©  -  
'T -
CM -
Assign G u j a r a t
l i
4 . 3  4 Q  —
I I I
® - 
© - 
 ^-
CM - 
O
5 9  5 . 7
4 . 8  5 4  _  5 4
I I  I I
© - 
© - 
*  -
CM -
2 . 6  2 . 3  2 . 3  2  1
ll III
£
'€
■6
iE
D
C
5
19911996199819992004
H a r y a n a
19911996199819992004
H i m a c h a f  P r a d e s h
19911996199819992004
© _ 
© -
M -
6.0 6 . 4
5.2
00 . 
©
'T - 
CM -  
O
2 . 2  2 . 3  2 . 2
©  .  
©  - 
Tf -
CM -  
O
J a m m u  a n d  K a s h m i r  
6.6
19911996199819992004
K a r n a t a k a
©  -
5.1  <0 -
 ^ - 
CM -
3 . 6  3 . 8 3 . 2  3 . 3
19911996199819992004
M a d h y a  P r a d e s h
19911996199819992004 
M a h a r a h s t r a
19911996199819992004 
O r i s s a
19911996199819992004
P u n j a b
© -  
©  -  
^  -
CM -  
O
©  -  
©  -
CM -
1991 1996199819992004 
T a m i l  N a d u
6 . 5
19911996199819992004 
U t t a r  P r a d e s h
4 . 9  4 . 8  4 . 9  5  0
3 . 8urn mu
19911996199819992004 
W e s t  B e n g a l
4 . 5  4 . 4  4 . 4
19911996199819992004
19911996199819992004
G raphs by state
19911996199819992004 19911996199819992004
«  -  
©  -  
"T -  
CM -  
O
2 8  2 . 6  2 . 7  2  1 2 .4
I  I  I  ■ I
19911996199819992004
©  .  
©  -
::
1991 1996199819992004
R a j a s t h a n
©  - 00 - ©  - ©  -
©  -
3 . 6
2 . 6  2 . 7  2  4  2 . 8  *  -
I l i 1 1 :
5 . 0  4 . 8  CD -
■ 1 I I I  :
©  -
3  1 3 .2  3 . 4  3  1 3 . 4  ^
l l l l l  r
A K 4 . 8  ©  -  
4 5  4 . 1  3 . 9
i l l l l
2 . 7  2 . 9  2 . 7 2 . 3  2 . 4
■ ■ ■ ■ I
19911996199819992004
255
CHAPTER 6
PARTY AGGREGATION AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
In this period of decentralisation, one expects to see increase in the number of parties 
at the state level. Figure 6-8 shows that many states such as Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, West Bengal, Punjab and Tamil Nadu witness an increase in the 
number of parties, while number of parties in Haryana and Jammu and Kashmir 
decrease during this period. In many states such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa 
and Rajasthan, the number of parties remain stable. Overall, there are no consistent 
patterns in the trend of number of parties in the Indian states during this period.
Figure 6-9 presents the Ratio of ENP at state level to ENP at district level during 
1991 -  2004 in the Indian states.
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Figure 6-9 Party aggregation in the Indian states 1991 -  2004
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The results in Figure 6-9 also show different patterns of aggregation in the Indian 
states. The states of Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Maharashtra in particular see a 
large increase in the Ratio, in line with federal decentralisation. The trends in Kerala 
are contrary to the expected result, and the Ratio actually falls from 2.1 in 1991 to 
1.7 in 2004.
The above discussion shows that the effects of changes in federal distribution of 
powers on the Indian states are not consistent and uniform. The trends in the number 
of parties at the state level also show that there is no unqualified empirical support to 
the theory that federal centralisation leads to higher party aggregation (and decrease 
in the number of parties), and federal decentralisation leads to lower aggregation 
(and increase in the number of parties) at the state level. This is in contrast to the 
findings of Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) about Party Aggregation in India at 
the national level. One reason for this inconsistency may be due to the varying level 
of dependence of Indian states on the national government. This factor is discussed 
below.
6.3.2 Dependence and party aggregation -  an empirical analysis
In section 6.3.1, I presented the argument regarding the effects of the degree of 
dependence of Indian states on the party aggregation phenomenon. Chhibber and 
Kollman (2004:208) acknowledge the importance of this factor by saying that 
“Among the Indian states, some are more dependent upon the central government for 
budgetary support...” For example, smaller states in the North East region, as well 
as the special status states -  the union territories are more dependent on the national 
government, and one can expect higher level of aggregation in these states.
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However, this factor is not investigated further in their analysis. The difficulty in 
providing precise measures of federal centralisation and decentralisation has already 
been discussed in section 6.2. Similar limitations apply to measuring the dependence 
factor, and in particular, it is difficult to quantify political dependence of the Indian 
states on the national government. Therefore, I divide Indian states into two 
categories -  those which are ‘Highly dependent’ on the national government, and all 
other states.69
Figures 6-10 to 6-13 present trends of effective number of parties and party 
aggregation at the state level for these two categories of Indian states. These figures 
enable graphical evaluation of empirical results with my hypotheses regarding 
relationship between federal centralisation and decentralisation, states’ dependence 
on national government, and the party aggregation phenomenon. As before, I label 
the time periods into centralising, decentralising and ambiguous periods as described 
in Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-10 depicts the trends of ENP in the Indian states that are highly dependent 
on the national government, as described earlier. The periods have been categorised 
in terms of federal centralisation of powers as defined in Chhibber and Kollman 
(2004). In the first centralising period 1951-1957, the ENP falls marginally, and in 
the 1967 elections too, which represent the first decentralising period, the ENP 
declines marginally to 3.2. This fall however is not in line with theoretical prediction
69Highly dependent states include (1) Union Territories - states which derive all their resources from 
the national government’s budget (2) All North Eastern states which are very small and are highly 
dependent on the national government for resources and funds, and (3) Other dependent states -  
Assam and Himachal Pradesh based on their fiscal position. These categories are also consistent with 
Chhibber and Kollman (2004: 208). I exclude the state of Jammu and Kashmir since it has a special 
status, and the political situation there is affected by many exogenous factors relating to law and order 
and militancy.
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that number of parties tend to increase during periods of decentralisation. Thereafter, 
during the centralising phase between 1970 -  1977, ENP shows a sharp decline to 
2.6. Finally, in the decentralising phase starting in 1991, ENP increases from 3.1 to
3.4 in 2004.
Figure 6-10 E N P  in Highly dependent states
&  $ & & & &
Figure 6-11 charts Party Aggregation (Ratio) for the Highly dependent states. The 
trends in the aggregation ratio shown in Figure 6-11 show that it tends to declines 
marginally during the centralising periods, and it does not increase much during the 
decentralisation periods except between 1998 and 2004.
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Figure 6-11 Party aggregation in Highly dependent states
I present similar analysis for Indian states which are not Highly dependent on the 
national government. Figure 6-12 shows that ENP increases during the first phase of 
centralisation during 1951-57, while it decreases in the second centralisation phase 
during 1970-77. Thus, the results for these states do not consistently follow the 
expected reduction in ENP during the federal centralisation of powers. In the 
decentralisation phase during 1991-2004, the ENP increases from 3.6 from 1991 to
4.1 in 1996, but thereafter decreases to 3.8 in 2004. Thus, even during the latest 
decentralisation phase, there is no consistent increase in ENP for this category of 
states as is predicted by the theory of Party Aggregation. This is further confirmed 
by the trends in Party Aggregation {Ratio) shown in Figure 6-13.
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Figure 6-12 E N P  in other (not Highly dependent) states
Figure 6-13 shows that the Ratio increases marginally during the first centralisation 
phase 1951-57, but decreases in the next centralisation phase 1970-77. In the 
decentralisation phase 1991 onwards, in general, the Ratio does not show a clear 
increase as would be expected. After 1998, this Ratio declines from 1.55 to 1.43 in 
2004, a result that is contrary to theoretical prediction.
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Figure 6-13 Party Aggregation on other (not Highly dependent) states
C = Centralising period; D = Decentralising period; A = Ambiguous period
In general, the results for the Highly dependent states are in line with expectations, 
and changes in the size of party systems in these states tend to follow the federal 
distribution of powers. Further, for these states, the effects of federal centralisation 
are more pronounced than federal decentralisation. Thus, faced with federal 
centralisation, voters in these states have incentives to vote for state or national 
(rather than focal) parties in order to influence policy decisions at these levels. The 
results for the states which are not Highly dependent on the national government 
however do not consistently follow the changes in federal distribution of powers, 
results which is not in line with the existing theory of party aggregation.
I further examine the effects of federal centralisation and decentralisation, and the 
dependence factor in a unified regression model in Chapter 7.
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6.4 Other Contextual factors
In addition to the phenomenon of party aggregation, there are some other important 
contextual variables in the Indian states that affect the size of the party systems.
6.4.1 Politicisation o f  cleavages and success o f ethnic parties
I question Chhibber and Kollman’s (1998, 2004) assumption that since the number of 
social cleavages remain relatively constant in a polity, the changes in the size of 
party system over time cannot be explained by sociological factors. Till date, there is 
no clear theoretical explanation of the process of politicisation of social cleavages, 
and how a particular social cleavage will lead to an effective party. However, we do 
know that different factors (such as access to resources and media) can hinder or 
facilitate the politicisation of social cleavages. Therefore, even though the 
underlying number of social cleavages in a polity may remain constant, their effect 
on party system can vary over time due to degree of politicisation and mobilisation in 
different elections. Also, as the discussion in Chapter 3 shows, a large strand of 
research on the evolution of the Indian party system has pointed out towards the 
politicisation of social cleavages based on region, religion and castes being important 
reasons for the recent increase in number of parties both at the state and the national 
level. The rise of BJP has brought the effect of religion back into the focus, as 
scholars (for example Jaffrelot, 1995) explain its rise to its exploitation of religious 
cleavages. Since Indian party system has developed on regional lines, as against 
ideological or national lines (Wallace, 2000), regional parties have also used 
advancing of the interest of a particular region, as a part of their electoral strategy.
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This is also brought out by the following comment by Chhibber and Petrocik (1998: 
201).
Given the territorial nature of social cleavages in 
India, we expect that: (1) At the national level, where 
a voters livers -  his or her state -  should be a far 
stronger predictor of the vote than social factors such 
as caste, religion or social class observed nationally.
(2) However, because caste, class and religion are 
major points of conflict within India, each will have 
a strong correlation with party support when 
examined at the level at which these social factors 
are politically significant; that is, within each state.
(3) The political significance of group conflicts 
varies by State so the strength of the link between 
particular social cleavages and party should vary 
across the States.
Chandra (2004) implies that success of ethnic parties depends on factors such as 
relative population of the groups it leads, their ability to secure the required threshold 
of votes, as well as intra-party opportunities for its leaders. These factors change 
over time, and hence represent important sociological context in which different 
elections take place.
Thus, since the nature and the intensity of the conflicts based on caste, class and 
religion do not remain constant, the role of sociological factors in explaining the 
changes in the size of party system over time has to be acknowledged, even if these 
effects are difficult to study and measure. When these conflicts become intensive, 
they are more likely to be politicised and affect the party systems. Thus, the 
sociological context in which elections take place are crucial determinants of the size 
of party systems in the Indian states.
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6.4.2 Expectation o f coalition government at the national level
The expectation of the formation of Coalition government leads to disaggregation of 
party system both at the national and the state level. In a coalition government, 
smaller parties enjoy disproportionate powers in terms of negotiating for ministerial 
berths, and influencing policy, and this favours formation of new state parties, and 
strengthening of existing state parties. During the 1990s, India has seen formation of 
coalition governments at the national level and in many states, and this has motivated 
the formation of new parties through a split in the existing parties, and an increase in 
the share of state parties. This has led to national parties being forced into electoral 
alliances and seat sharing arrangements with state parties, a move that further 
increases the viability of smaller parties, and disaggregation of party system both at 
the state and the national levels. One can measure this factor by vote share of state 
parties since this leads to increase in fragmentation of party system at the national 
level, and the chances of the formation of a coalition government at the national 
level.
6.4.3 Literacy levels
The mechanics of Duverger’s Law assume that voters act rationally in voting for 
larger parties. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that the mechanical and 
psychological effect will be more in states with higher literacy Btes. As Heller 
(2000) points out,
If democracy in Kerala works better than in the rest 
of India... it is in large part because individuals have 
been equipped with the basic human capabilities
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required of citizenship. Literacy in Kerala has 
reached 91 percent, compared with 49 percent for 
India as a whole... As a direct result, traditionally 
marginalized groups, most notably women and dalits 
[SCs and backward castes] have acquired the basic 
social skills required for informed participation...
Caste and community in Kerala continue to be a 
powerful basis of social identity and civic 
engagement. But in the realm of politics and in the 
expression of public authority, these forms of 
association have been subordinated to broader 
aggregations.
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) assume that voters and parties coordinate their 
strategies across districts and states, and this affects the aggregation of parties at the 
state and national level. This requires voters and parties to act rationally in assessing 
their choices, and maximising their utilities. Most models of voters’ choice are based 
on rational-choice, that believe that voters act rationally in interpreting their 
incentives, and maximising their utilities, while voting for a particular party. 
Strategic voting on the part of voters assumes that voters have the ability and 
knowledge to look at the implications of their votes on outcomes of the elections, and 
on the policy outcomes at the different levels of the government. One can therefore 
argue that states with higher literacy levels will witness a higher level of strategic 
voting, and therefore, fewer number of parties. The correlation matrix between 
literacy level and the party system variables is shown in Table 6-1 below.
Table 6-1 Correlation between Literacy rates and number of parties
Effective Effective
electoral legislative Contesting
parties parties parties
LITERAC -.003 .020 -.074
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
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The correlation matrix shows that literacy does have a negative effect on the 
effective number of electoral and contesting parties, but the effect is not a significant 
one. Overall, Indian states do not exhibit a significant relationship between literacy 
and party systems.
6.4.4 Urbanisation
Dahl and Tufte (1973: 98 -100), while arguing the case for a relationship between 
size and party system fragmentation, point out that urbanization and socio-economic 
diversification may account for the explanatory power of the size variable. Anckar 
(2000) includes this variable in his comparative empirical analysis of party systems 
of 77 countries. Therefore, there are theoretical reasons to include the degree of 
urbanisation in my study. Further, since Indian states vary in terms of this dimension, 
it is possible to test it empirically. Figure 6-14 shows the urban population 
percentage in the Indian states over the years. As can be seen this has increased 
especially after 1971.
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Figure 6-14 Urban population percentage at state level by election years
o  .
■sr
Figure 6-15 shows the cross-sectional variation o f this variable in key Indian states. 
As can be seen, the range in the urban population percentage is large, with states 
showing urbanisation o f  10% to 80%.
Figure 6-15 Urban population percentage by state
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Table 6-2 provides correlation analysis between urbanisation and three party system 
variables. It can be seen that there is significant negative correlation between the 
state’s urbanisation, and the ENP and ELP.
Table 6-2 Correlation between urbanisation and number of parties
Effective Effective
electoral legislative Contesting
parties parties parties
URBAN -,13(**) -.14(**) -.01
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the contextual factors affecting the party systems in India. 
The first contextual factor is the phenomenon of party aggregation that takes place 
both at the national and the state level, and involves interplay between voters, parties 
and the economic and political environment. While Duverger’s Law is able to 
explain the number of parties at the district level in SMPS, the number of parties at 
the state and the national level are subject to the phenomenon of party aggregation. 
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) put forward a theory linking the party 
aggregation at the national level to the changes in federal distribution of powers. 
While Chhibber and Kollman’s arguments are sound, they derive their conclusions 
by focusing on party aggregation at the national level, thus ignoring the 
heterogeneity of the Indian states. I show that party aggregation at the state level 
varies between different Indian states. Using this insight, I argue that party 
aggregation needs to be studied at both national and the state levels. I discuss the 
factors that account for the phenomenon of party aggregation at the state le\el party 
system in India. In particular, I discuss the importance of the states’ dependence on
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the national government in affecting the party aggregation phenomenon. In general, 
states which are highly dependent on the national government tend to show higher 
aggregation of parties at the state level during the phase of federal centralisation of 
powers.
The second set of contextual factors discussed in this chapter relate to variables such 
as literacy levels, degree of urbanisation, and the expectation of formation of 
coalition government. Since these factors vary across the Indian states and in 
different elections, they need to be taken into account while studying the 
determinants of party systems in India.
This leads me to set up the agenda for my final chapter which presents a unified 
model of the determinants of party systems in the Indian states. My unified model 
uses important institutional, sociological and contextual variables in a multivariate 
analysis to explain the variation in the number of parties in the Indian states.
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7 SYNTHESIS: UNIFIED MODEL OF PARTY SYSTEMS
In this chapter, I first build up a case for a unified model of the determinants of the 
size of the party systems in the Indian states. This is based on the argument that 
since party systems are shaped by institutional, sociological and contextual factors, 
we need to move towards a unified model that incorporates all these factors into the 
empirical analysis.
I first present regression results incorporating both institutional and sociological 
factors, and then include contextual factors to analyse results of the unified 
regression model. I end this chapter and my thesis by providing some concluding 
remarks on my research highlighting its achievements, and how it provides directions 
for further research on party systems in general, and specifically on the Indian party 
system.
7.1 Towards a unified model o f  party systems in Indian states
My empirical analysis in the previous chapters investigates the effects of 
institutional, sociological and contextual factors on the Indian party system 
separately. This approach helps in an in-depth study of these factors and how they 
influence the size of the Indian party system. As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars 
representing institutional and sociological schools have often stressed that these 
respective factors individually play a dominant role in the formation of party 
systems. Thus, the scholars of the institutional school have stressed the affect of 
institutional variables while the sociological school focuses on the social
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heterogeneity as the primary reason affecting the number of parties in a polity. 
However, while focusing on these respective factors, scholars have not been unaware 
of the complex set of determinants of party systems, but prefer to be parsimonious in 
including these in their empirical analysis. The preference for this unilateral focus in 
the institutional school can be defended so long as the one is studying polities with 
limited cross-sectional social heterogeneity. In such a situation, it can be argued with 
some conviction that size of party system will be affected more by institutional than 
social factors. Indeed, many early comparative studies on the subject which focus 
only on institutional factors relate to old western democracies which exhibit 
relatively stable and homogeneous social structure. Furthermore, even if the number 
of social groups in a polity remains stable, its effects on the size of party system can 
vary depending on how and whether these social cleavages are politicised and 
mobilised. This too, calls for including the sociological factors in an empirical study 
of party systems.
On the other hand, focusing only on sociological factors is based on an assumption 
that institutions tend to be stable over time, and therefore only have limited affect on 
the size of party system, and changes therein over time. However, this view ignores 
the fact that institutional factors matter in explaining the variation in the size of party 
systems on a cross-sectional basis. Furthermore, institutional factors do not act in a 
vacuum, and their effects can vary over time depending upon the environment or the 
context in which elections are held.
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Recent scholarship has sought to address this weakness in the literature by 
undertaking studies of party systems, by including both the institutional and 
sociological, and including a larger set of countries in their analysis.
I have argued in chapters 4-6 that there are sound theoretical explanations of the 
effects of these individual set of factors, i.e. institutional, sociological and contextual 
on the size of the party systems in Indian states. Although the relative importance of 
these factors may vary across elections and states, they are all nevertheless crucial 
determinants of the size of party systems. The basic idea of this chapter is to 
recognise the importance of a unified model of the size of the party systems in the 
Indian states. This unified model should include the combined effects of the 
important variables on the size of the party systems. In the context of my research, 
such a model will also help in checking the robustness of the effects of individual 
variables identified in chapters 4 to 6, and avoiding the possibility of ‘omitted 
variable bias’ in the analyses that include only the individual effects.
Since the formation of party systems is a complex phenomenon, it necessitates using 
a more comprehensive set of explanatory variables to explain the size of the party 
system. A unified model should provide superior results especially in the context of a 
comparative study where different Indian states are affected by different set of 
variables to varying degree.
In the next section, I present a unified model of party systems in Indian states in two 
steps: first using sociological and institutional variables, followed by models which 
also adds contextual factors in the regression equation. The dependent variable I use
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in the following sections is the effective number of parties based on v)tes (ENP), 
since this corresponds most closely with both the institutional and sociological 
variables. Electoral results in a plurality-based system often produce disproportional 
results in terms of ratio of seats to votes, and therefore, the effect of sociological 
variables in particular will be more visible on vote-getting rather than seat-getting 
parties.
7.1.1 Size o f  party systems, and sociological and institutional variables
In this section, I present regression analysis that includes both sociological and 
institutional factors as explanatory variables to explain the size of party systems in 
Indian states. I compare the results from a model that includes both sociological and 
institutional variable to those of a model that includes only one of these two 
variables.
Table 7-1 presents comparison of regression results of models including only 
institutional or sociological factors (Models 1 and 2 respectively) with the regression 
which includes both institutional and sociological factors as independent variables 
(Model 3).70
70Using E S G  instead o f E R L  to represent social heterogeneity produces consistent results, as they have 
high positive correlation.
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Table 7-1 Regression analysis using Institutional and Sociological factors71
Dependent -  
ENP
1
Institutional
2
Sociological
3
Institutional
and
sociological
Assembly 0.16** 0.20**
Size (5.1) (6.9)
Effective -7.7** -7.5**
Threshold (9.3) (9.5)
Electoral Reforms 0.01 0.01
(0.6) (0.6)
Effective 0.54** 0.75**
Religious groups (3.4) (4.9)
(E R L )
ENPJLagged 0.43** 0.58** 0.35**
(9.3) (12.2) (7.9)
Intercept 
R square 
N
4.8
0.57
358
0.60
0.42
358
3.8
0.61
358
The results reported in Table 7-1 show that Model 3 that includes both sociological 
and institutional variables have better explanatory power than the ones using only of 
these factors. Thus, the R square for Models 1 and 2 is 0.57 and 0.42 respectively, 
while it increases to 0.61 in model 3. The coefficients of important institutional and 
sociological variables are of predicted sign and are significant in the Model 3. 
Therefore, I can conclude both institutional and sociological factors are significant 
variables that affect the size of the party systems in the Indian states. While 
Assembly Size increases the number of parties in the Indian states, the Effective 
Threshold tends to depress it. The effect of social heterogeneity is also consistent
7’The results reported are based on OLS with PCSE and lagged dependent variable; OLS, REM 
regressions produce consistent results. Introducing interaction terms to Model 3 does not improve the 
regression results, and these are therefore not reported.
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with theoretical predictions; ERL has positive and significant effects on the effective 
number of parties in the Indian states.
Overall, the results in Table 7-1 confirm that both sociological and institutional 
variables affect the size of the party systems. Further, models that include both 
sociological and institutional variables have better explanatory power (R square) 
compared to the one that includes either of these variables.
The results also show the robustness of the general result about the importance of 
religious cleavages and institutional variables in the Indian states, as their 
coefficients continue to be significant in the models including both these variables. 
Thus my results confirm the results obtained using individual institutional and 
sociological factors in chapters 4 and 5.
7.2 Unified model o f the size ofparty systems in Indian states
As discussed in section 7.1, party systems are shaped by variety of factors, and 
therefore, a unified model of the size of party systems which includes these factors 
should provide superior results, than the one which excludes important variables 
from its analysis. This view does not support adding more variables merely to 
improve the statistical validity of the regression model, but favours including all the 
factors that warrant inclusion based on theoretical and analytical reasons.
This proposition is supported by the regression results shown in Table 7.1, where I 
juxtapose both sociological and institutional factors in the same regression model,
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and this improves the explanatory power of the regression model. Based on this 
result, one can also hypothesise that adding contextual factors identified in chapter 6 
to the model will improve our understanding of the determinants of the party system 
further. Based on this hypothesis, I specify a ‘Unified’ model of party systems in the 
Indian states which can be represented by Equation 7-1.
Equation 7-1 Party system ~ / (Institutional, Sociological, Contextual factors)
In chapters 4-6,1 identify and analyse the important institutional, sociological and 
contextual variables affecting party systems in Indian states. I now use important 
factors in these categories in my unified model of the size of party systems, using a 
single regression equation. The explanatory variables and the expected direction of 
the relationship with party system variables used in my unified model are shown 
below.
Table 7-2 Variables for the Unified model
Explanatory variables Dependent
variable
Category Description ENP
In s t i tu t io n a l Assembly size +
Effective Threshold -
Electoral Reforms +
S o c io lo g ic a l Effective religious groups +
C o n te x tu a l Centralisation dummy -
Decentralisation dummy +
Dependence on national 
government
-
Degree of urbanisation -
Vote share o f state parties at 
the national level
+
O th e r Lagged E N P +
278
CHAPTER 7
UNIFIED MODEL
The dependent variable in Table 7-2 is the Effective number of parties by votes 
(ENP), while the explanatory variables represent institutional, sociological and 
contextual factors which have been discussed at length in chapters 4-6. I also use a 
lagged dependent variable following Beck and Katz (1995) and Beck (2001). The 
expected direction of the relationship between the variables as per theoretical 
explanations is also shown in Table 7-2. My unified model of party systems in 
Indian states includes the dependent and explanatory variables shown in Table 7-2.
Regression analysis for the unified model is carried out in four different models. 
These models use different combination of the factors shown in Table 7-2 to test 
alternative hypotheses and the robustness of the model. I do not use Assembly Size 
and Dependence on National government in the same regression because of high 
correlation between the two. Similarly, I use degree of Urbanisation instead of 
Literacy levels to avoid multi-collinearity.
I use dummy variables representing the periods of federal centralisation and 
decentralisation, and the states that are highly dependent on national government. 
As discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3.2, it is difficult to provide reliable quantitative 
measures for the degree of federal centralisation and decentralisation, and 
dependence of state governments on the national governments. I follow Chhibber 
and Kollman (2004) in categorising periods into centralising, decentralising and 
ambiguous, and provide two dummy variables to represent these. I use the 
categorisation discussed in section 6.3.2 in defining states that are highly dependent 
on the national government, and provide a dummy variable to represent these states.
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As discussed in chapter 6, fiscal and political centralisation favours a decrease in the 
number of parties, while deceitralisation tends to increase the number of parties.
Another contextual factor used in my unified model relates to the expectation of 
formation of a coalition government. After 1991 elections, major parties in India 
have fought elections with different pre-poll alliances and as a part of coalition, thus 
raising the expectation of a coalition government. This leads to smaller parties 
becoming more important, as they can be valuable for keeping the coalition in 
majority in the parliament, and thus hold disproportionate bargaining power. 
Furthermore, in this situation, voters need not favour larger parties in order to affect 
policy outcomes, since smaller parties as part of coalition government can 
increasingly influence policy making. Thus, the hypothesis that the expectation of 
formation of a coalition government tends to increase the number of parties. I use 
vote share of state level parties as defined by Election Commission at the national 
level to depict the probability of a coalition government at the national level.
Table 7.3 presents the results of regression of my unified model (Models 4 - 7 )  
including dependent and explanatory variables in different formulations using OLS 
with PCSE and lagged dependent variable taken as independent variable.72 I also 
reproduce the regression results using institutional, sociological and combination of 
these two factors in Models 1-3 to facilitate comparison between the different 
models.
72Using OLS and Random effects model produce consistent results.
280
CHAPTER 7
UNIFIED MODEL
Table 7-3 Unified model regression results73
Dependent:
E N P
Inst. 
Model 1
Social. 
Model 2
Inst. + 
Social.
Model 3 Model 4
Unified Model 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Assembly size 0.16** 0.20** 0.32** 0.19**
(log) (5.1) (6.9) (10.6) (6.6)
Effective -7.7* -7.5** -8.4** -7.3** -9.2** -7.6**
threshold (9.3) (9.5) ( H I ) (9.4) (11.8) (9.6)
Electoral 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06*
reforms (0.6) (0.6) (1.1) (1.5) (1.4) (1.8)
Effective 0.54** 0.75** 1.2** 0.74** j j*=t= 0.61**
religious groups (3.4) (4.9) (7.3) (4.9) (6.1) (4.0)
Centralisation -0.33** -0.43** -0.40** -0.46**
(2.3) (3.2) (2.6) (3.3)
Decentralisation 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.05
(1.0) (0.6) (0.7) (0.4)
Degree of -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
urbanisation (0.0) (0.2) (1.4) (1.0)
Vote Share of 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
regional parties (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
Dependence on -0.59** -0.36**
national (5.8) (3.8)
government
ENPJagged 0.43** 0.57** 0.35** 0.36** 0.41**
(9.3) (12.2) (7.9) (8.0) (9.2)
Constant 4.8 0.60 3.8 5.2 4.7 6.9 5.6
R square 0.57 0.42 0.61 0.51 0.62 0.42 0.59
N 358 358 358 401 358 401 358
73Using E S G  instead o f E R L  to represent social heterogeneity produces consistent results.
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As can be seen in Table 7-3, the direction of the relationship between the dependent 
and explanatory variables are consistent with those predicted by theory shown in 
Table 7-2. The Assembly Size variable is positive and statistically significant in 
Models 1 and 3 confirming the result from Chapter 4. Further, this variable 
continues to be positive and significant in the unified Models 4 and 5. Thus, states 
with larger Assembly Size tend to have higher number of parties.
The regression coefficient for Effective Threshold variable is negative and 
significant in all the models. Thus, higher the percentage of vote required to win 
elections in a particular state, lower the number of parties in that state, and vice 
versa. This too confirms the importance of institutional factors, and the robustness of 
the results obtained using only institutional factors (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
Higher social heterogeneity ($RL) leads to higher number of parties of a state, a 
result that is consistent with the sociological school of party systems. The fact that 
this variable is consistently significant in all the models shows robustness of this 
result.
Also, elections held during periods of federal centralisation of powers tend to 
produce lower number of parties in Indian states (Models 47). As discussed in 
Chapter 6, this happens because the distribution of powers affects incentives to vote 
either for local, state or national party, and this affects the party aggregation at the 
state level. The result for the centralisation variable shows that this factor is 
significant in explaining the variation in the size of party systems across the Indian 
states. Thus, voters tend to vote for either the state parties or the national parties 
during periods of federal centralisation, and this leads to reduction in the number of
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parties at the state level. It is interesting to note that federal decentralisation is not a 
significant variable thus meaning that number of parties at the state level do not 
increase in the periods of federal decentralisation. This is explainable since even 
during periods of decentralisation, voters do not have any extra reason to vote for the 
local (district) party rather than a state or a national party because India has a two- 
tiered federal system. And therefore federal decentralisation to the states need not 
lead to further decentralisation to the local level. This means that federal 
decentralisation alone does not influence the decisions of the voters to vote for local 
rather than state or the national party. Thus, while federal centralisation leads to 
decrease in the number of parties at the state level, federal decentralisation does not 
increase it.
The regression coefficient for urbanisation and vote share of regional parties are not 
significant; this means that for all states taken together, these are not important 
determinants of the size of party systems. The degree of urbanisation is a proxy for 
more awareness and rational behaviour on part of voters, and therefore the 
hypothesis was that it has a negative effect on the size of party system. However, 
empirically, this factor is not significant. In general, Electoral Reforms variable is 
not a significant variable affecting the effective number of parties in the Indian 
states.
The variable Dependence on national government is negative and significant in 
Models 6-7, where it is used. This confirms the hypothesis that states which are 
highly dependent on the national government for budgetary support have fewer 
parties. As discussed in Chapter 6, this happens because voters tend to vote for
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parties that can influence the national level politics, and this leads to higher party 
aggregation at the state level, and lower number of parties in these states. Finally, 
the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant in all models confirming 
that size of party systems is influenced by the results of the previous elections.
The explanatory power of all the models in Table 7-3 (in terms of R) is between 0.42 
to 0.62, and adding the Lagged dependent variable, and adds to the explanatory 
power of the models.
In general, my empirical results are consistent with the findings of cross-country 
comparative analysis on the size of party systems. The only study that focuses on 
Indian empirical data is Pamerkar (2002) which uses district level data for the 1998 
and 1999 elections. My results are in general consistent with both cross-country 
studies, and Pamerkar’s work on the district level party systems. My finding which 
shows the importance of institutional and sociological factors is consistent with the 
findings of major empirical research in cross-comparative research on party systems, 
and also with the empirical research available on the Indian party systems. 
Furthermore, it confirms the role played by federal centralisation and dependence of 
the states on the national government in determining the size of the Indian party 
system My results regarding party aggregation at the state level are not fully 
consistent with Chhibber and Kollman’s (2004) finding at the national level in that 
federal decentralisation is not a significant variable in effecting the size of party at 
the state level.
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73 Concluding remarks and areas fo r future research
My thesis investigates the size of the party system in India at different levels. It 
studies the determinants of the Indian party system using alternative theories, and 
provides empirical evidence about the effects of institutional, sociological and 
contextual factors on the size of the party systems in the Indian states.
To conclude, my research achieves many important objectives, and also highlights 
key areas for future research on party systems, especially of a comparative nature. It 
undertakes a systematic review of the application of Duverger’s Law to the Indian 
case using a comprehensive database and alternative methods. My research provides 
a comparative empirical analysis of the party systems at the state level in India. To 
do so, it constructs a comprehensive data set covering all the general elections in 
India, identifies and quantifies important determinants of party systems, and 
systematically examines their affect on the party systems in the Indian states, using 
alternative arguments, and regression models. A major objective of my work has 
been to research general patterns in the size of the party systems in the Indian states, 
and to provide an empirical framework to study its determinants. While previous 
research on the Indian party systems has been descriptive, focussing on specific 
states or elections, my study takes a comparative and empirical approach.
My research also highlights that Indian party system can be studied at the district, 
state or national level, and explains (Chapter 6) how party systems at these levels are 
related. While studying party systems at any of these levels has its merits and 
importance, I argue for the growing importance of party systems at the state level.
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The trends in Indian politics especially in the last decade also show that party system 
at the national level has now become a sum of distinct state level party systems, and 
electoral competition is between two coalitions each of which consists of one major 
national party, and many state level parties. My research aims at highlighting the 
importance of state level party systems in understanding the political situation in 
India.
Previous comparative work on Indian party system has focused at the national level, 
ignoring the heterogeneity of the Indian states. My methodology of undertaking a 
comparative study of party systems in Indian states overcomes this limitation of the 
existing literature, and provides an alternative approach to study party systems in 
India. My results also highlight that with the demand for smaller states, one can 
expect further fragmentation of party systems, and more state level parties, and a 
reduction of the size of party systems at the state level.
My research provides directions for future comparative research on party systems in 
India. An important finding of my research relates to the importance of electoral 
rules on party systems. India had adopted SMPS without a legal electoral threshold. 
An expected outcome of SMPS is that it tends to reduce the size of the party system, 
and this was one reason for its adoption in India after its independence. However, 
SMPS has off late not been successful at providing definitive mandate to a party to 
form the government, and the national party system has fragmented into many state 
level party systems. Furthermore, it can also be argued that Indian democracy and 
political system has matured, and the time has come to reassess the usefulness of 
continuing with SMSP, and introduce PR of some kind, so that different social
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groups are given their due. Further, introduction of PR may not necessarily lead to 
political instability, if its design takes into account the Indian situation. However, 
since this will have a major effect on the political system and Indian democracy, this 
issue requires careful examination, and is a rich area for future research.
As state level politics becomes important, smaller parties have better chances of 
gaining votes and seats. Through their growing importance, smaller parties also stand 
to gain more power in negotiating ministerial berths, and affecting policy outcomes. 
There also remains a rich potential to apply the Power indices theory (for example 
see Shapley and Shubik, 1969) to ascertain whether and to what extent small parties 
operating at state level have gained disproportionate power in comparison with their 
vote and seat shares. Finally, party aggregation at state level is an important area of 
further research which has been identified and discussed in my research.
There are some explanatory variables this research does not address. The effect of 
political leadership is one such factor, which is gaining in importance, and is difficult 
to incorporate in an empirical study. The increasing importance of state and regional 
politics in India is also attributable to the success of leaders of these parties in 
mobilising votes for their parties. This factor and the nature of its effect of party 
systems is however difficult to measure, and presents an interesting area for future 
researchers. Thus, it will be interesting to research how the personalities and 
ambitions of political leaders influence the party system in the Indian states.
A key question for political scientists studying Indian party system will have to be 
the very definition of a political party. With coalition politics becoming a regular
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feature of Indian political system, and the emergence of electoral alliances between 
parties, it is becoming difficult to define a political party for analytical purposes. 
Thus, if two or more parties contest elections not as individual parties but as a 
coalition, should we not use these alliances rather than their component parties as the 
unit of comparative analyses?
My research thus provides many areas and ideas for future researchers to study the 
Indian party system and its determinants. Beyond Indian politics, my research can 
stimulate comparative research for other countries at the sub-national level using a 
similar research design. Researchers can also attempt to think about better ways of 
modelling contextual factors to incorporate them in future comparative studies.
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APPENDIX A - Effective number of Parties for Incomplete Data
Taagepera (1997) suggests following methodology to compute the effective number 
of parties in absence of complete data on the vote-share and the seat-share of all 
parties. If the data is incomplete, common practices include either omitting this data 
of smaller parties and independent candidates from the analysis, or to club the share 
of all these parties one ‘Others’ category. Taagepera shows that both these practices 
produce distorted measures of the effective number of parties. Let R represent the 
share of the ‘Others’ category, and ft, be the vote share of the party getting least 
share (for which separate data is available). He demonstrates that treating R as a 
single party for India during for the 1962 -  84 data yields ENP of 4.10, which is too 
low compared to Lijphart’s (1994:169-172) calculation of 4.32. However, 
subtracting R altogether, as if ‘Other’ votes did not exist, he obtains 3.45, a figure 
close to the one reported by Chhibber and Kollman (1996). This obviously is a vast 
underestimate of ENP.
He suggests following practical guide to improve the ENP calculations in absence of 
complete data.
Simplest Method
Add ‘Others’ without squaring in the ENP formula.
Best Method (in the Absence o f Other Information)
Take the mean of extremes
(1) Add ‘Others’ as 0, and calculate ENP.
(2) Add ‘Others’ as the lower of R2 or (PlR) and calculate ENP.
(3) Take the average of ENP under (1) and (2).
A No-No
Do not merely square the ‘Others’. Here the results will be unrealistically low,
D o not omit ‘Others’ from the total. One would obtain utterly unrealistic ENP.
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APPENDIX B -  Electoral Reforms Index
Reform s 1957 1977 2004195 196.2 1967 121 1984 1985 1989 1991 1992 1996 1998 1999
Verifiable criteria to be 
registered as a voter
Right to establish a party
Right to campaign on 
equal ba§i?________
Egual access to media
Restrictions on 
candidature, parties' 
activities and campaign 
rights
Effective, impartial 
registration of voter
Funding of political 
parties___________
Impartial election 
personnel
Updating of electoral 
rolls_______________
Code of conduct
Integrity of counting 
votes_____________
Non-partisan media 
coverage
Secret ballot
Exp. Observers
Independent authority to 
deal with complaints
Election expenditure 
limits______________
Anti-defection law
Electronic voting 
machines______
Candidates' Affidavits on 
the Internet____________
Total 12 12 12 15 15 15H 15 15 16 IS
Based on Election Commission of India’s reports
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APPENDIX C -  Snapshot of data points at state level
State level Analysis
Details of data points for the Indian states
STATE/Union Territory Number of 
data points
Election
years
Andaman Nicobar islands 11 1967-2004
Ajmer 1 1951
Andhra Pradesh 13 1957-2004
Arunachal Pradesh 9 1977 - 2004
Assam 13 1951 - 2004
Bhopal 1 1951
Bihar 14 1951 -2004
Bilaspur 1 1951
Bombay 2 1951 -1957
Chandigarh 11 1967-2004
Chhhatisgarh 1 2004
Coorg 1 1951
Dadar Nagar Haveli 11 1967-2004
Daman and Diu 6 1989-2004
Delhi 14 1951 -2004
Goa 8 1980-2004
Goa,daman and Diu 3 1971 - 1980
Gujarat 12 1962-2004
Haryana 11 1967-2004
Himachal Pradesh 14 1951-2004
Hyderabad 1 1951
Jammu and Kashmir 10 1967-2004
Jharkhand 1 2004
Karnataka 9 1977-2004
Kerala 13 1957-2004
Kutch 1 1951
Lakshwadweep 9 1977-2004
LM islands 2 1967-1971
Madhya Bharat 1 1951
Madhya Pradesh 14 1951 -2004
Maharahstra 12 1962-2004
Manipur 14 1951 -2004
Meghalaya 9 1977-2004
Mizoram 9 1977 - 2004
Mysore 5 1951 -1971
Nagaland 11 1967-2004
Orissa 14 1951 -2004
Patiala and E Punjab 1 1951
Pondicherry 11 1967-2004
Punjab 14 1951 -2004
Rajasthan 14 1952-2004
Saurashtra 1 1951
Sikkim 9 1980-2004
Tamil Nadu 14 1951 -2004
Travancore Cochin 1 1951
Tripura 14 1951 -2004
Uttar Pradesh 14 1951 -2004
Uttaranchal 1 2004
Vindhya Pradesh 1 1951
West Bengal 14 1951 -2004
Total 401 1951 - 2004
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APPENDIX D -  Effective number of Social groups
(1) As far as possible, the data should be from the same source; this will ensure 
integrity of the data.74
(2) The social groups should be clearly defined, and only those social groups 
should be included, for which reliable information is available for all the 
states and periods; this will ensure consistency of data.
(3) The social groups should not overlap with religious groupings; this will
ensure that the explanatory variables are distinct.
(4) The steps for constructing this measure index are detailed below
a. I take the total proportion in a state to be P = 1
b. I source the population proportion of the following groups from the
Indian census data.
Scheduled castes (SCP) T
Scheduled castes (STP) J  Caste-based groups
Muslims (MUS)
Jains (J)
c. The balance non (1 -  SCP -  STP -  MUS -  J) represents the total 
proportion of non SC/ST population of
Hindus (H)
Sikhs (S')
Buddhists (B ’)
Others (O)
d. From this total I obtain individual groups (H\ S ’, B \ O’) using the 
total proportions of Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Other religions 
respectively in India’s population.75
e. Thus, I obtain non-overlapping population percentages of religious 
(MUS, J, H ’, S ’ B ’,O ’) and two caste-based (SCP, STP) groups in the 
Indian population
(5) I use these percentages to calculate ESG using equation 5-2, but replacing 
religious groups by the abow social groups.76
The above procedure enables the computation of ESG which includes religious and 
SC and ST groupings in the Indian states.
74I source my data on social and religious groups from the Census o f India (various years).
75There are no SC and ST among Jain and Muslim population.
76Following Taagepera’s (1998), the share of ‘Others’ category is added without squaring it for my 
computation.
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